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1.1. Fifty shades of green 
Green et al. (2005) revived the debate on how to reconcile farming production with nature 
preservation. Their study emphasises two schools of thought: wildlife-friendly farming - which aims to 
integrate the provision of environmental goods within the farming production process, but may reduce 
agricultural yield – and, land sparing - which aims to increase agricultural yield in order to reduce the demand 
for farmland. The wildlife-friendly approach has received support in Europe and today the rural 
development programs within the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) provide payments to farmers to shift 
towards a more extensive mode of production and to minimize negative externalities. The land sparing 
approach goes beyond the farming system and argues that the former approach would require a larger area 
of farmland to meet food production targets. It suggests, instead, freeing farmers of any environmental 
requirements and increasing yield on already converted lands, thereby reducing the pressure on natural 
habitat and ultimately returning former farmland back to natural area. Such an approach is mostly advocated 
in development literature (Lee and Barrett, 2001). Nevertheless, in reality, a range of mixed approaches exist 
between both paradigms and choices are often driven by landscape and its biophysical properties, historical 
evolution and socio-economic context (Fischer et al., 2008). The present study focuses on the integration 
of environmental policy into the European agricultural policy and more specifically on the greening of the 
CAP during the last reform, but parallels are made with other country’s policies where relevant. 
The integration of environmental issues into international law was formally recognised in 1992, 
during the United Nations conference on the environment and development, in Rio. Since then, agricultural 
policy has integrated the management of natural resources by requiring or incentivising farmers to 
contribute, maintain or restore certain environmental attributes. Governments across the globe sponsor 
several environmental programs aimed at more environmentally friendly farming practices, or sanction 
farmers who fail to comply with a set of environmental rules. The current CAP reflects this dichotomy 
between promoting and sanctioning with its two pillar structure. Pillar I is oriented towards production and 
withholds payments if farmers do not comply with a set of environmental rules, while Pillar II promotes 
sustainable rural development. The rationale behind rural development programs is that farmers, by 
producing positive environmental externalities and/or reducing negative externalities, will deviate from the 
economically optimal decision. Consequently, governments compensate for farmers’ economic losses and, 
in so doing, address the market failure to internalize environmental concerns (Baylis et al., 2008). However, 
the rationale behind the integration of environmental concerns within Pillar I of the CAP remains unclear 
and is discussed further on. 
The integration of environmental policy into agricultural policy has been a slow process driven by 
historical developments, international and socio-economic contexts, leading eventually to the latest CAP 
reform in 2013 and the greening of the direct payment systems. The “greening” refers to the introduction 
of three main measures deemed beneficial for the environment and the climate, namely: crop diversification, 
maintenance of permanent grassland and dedicating 5% of arable land to Ecological Focus Area (EFA). 
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The crop diversification measure aims to tackle the issue of decreasing diversity in agricultural 
landscapes - in other words the presence of monocultures. Farmers are required to have a minimum of two 
crops if they have between 10 and 30 ha of arable land. If they have more than 30 ha, they need to have 
three crops. The first crop cannot cover more than 75% of the arable land, and in cases involving more 
than 30 ha of arable land, the first two crops are not allowed to cover more than 95% of the arable land  
(Council of the European Union, 2012). Regarding permanent grassland, Members States (MS) need to 
ensure that the ratio of permanent grassland area to total Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) does not fall by 
more than 5% compared to the baseline year (2012), plus arable land converted to permanent grassland in 
2015. MS could choose whether to implement this ratio at national, regional or farm level. Finally, farmers 
with arable areas exceeding 15 ha must ensure that at least 5% of such areas is an EFA. EFAs cover a broad 
range of features. MS could choose which list of features to define as EFA from which their farmers can 
choose. All MS except the Netherlands and Romania decided that set-aside land qualifies for EFA 
(European Commission, 2015). However, contrary to Pillar II of the CAP, this set of measures is mandatory 
in the sense that if farmers do not comply with them 30% of their direct payments will be withdrawn. In 
order to better understand the current rationale, we briefly describe the major steps in the integration of 
environmental concerns into agricultural policy, and we focus particularly on the first pillar of the CAP (for 
a more thorough review see Matthews (2013) and Erjavec and Erjavec (2015)). 
The first green shift in the CAP happened in 1992 with the MacSharry reform. In the 70s and 80s 
the European Union (EU) was a victim of its own success in guaranteeing food supply and it swung 
decisively into surplus for most commodities. Support linked to production level led to a costly 
accumulation of stocks. The reform cut price support for key commodities, compensated farmers with 
direct payments, and introduced compulsory set-aside. Coupled direct payments were established on the 
basis of historical references and were therefore limited to predetermined quantities. By providing direct 
payments the EU aimed to reduce the negative externalities from intensive farming systems while set-aside 
was not yet perceived as a tool to promote environmental goods, but rather as a tool to reduce production 
volume. 
The assessment of the 1992 reform from an environmental point of view was rather mixed (Winter, 
2000). If the use of fertilisers and pesticides decreased overall, there was considerable variation between 
Member States (MS), with a reduction in high input countries and an increase in most other countries. By 
then, researchers had already highlighted the need to strengthen the link between crop and livestock 
production, and suggested a more targeted environmental policy which would take into account the 
heterogeneity in farming systems and landscapes (Winter, 2000; Holland et al., 1994). Furthermore, with the 
1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, European agricultural policy became subject to 
international governance through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Consequently, with the 
anticipation of the new World Trade Organisation (WTO) rounds and the expansion of the EU to 
incorporate new countries, the Agenda 2000 reform further emphasised the shift from market price support 
towards direct income support in line with the McSharry reform. Additionally, the Agenda 2000 reform 
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introduced Pillar II of the CAP with the rural development policy. However, if the reform intended to 
integrate more environmental concerns into Pillar I, it was left to MS to decide whether they would sanction 
or promote farmers respecting certain environmental rules. In fact, the European Commission rationale 
was: “The philosophy underpinning the environmental aspects of CAP reform is that farmers should be 
expected to observe basic environmental standards without compensation. However, wherever society 
desires that farmers deliver an environmental service beyond this base-line level, this service should be 
specifically purchased through the agri-environment measures.”(European Commission, 1999). Hence, MS 
could define the minimum baseline level through cross-compliance and so apply the “Polluter-Pays-
Principle”, or they could decide that the provision of public goods goes beyond farmers’ normal activities 
through the rural development program and apply the “Provider-Gets-Principle”. This bivalence still 
remains in the current CAP. 
Under the pressure of the WTO, the 2003 reform of the CAP set the baseline level for 
environmental services by making cross-compliance mandatory (Swinbank and Daugbjerg, 2006). Not only 
did cross-compliance become mandatory, MS had to maintain their ratio of permanent pasture. The reform 
introduced the decoupling of production from direct payments through the “Single Payment Scheme” and 
a modulation mechanism in order to initiate a shift of budget from Pillar I to Pillar II (Schmid, Sinabell and 
Hofreither, 2007). Regarding cross-compliance policy, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 2010): “Cross-compliance neither pursues an income support 
objective nor is it the primary mechanism for enforcing environmental legislation. Rather, cross compliance 
is a tool linking payment schemes to the respect of a wide array of environmental requirements and fostering 
adherence to them”. Indeed, as its basis, the adherence to cross-compliance is voluntary for farmers. In 
principle, farmers will enforce cross-compliance only if the cost of enforcement is lower than the amount 
of retained payment (H. Bennett et al., 2006). Hence, we can question whether cross-compliance constitutes 
a baseline, since farmers can choose whether or not to enforce what is stated as basic environmental 
standards (Matthews, 2013). Furthermore, such policy does not target all farmers evenly, but rather focuses 
on farmers who were historically eligible for most of the agricultural support and not those in the most 
environmental sensitive areas nor those where the highest environmental value would be achieved. If cross-
compliance was seen as a tool to better integrate environmental standards into agricultural policy, it also 
increased the acceptance of direct payments under Pillar I by the civil society and the international scene. 
The Health Check in 2008 was in line with the 2003 reform with a further transfer of budget from 
Pillar I to Pillar II, a simplification of cross compliance and a further decoupling of the remaining coupled 
support. In 2013, the EU enacted the CAP for the period 2014-2020. In order to further integrate 
environmental concerns, the EU had two options: to strengthen Pillar II and to further enhance the 
promotion of targeted environmental policy through agro-environmental measures, or to strengthen cross-
compliance policy by enlarging its scope and the number of farmers affected. Instead, the reform introduced 
a new policy tool, the “Greening” of the CAP. The goals of the European Commission were to apply a 
universal set of measures to all farmers, to avoid a watering down of the policy by MS, to frame a policy 
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incentive rather than a policy requirement, to link environmental standards to Pillar I in order to ensure the 
legitimacy of direct payment. The introduction of the greening requirement illustrates the struggle by the 
EU to integrate environmental policy while at the same time supporting farmers in need, between promoting 
or sanctioning, between the “Provider-Gets-Principle” and the “Polluter-Pays-Principle”, between targeted 
flexible payments and a universal baseline level. In the end, the greening requirements are a mixture of both, 
aiming to be the same for all farmers in all MS, but with exemptions and a list of different options for MS 
and where enforcement of the legislation is problematic. Today, academics and Non-Governmental 
Organisations seriously question the effectiveness of such policy and ask that any payments made to farmers 
be linked to environmental services which are targeted, measurable and progress towards better integration 
of livestock and crop systems (European Envionmental Bureau and BirdLife, 2016; Matthews, 2015; Moore, 
2016; Pe’er et al., 2014; Mouysset, 2014; Kirchner, Schönhart and Schmid, 2016; Balmann et al., 2010) . 
Furthermore, the reform of the CAP has reintroduced the opportunity to grant Voluntary Coupled Support 
(VCS) for specific farm types or sectors, representing 4.1% of the total amount of direct support in the EU. 
Almost all MS chose to support the cattle sector, headed by the beef and veal sector, accounting for 41% 
of the budget dedicated to VCS, followed by the dairy sector with 20% of this budget and by the sheep and 
goat sector with 11% of the budget (European Commission, 2015c). Coupled support is classified by the 
OECD as an environmentally harmful (Schmid et al., 2007) and trade distortive instrument. The reforms of 
2000 and 2003 intended to eliminate such types of support. The main argument was to support agricultural 
sectors that are particularly important for economic, social or environmental reasons and which face certain 
difficulties. They should take the form of an annual payment and be granted within defined quantitative 
limits. 
This dissertation contributes to the impact assessment of the greening measures by analysing the 
farm-level and regional-level responses and comparing these responses to two suggested alternative policy 
instruments. The first proposed policy instrument is a premium per hectare for permanent grassland. The 
second proposed instrument is a Counter Cyclical Capacity Payment (CCCP) for set-aside land. We suggest 
that set-aside land should be considered as a reserve agricultural capacity. This will provide a premium per 
hectare of set aside land, that is inversely correlated to commodity prices. 
The option of a premium per hectare for permanent grassland would increase the competitiveness 
of permanent grassland and would ultimately lead to a decrease in forage costs. Similarly to VCS, it would 
indirectly support the livestock sector. However, in contrast to VCS, the provision of coupled support linked 
to permanent grassland instead of headage payments is expected to favour extensive livestock production 
and enhance the provision of environmental benefits. Indeed, permanent grassland provides more 
environmental and societal benefits than a feed and crop feed system such as corn silage. Additionally, by 
simulating the introduction of a premium per hectare for permanent grassland, we can determine the 
premium level for which permanent grassland would be maintained according to a given base year. Hence, 
the derived premium reflects the current opportunity costs for the maintenance of permanent grassland 
under the greening requirements of the CAP. 
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Set-aside land is recognised for its positive environmental impact. While the set-aside policy can be 
viewed through an environmental lens, we propose to also look at set-aside land in terms of agricultural 
capacity. Indeed, the agricultural sector exhibits high volatility prices with an inelastic demand. Given the 
risk averse nature of farmers, we consider set-aside land as a reserve agricultural capacity. The rationale 
underpinning reserve agricultural capacity is that in times of low commodity prices farmers will receive an 
incentive to withdraw land from production and vice-versa. In this case, it would promote the building of a 
agricultural production capacity buffering against the impact of price volatility, while providing 
environmental goods at the lowest opportunity cost. In this configuration, set-aside land could play a role 
beyond the provision of environmental goods by mitigating farm income volatility and even price volatility 
for processors or consumers of agricultural commodities. 
1.2. Greening and the new challenges for modellers 
Section 1.1 outlines the context of the research questions: the shift in the CAP from market-based policy 
instrument to farm-level decoupled subsidies and requirements. The introduction of the greening measures 
poses new methodological challenges for agricultural policy modellers. The greening measures are farm 
specific and intend to change the land allocation at farm level. Consequently, any ex-ante assessment should 
be able to take into account farm-level specificity and take up certain challenges. This section highlights the 
main modelling challenges associated with the greening of the CAP and then discusses our proposal to 
tackle them. 
1.2.1. Challenges for modellers  
 Self-selection bias: 
The crop diversification measure aims to stimulate farms to adopt an additional crop within their 
crop plan. In a sample of farmers, farmers do not produce all available crops but a subset of them. The 
choice to produce or not reflects farmers’ preferences, technological limitations, or environmental concerns, 
etc… In fact, the reasoning behind the farmer’s decision whether or not to grow a crop is not known to 
policy modellers. This phenomenon is called the self-selection problem (Paris, 2001). It refers to the fact 
that a typical farm produces only a limited set of crops without a clear economic underpinning. In such 
situations, not accounting for farmer heterogeneity would yield inconsistent estimates of the impact of the 
crop diversification measure (Barrett et al., 2004; Crost et al., 2007; Kabunga, Dubois and Qaim, 2012). 
 Substitution patterns: 
One of the main challenges of agricultural policy models is that they lie at the interface between 
biological systems and the social system. The integration of nature and the social system exhibits complex 
relationships, playing at different scales (Antle and Capalbo, 2001). The substitution patterns between the 
different inputs are the essential relationships driving responses to policy or price shocks. Social scientists 
often take into account the embedded nonlinearity intrinsic to biological systems by approximating a 
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production function via a Taylor polynomial. However, such an approach may have some drawbacks. First 
of all, we can question the interpretability of some estimated parameters such as interaction terms (Ai and 
Norton, 2003; Greene, 2010; Heckelei, Britz and Zhang, 2012; Mérel and Howitt, 2014). Second, nonlinear 
phenomena, such as threshold effects, are numerous. Biological systems may respond to an incremental 
change with a sudden regime shift. It is not only biological systems that may respond in a nonlinear fashion. 
Farm management decisions regarding the allocation and the expansion of inputs also exhibit threshold 
effects, for instance the substitution of maize forage by permanent grassland. The introduction of 
permanent grassland maintenance or ecological focus area requirements demands that policy modellers 
accurately simulate substitution patterns and their accompanying unknown threshold effects. 
 Aggregation bias: 
Policy impact assessments have been mostly carried out with a certain level of aggregation and this 
also applies to analysis of the greening measures (Pelikan, Britz and Hertel, 2015; Cortignani and Dono, 
2015; Solazzo, Donati and Arfini, 2015). Such models often, aggregate and simplify representations of 
heterogeneous farm decisions. Often, representative farms are constructed representing a subset of farmers 
and encompassing all farmers’ activities. Hence, aggregate models may display a different supply response 
from the actual aggregate behaviour of individuals. Aggregation was necessary due to data availability 
constraints, or computational difficulties in modelling all farmers. Aggregation was also performed to ensure 
representativeness. However, aggregated models implicitly assume a certain degree of substitution between 
farmers. For instance for a regional model, forage surplus of some farmers will compensate forage deficits 
of other farmers in the same region at no costs. In reality, forage might not always be tradable and certainly 
not without incurring a cost, leading to unrealistic results. 
 Uncertainty:  
The shift from market price supports to decoupled payment has exposed farmers to the intrinsic 
price volatility of agricultural commodities. Sckokai and Moro (2006) show the importance of assessing the 
impact of CAP reforms on farm income variability. So far, uncertainty has been mostly incorporated in 
“pure” econometric farm-level models (Oude Lansink, 1999; Carpentier et al., 2015). The introduction of 
risk and uncertainty in a farm-level model is challenging, since it often requires a larger amount of data than 
is available (Arata et al., 2014). 
 Data availability: 
One of the main challenges, which also relates to the abovementioned issues, is the availability of 
data. For the EU, only the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) provides microeconomic data 
harmonised between MS and can be used to model the impact of farm income and land-use changes. 
However, FADN lacks representativeness for most variables except for holding size and holding 
specialisation. Despite a growing number of farm-level modelling exercises, most of the models are specified 
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for a specific location and use other data sources, hence making the reuse of them difficult (Ciaian et al., 
2013). 
1.2.2. A non-parametric response 
In the EU, one of the most widely used types of model to simulate the impact of the CAP is Positive 
Mathematical Programming (PMP). Heckelei et al. (2012) and Mérel and Howitt (2014) review the 
methodological developments and the applications of PMP. In order to account for the self-selection 
problem, Paris (2001) proposed using a symmetrical positive equilibrium problem methodology, where 
sample aggregated cost functions are used to derive the missing information in individual farms’ cost 
functions for crops that are not cultivated. Unfortunately, a model based purely on statistics for gross 
margins of different crops cannot incorporate agent heterogeneity. In this study, we tackle the self-selection 
problem by proposing a non-parametric simulation model to predict land-cover changes, assuming that 
farmers may adopt the crop configuration of one of their peers. 
One of the strengths of PMP is the explicit introduction of farm management practices (nitrogen 
use, tillage, irrigation etc.). However, it also requires econometric estimation of a production function, often 
a variable cost function, typically taking a quadratic form. The main disadvantage of econometrically 
estimating a production function lies in the rationalisation of the chosen functional form and in the bias due 
to functional form misspecification. Non-parametric approaches based on the identification of peers have 
also been used to estimate the impact of policy change. The main disadvantage of a non-parametric model 
is its sensitivity to noise. Hence, we perform an output validation for two methods, a parametric and a non-
parametric approach, against synthetic data and assess the capability of the models in terms of revealing an 
unknown substitution pattern.  
Based on the validation exercise, and in order to simulate the impact of the maintenance of 
permanent grassland and ecological focus areas, we develop a non-parametric farm-type regional model. 
This non-parametric farm-type regional model addresses the self-selection problem by assuming that 
farmers will adopt, either fully or partially, the activity mix of one of their peers or their own historical 
activity mix. The model addresses aggregation bias by simultaneously embedding individual production 
possibility constraints and partitioning farm-type regional responses into individual responses. To the best 
of our knowledge, it is the only study taking full advantage of the three dimensions of information available 
in FADN: unbalanced panel information at farm level, cross-sectional information at farm level and 
balanced panel information at farm-type regional level. Finally, such an approach enables us to introduce 
price uncertainty in a simple and straightforward way. 
1.3. Objective and research questions 
The objectives of this dissertation are threefold. First, we investigate the impact of the greening 
requirements at farm level on land-use change and, when data is available, on farm income. Second, we 
simulate alternative policies which could potentially achieve similar environmental targets. A premium per 
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ha of permanent grassland could potentially support the livestock sector similarly to the current VCS  but 
at a lower cost, while at the same time it insures the maintenance of permanent grassland. A CCCP for set-
aside land could achieve the same level of set-aside at farm and regional level compared to the current 
requirement, while at the same time it could decrease production surplus in times of low commodity prices 
and reduce farm income volatility. Third, we develop a non-parametric mathematical programming model 
addressing self-selection bias, substitution patterns, aggregation bias and uncertainty. Specifically, this 
dissertation will seek to answer the following research questions: 
(1). Does the greening measure, crop diversification, increase crop diversity? 
(2). What is the opportunity cost for the maintenance of permanent grassland and could it be 
replaced by a premium per hectare? 
(3). Does a CCCP for fallow land deliver similar environmental benefits to EFA and could it 
reduce farm income variability? 
(4). What is the best approach to address the methodological challenges linked to the 
introduction of greening measures? 
1.4. Outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation is a compilation of individual studies where each study contributes to answering, 
either fully or partially, the abovementioned research questions. Each chapter can be read as a stand-alone 
piece of work where findings go beyond the overarching theme of the dissertation. Repetitions between 
chapters are kept to a minimum and references are made to other chapters when necessary. 
Figure 1-1 presents the outline of the dissertation and how the different chapters address the 
modelling challenge described in section 1.2.1 and the greening measures and alternative policy instruments. 
Chapter 2 presents a non-parametric simulation model to predict land-cover changes while tackling the self-
selection problem. We study the impact of crop diversification on land use and the Shannon diversity index 
(SHDI) is used as an indicator to measure the policy impact on crop diversity. Chapter 3 proposes an output 
validation methodology that enables researchers to test the performance of their model when they know 
that biophysical relationships might impact the underlying data-generating process. Two model types are 
compared: a parametric approach versus a non-parametric approach. Chapter 4 evaluates the impact of the 
maintenance of permanent grassland measure on farm income and land use and compares its efficiency to 
a premium per hectare for permanent grassland. The methodology developed further elaborates the 
methodology introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 while tackling the issue of aggregation bias. Chapter 5 simulates 
a CCCP for set-aside land by taking into account price uncertainty and its impact on farm income variability 
and land-use change. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes, provides some policy recommendations and possible 
future researches. 
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Figure 1-1. Outline of the dissertation and issues addressed by the different chapters 
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Chapter 2. Simulating farm-level response to crop diversification policy 
 
Abstract 
One of the new political instruments of the European Common Agricultural Policy-reform is the 
crop diversification measure. To comply with this measure, arable farmers will be required to grow a 
minimum number of crops on their land, in given proportions. In this paper, a non-parametric simulation 
model is developed to predict land cover changes while tackling the self-selection problem. Farmers’ 
behaviour is based on their closest peer’s behaviour. A comparison between the results for diversity, 
measured through the Shannon Diversity Index, and the policy impact on farms, shows a clear trade-off 
and the potential for targeting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published as: Mahy, L., B.E.T.I. Dupeux, G. Van Huylenbroeck, and J. Buysse. 2015. “Simulating farm level 
response to crop diversification policy.” Land Use Policy, 45:36–42
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2.1. Introduction 
Agriculture is one of the most important land uses and its management practices have substantial 
impacts on the environment. Policy makers are trying to reduce the negative impacts and reinforce the 
positive ones through environmental regulation. One of the recent outcomes of this process is the greening 
of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). One measure in this greening package, which aims to 
improve the diversity of agricultural landscapes, is crop diversification. 
Evaluation of this measure is challenging for traditional policy simulation models. Assessing the 
impact using a regional simulation model is inadequate, because the policy measure is very specifically 
targeted at individual farm level. Crop diversification aims to stimulate farms to introduce an additional crop 
within their crop plan. Existing farm-level positive mathematical programming models (Buysse, Van 
Huylenbroeck and Lauwers (2007)) have difficulty with the evaluation of crop diversification because of the 
so-called self-selection problem. The self-selection problem refers to the fact that a typical farm produces 
only a limited set of crops without a clear economic underpinning (Paris, 2001). In order to tackle the self-
selection problem and recover the missing price information for the non-produced crops at fam level, Paris 
(2001) used instead the average prices of the sample. Paris assumed that farmers are well aware of prices, 
costs, and technical coefficients for every crops and that this information is reflected by the average prices, 
accounting costs and technical coefficients. The missing information is recovered in a profit maximisation 
setting (see Paris, 2001). Hence, Paris’ approach suffers from several limitations. First it does not account 
for non-economic factors to explain crop choices. Second, by using average prices, the advantages of 
incorporating agent-level heterogeneity are lost (Rounsevell, Robinson and Murray-Rust, 2012). Finally, the 
interpretation of the behavioural assumptions are debatable (Britz, Heckelei and Wolff, 2003)., 
Consequently, such models are also unable to deal with decisions about whether or not to produce an 
additional crop, whereas this is exactly what is needed to simulate the crop diversification policy measure. 
Therefore, this chapter proposes and develops a non-parametric mathematical programming model 
based on peer behaviour, to predict the ex-ante impact at farm and landscape level. The Shannon diversity 
index (SHDI) is used as an indicator to measure the policy impact on crop diversity. This is currently the 
most widely used landscape diversity index and has been implemented within the CAPRI model1 
(Mittenzwei et al., 2007). The following section 2.2 is an introduction to the policy proposal analysed, 
followed by a methodological section 2.3, where the assumptions and the calculation of the model are 
described. Afterwards, section 2.4 outlines the simulated changes in farm-level crop allocations and 
landscape diversity. The final section 2.5 contains the conclusion, discussion and some suggestions for 
future research. 
                                                     
1 The Common Agricultural Policy Regionalized Impact model has been developed by European Commission 
research funds and is now the most widely used model by the European Commission to evaluate ex-ante impacts of 
the Common Agricultural Policy and trade policies on production, income, markets, trade, and the environment, from 
global to regional scale. 
Simulating crop diversification policy 
13 
 
2.2. The EU's crop diversification measure 
The latest reform of the CAP  introduced that 30% of farmers’ direct payments are conditional on 
three agri-environmental measures. The crop diversification measure aims to tackle the issue of decreasing 
diversity in agricultural landscapes - in other words the presence of monocultures. More diversified 
agricultural landscapes in time and space are supposed to increase soil- and ecosystem resilience (Weibull, 
Östman and Granqvist, 2003; Swift, Izac and van Noordwijk, 2004; Lin, 2011; Schouten et al., 2013). 
Farmers are required to have a minimum of two crops if they have between 10 and 30 ha of arable land2. If 
they have more than 30 ha, they need to have three crops. The first crop cannot cover more than 75% of 
the arable land, and in cases involving more than 30 ha of arable land, the first two crops are not allowed to 
cover more than 95% of the arable land3 (Council of the European Union, 2012). 
During the “trilogue” the European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP) and the 
Council of the European Union came up with their own proposals. Finally, a compromise was reached 
(further referred to as Final proposal). Some differences between these proposals are: 
(1). Each proposal has different proportional requirements for different farm categories. The EC 
proposes to treat all farms above 3 ha equally. They need to have a minimum of 3 crops, the first 
of which should cover less than 70% of the arable land, the third should cover at least 5%. The EP, 
the Council and the final proposal have adapted requirements for smaller farms. Farmers with 
between 10 and 30 ha of arable land need to have 2 crops, and those above 30 ha 3 crops. Yet, 
there are some small variations in the percentages these crops should cover. 
(2). The Council exempts some farms from diversification requirements. Those with large parts of their 
arable land covered with leguminous crops, grassland, herbaceous forage or fallow; as well as 
farmers who interchange parts of their land and provide in-crop rotation through this interchange. 
The EC exempts farmers with all of their arable land covered by grassland or fallow. The EP has 
no exemptions. The final proposal is a mixture of the three other proposals. 
(3). It is also important to note that the Council adopts a different definition of ‘crop’ within its 
proposal. Additional to the EC and EP definitions of crops at genus level, the Council's proposal 
considers summer and winter varieties as distinct crops. Moreover, regarding the Brassicaceae, 
Solanaeceae, Cucurbitaceae families and the genus Triticum, the distinctions between crops are 
proposed at species level by the Council rather than at genus level. The Council's crop definition 
was adopted in the final proposal, except for the genus Triticum, which is treated as a genus as with 
                                                     
2 Arable land, as considered by the European institutions, hence in this paper, is distinct from land covered 
by permanent grassland and – crops. These permanent covers are non-rotational. They are considered as such as soon 
as they occupy the land for five consecutive years or longer (European Commission, 2011c)  
3 There are also a series of exemptions relating to land cover considered ecologically valuable, eg. grassland 
and land lying fallow (a complete overview of the final proposal can be found in (Council of the European Union, 
2012) 
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most other crops (European Commission, 2011c; Council of the European Union, 2013a; 
European Parliament, 2016). 
By simulating the impact of the different proposals, we indirectly capture the participation of small 
farmers to landscape diversity. Indeed, only the EC proposal requires that farmers below 10ha must grow 
three crops. We can also investigate the impact of the different grassland exemptions granted by the EC 
and Council, unlike the EP proposal which does not treat grassland differently. Finally, the definition of 
‘crops’ in the Council proposal and in the final implementation give more flexibility to farmers. Keeping in 
mind that EC shall provide its first report on the performance of the CAP to the EP and the Council by the 
end of 2018 (European Commission, 2015b), a comparison of the different proposals is of particular interest 
by providing a chance to explore possible improvements. 
To test the impact of the four proposals we model the impact of them in the Flemish case. The 
Flemish case is interesting because there are a lot of relatively small farms; it has a dominant crop (maize) 
and it has very detailed spatial information on the crops. The prime question is whether the different crop 
diversification proposals reverse homogenization. Although a positive relationship was found between the 
composition of a crop mosaic and biodiversity (Weibull et al., 2003; Swift et al., 2004; A. F. Bennett, Radford 
and Haslem, 2006; Billeter et al., 2007; Gardiner et al., 2009), we do not quantify or draw conclusions with 
respect to the policy impact on biodiversity. Hence, in this chapter, only the first step of the impact analysis 
on biodiversity is investigated, namely whether or not the crop diversification proposals increase crop 
diversity. The diversification requirement can be perceived as a public claim on former private property 
rights (Rodgers, 2009) and requires cautious implementation, which makes the standard ex-ante impact 
assessment procedures relevant (Thiel, 2009). The methodology suited to perform such an impact 
assessment is described in the following section. 
2.3. Methodology 
As explained in the introduction, neither regional nor farm-level positive mathematical modelling 
techniques are adequate to simulate the impact of crop diversification policies. Therefore, we choose 
another modelling route which is based on ‘mimicking’ behaviour, in the sense that we assume that farmers 
faced with the introduction of a new crop will act similarly to farmers who may already fulfil the crop 
diversification requirement. In other words, we assume they are likely to come to the same conclusion as 
other farmers in the same context. They might even copy the behaviour of a successful peer4 (Polhill, Gotts 
and Law, 2001). This forms the basis of the proposed model. 
To predict the reaction of farmer A to a newly imposed rule that requires him to change his crop 
allocation, we look at farmer B. The relative crop shares of farmer B are projected onto the total area of 
farmer A. To choose this farmer B we take the farmer who best matches farmer A in terms of crop 
                                                     
4 In the context of Chapter 2, ‘peer’ does not refer to the definition found in the Data Envelopment Analysis 
literature. Here, the word ‘peer’ is used to refer to a farmer that is selected given three variables: permanent grassland 
area, the number of crops grown, absolute crop area and distance (see model description). 
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allocation. Of course, only those farms with projections resulting in a new compliant crop configuration for 
farmer A are eligible to be farmer B. This type of approach focuses on observable proxies and the farmers’ 
response. The model is built on the following four assumptions and, as we will discuss, the assumptions 
indirectly allow farmers’ behaviour to reflect more objectives than simply maximizing profit: 
(1). Farmers are rational, and try to get the maximum utility from their activity. 
(2). The observed land allocation is optimal. 
(3). Every non-compliant farmers want to comply and thus change their crop allocation. 
(4). Apart from the crop diversification measure, all other things remain equal or constant 
The first assumption is that every farmer wants to maximize utility. This is probably one of the 
most recurrent assumptions in agricultural economic models. Contrary to many models, we do not limit 
utility to profit (Debertin, 2012; Polhill et al., 2001). Since no explicit monetary value is used in the model, 
utility can be left undefined and comprise all elements considered by the farmer. The second assumption, 
that the observed land allocation is optimal, gives the model a positive basis (Buysse et al., 2007). The farmer 
optimizes his utility by making a decision on the crop allocation he perceives as optimal. This decision is 
determined by many factors (monetary- and non-monetary variables, social- and psychological factors, etc.). 
A first implication of this second assumption is that any imposed deviation from the farmer's 
present allocation obstructs the maximization of his perceived utility. A second implication is that when a 
farmer changes his allocation due to the crop diversification rule, he would follow the reasoning of 
compliant farmers, since they have already made their optimal choices, determined by economic, social and 
other arguments. Both implications together imply that the existing, compliant crop combination that differs 
the least from the farm's current crop allocation can be used as a reference to predict a farmer's reaction to 
a newly imposed constraint - here, the crop diversification measure. 
One of the advantages of this mechanism is that by looking at realized crop combinations, many 
factors can be taken into account - factors often unknown to, or beyond the possibilities of, modellers. For 
example, information on the relationships between crops, such as rotation and complementary machinery, 
or factors determined by the period when the crop choice is made, e.g. weather and prices. Many of these 
factors are equal or shared between farmers. This creates overlap in the individual decision-making contexts. 
By looking at the closest peer, this overlap is maximized. 
A change from the current crop allocation to a new allocation is, in fact, a violation of the 
assumption of optimal choice made by farmers. However, since the environment changes, the optimal 
choice also changes. Hence, we introduce a third assumption, namely that all farmers want to comply. This 
is an overgeneralization. However, direct payments, becoming partially dependent on the crop 
diversification measure, form a considerable proportion of farm income (European Commission, 2011b). 
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For a more demanding greening package than the one actually discussed5, it has been estimated that in 
Belgium the total average cost per eligible6 hectare would be 117 euro. This overestimated cost still comes 
below 30% of the direct payments per hectare (European Commission, 2011b). From this we can infer that 
many farmers could be compelled to comply. Therefore, under the three assumptions indicated, we come 
to full, but minimal, compliance simulations. 
The model decides upon peer farms based on the following four proxy variables: The first one is 
crop areas. By taking into account the individual crop areas we actually take into account three variables: 
which crops the farmers have in common, the area of those individual crops and the total farm area. 
Considering the latter, Danckaert, Deuninck and Gijseghem (2012)) showed that the diversification criteria, 
the number of crops and/or their proportional allocations, depend on the farm size. More precisely, small 
farms comply less with the proposed diversification requirements. This argument, together with the fact 
that policy makers are interested in the impact on different farm sizes and the structural change within the 
sector7 (Buysse et al., 2007), makes it reasonable to use absolute crop areas as the matching variable. Second, 
as a small number of Flemish farms have a high number of crops and the idea is to simulate minimal 
compliance, the eligible peer farms are limited to those with a maximum of two types of crop more than 
the original farm. It is unlikely that a farmer will adopt a high number of new crops because of the crop 
diversification measure, but in some cases farmers will have to adopt a maximum of two new crops. For 
instance, a plus 30 ha mono-cropping farmer growing maize will have to comply with the new regulation by 
growing at least two additional crops. Since we simulate minimal compliance, the chosen peer farmer grows 
maize and (not more than) two other crops. A third variable, the geographical distance between the farms’ 
communities, is also incorporated to further distinguish the peers. A lower distance goes together with 
higher chances of sharing economic, physical and social conditions. Genius et al. (2014) investigate the role 
of information transmission in promoting agricultural technology adoption and diffusion through extension 
services and social learning. They show that a larger stock of adopters in the farmer’s reference group 
induces faster adoption while a greater distance between adopters increases time before adoption.  
A fourth variable is linked to the permanent grassland8. In the reference year, because of the CAP's 
cross-compliance measures, Flemish farmers are also obliged to preserve their area of permanent grassland 
(Danckaert et al., 2012). This will be maintained under the greening measures. To receive the payments 
linked to the crop diversification measure, farmers will also have to maintain at least 95% of their permanent 
grassland (European Commission, 2011c; European Parliament, 2016; Council of the European Union, 
                                                     
5 Option 3 in the impact assessment of the European Commission, with 10% EFA and 70% green cover, 
identical crop diversification and permanent grassland requirements (European Commission, 2011b). 
6 Eligible agricultural area refers to the farm area eligible for direct payments. 
7 Two notes have to be made here. (1) Several proposals increased the lower threshold for the diversification 
rule, so the smallest farms no longer have to comply. (2) Farms that choose the small farmers scheme, a special measure 
that regulates the subsidies for small farmers, do not have to comply with the greening measures to receive their full 
direct payments (European Commission, 2011c). 
8 Grassland is classified as permanent as soon as it remains for 5 years on the same parcel (European 
Commission, 2011c). This is the same criterion as for permanent crops, hence it is not considered arable land. 
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2013a). In other words, lowering a farm's relative area of permanent grassland goes against the incentive for 
crop diversification. On the other hand, increasing the area of permanent grassland goes together with future 
limitations on land use, and thus decreasing land prices for the newly classified permanent grassland 
(Vanoost, 2007). To prevent unrealistic changes, the choice of reference farms B is limited to those with 
relative areas of permanent grassland within a range of 95–100% of the relative permanent grassland area 
of the non-compliant farm A. The inclusion of this variable is supported by expert opinions that indicate 
that farmers have developed a considerable fear of creating nature amenities because of limitations on future 
land-use decisions. 
Finally, the fourth assumption is that all other factors remain equal, the so-called ceteris paribus 
condition. Inherent to ex-ante impact analyses is that one has to make an extraction of reality. One cannot 
know the farmers’ future decision-making environment. Therefore it is assumed that the decision-making 
environment remains equal, which is a necessary simplification. However, it also allows analysis of the 
impact of the crop diversification measure, with less interference. 
To implement the model, we use data on the region of Flanders in Belgium. Because of the 
obligatory, annual crop declaration for farmers there is a full coverage of data on farms’ crop allocations. It 
is also an area which has some dominant crops, which is a problem targeted by the measure under 
investigation. The raw data on Flemish crop land is provided by the Flemish Agency for Agriculture and 
Fisheries. This dataset provides the cover for each agricultural parcel for the year 2012, for 24,839 farmers 
(Agentschap voor Landbouw en Visserij, 2012). Farms are categorized by communities (Agiv, 2000) and 
crops by crop categories. 
Next we identify the closest peer to project its crop allocation onto the total area9 of the original 
farm to make the latter compliant. Let us consider a set of n farms, with the possibility to have m different 
land uses. Among the different possible land uses, several need to be specified independently as they are 
related to different rules in the policy packages. Hence, c represents the different crops, p represents 
permanent grassland, g stands for temporary grassland, h is herbaceous forage, f  is the index for fallow, and 
leguminous crops are indexed by I. Eq. (2.1) identifies the closest peer for farm n, referred to as peer. 
Variables are represented by Greek symbols. α is a dummy variable with value 1 if the conditions in (2.2) 
regarding the permanent grassland measure in the greening package are met, the high weight refers to the 
final assumption, without which it makes no sense to adapt the crop configuration. The same goes for β, a 
dummy variable with value 1 if the condition in (2.3) regarding the number of crops is met and where the 
presence of a crop on a farm is accounted for by δ a dummy variable. To make sure that no peer is selected 
with a high number of crops, each covering small areas, β receives a higher weight than the differences in 
crop areas. The area allocated to each crop is depicted by the variable σ. Eq. (2.1) takes the sum of the 
absolute differences in hectare per crop type between the farms. Finally, γ represents the geographical 
distance between the communities of the respective farms, to distinguish between farms with an equal 
                                                     
9 Both permanent and arable crops are included in the model. 
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outcome for the former variables - therefore a low weight. As can be noted, the substantial differences in 
weights attributed to the variables make the selection process function as a cascade. First, the selection is 
based on permanent grassland. This selection is followed by the criterion of the number of crops, then the 
crop areas. If there are still several peers in the selection, the distance should discriminate between them. 
Min 106 𝛼𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 + 10
3 𝛽𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 +  ∑|𝜎𝑐,𝑛 −  𝜎𝑐,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟|
𝑐
+ 10−4𝛾𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 
(2.1) 
s.t.  
 𝑖𝑓  0.95 
𝜎𝑝,𝑛
∑ 𝜎𝑐,𝑛𝑐
≤
𝜎𝑝,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
∑ 𝜎𝑐,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑐
≤
𝜎𝑝,𝑛
∑ 𝜎𝑐,𝑛𝑐
, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
𝛼𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 = 1, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  𝛼𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 = 0 
(2.2) 
𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝛿𝑐,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 ≤ ∑ 𝛿𝑐,𝑛
𝑐
+ 2, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
𝑐
 
𝛽𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 = 1, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝛽𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 = 0 
(2.3) 
However, not all farms are eligible as representative farms. Each proposal has some options for 
compliance. For each of these, a subset of equations is added to the general Eqs. (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), where 
the largest crop on a farm is represented by index 1, the second largest by 2 and the third largest by 3. The 
variable 𝜌 is introduced to distinguish the arable area of a farm from the total area, because the latter also 
comprises permanent grassland and permanent crops. It is also necessary to introduce the star superscript, 
representing the variable under optimality after simulation, such as  𝜎∗𝑐,𝑛. More precisely, for the EC's 
“normal” way of compliance the policy constraints are: 
 𝑖𝑓  𝜌𝑛
∗ > 3, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 (2.4) 
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.7𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎3,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 ≥ 0.05𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 (2.5) 
 𝑜𝑟 𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 = 𝜎𝑔,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 (2.6) 
𝑜𝑟 𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 = 𝜎𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 (2.7) 
Eq. (2.4) represents the requirement relating to the total arable area after the simulation. If the 
projected arable area is more than 3 hectares, the eligible peer farms have to comply with the rules 
represented in Eqs. (2.5), or (2.6) or (2.7).  In Eq (2.5), the first crop cannot cover more than 70% of the 
arable area, while the third crop has to cover more than 5% of the arable area. The other options for 
compliance are exemptions. In Eq (2.6), the farmer is exempted if the area of arable land is covered by 
grassland. In Eq (2.7), the farmer is exempted if the area of arable land is laid fallow. Finally, Eq. (2.8)  shows 
that if the project arable area is less than 3 hectares, the farmer is also exempted.  
𝑖𝑓 𝜌𝑛
∗ ≤ 3, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑  (2.8) 
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For each combination of n and peer, the right set10 of equations gives an outcome in Eq. (2.1). The 
combination with the lowest outcome for farm n is the basis for the final step, which is the projection of 
the new crop configuration on the total area of the affected farm. After this projection the formerly non-
compliant farm becomes compliant11: 
𝜎∗𝑐,𝑛 = 𝜎𝑐,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 × 
∑ 𝜎𝑐,𝑛𝑐
∑ 𝜎𝑐,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑐
 
(2.9) 
Table 2-1 shows a full description of the indexes and variables used in our model. 
Table 2-1. Description of indexes and variables 
Indexes Description 
𝒏 
 
Non-compliant farmers 
𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 Identified peer farmers 
𝒎 = (𝒄 ∪ 𝒑 ∪ 𝒉) Land use = crops, permanent grassland and herbaceous 
forage. 
𝒄 Crops 
𝒑 Permanent Grassland 
𝒉 Herbaceous forage 
𝒇 Fallow land 
Variables Description 
𝜶𝒏,𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 Binary variable for permanent grassland taking the value 
1 or 0 
𝝈𝒎,𝒏 Land cover m area of the non-compliant farmer (ha) 
𝝈𝒎,𝐩𝐞𝐞𝐫 Land cover m area of the peer farmer (ha) 
𝜷𝒏,𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 Binary variable for the number of crops taking the value 
1 or 0 
𝜸𝒏,𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 Geographical distance between the non-compliant 
farmer and the peer farmer. 
𝜹𝒄,𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 Binary variable taking the value 1 if the peer farmer grow 
the crop c or taking the value 0 if the peer farmer does 
not grow the crop. 
𝝆𝒏∗ Arable area of the non-compliant farmer (ha) 
𝝆𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 Arable area of the peer farmer (ha) 
𝑷𝒎 Relative share of Land cover m (ha) 
An overview of the options and their respective set of equations can be found in Table 2-2. Note 
that the Council's compliance options relating to agri-environmental measures and the interchange of land 
are not modelled, nor is the option on interchange of land for the final measure modelled. This is due to 
uncertainty about future agri-environmental measures and insufficient data on the interchange of land. 
  
                                                     
10 In the EC scenario the possible sets are: 1–6/1–3, 7/1–3, 8/1–3, 9. 
11 Compliant farms remain the same since they will be the ‘closest peer’ to themselves. 
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Table 2-2. Overview of the proposals and their respective options and equations. 
𝝆𝒏∗  (ha) n/peer requirements Comments 
European Commission 
≤ 3 / Farms up to 3 ha are exempted 
> 3 
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.7𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  Proportional requirements for first 
and third crop 𝜎3,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 ≥ 0.05𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
=  𝜎𝑔,𝑛∗  / 
Farms with the arable land 
completely covered by grassland are 
exempted 
=  𝜎𝑓,𝑛∗  / 
Farms with the arable land 
completely lying fallow are 
exempted 
European Parliament 
< 10  Farms below 10 ha are exempted 
≥ 10 and ≤ 30 𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.8𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
Respective proportional 
requirements 
≥ 30 
𝜎2,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.75𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  Respective proportional 
requirements 𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 + 𝜎2,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.95𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
Council of the European Union 
< 10 / Farms below 10 ha are exempted 
≥ 10 and ≤ 30 
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.75𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
Respective proportional 
requirements, incl. the derogation 
with relaxed proportions, but still 
two crops need to cover the arable 
land 
or 
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 = 𝜎𝑔,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
≥ 30 
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.75𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 + 𝜎2,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.95𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
or 
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 + 𝜎2,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 = 𝜎𝑔,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
≤
4
3
   (𝜎𝑔,𝑛∗ + 𝜎𝑓,𝑛∗ + 𝜎𝑙,𝑛∗
+ 𝜎ℎ,𝑛∗) 
/ 
Exemption for farms where 75% of 
the total el. area is covered by grass 
(permanent–and/or temporary) 
Final adopted proposal 
< 10 / Farms below 10 ha are exempted 
≥ 10 and ≤ 30 
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.75𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
Respective proportional 
requirements, incl. the derogation 
with relaxed proportions, but still 
two crops need to cover the arable 
land 
or 
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  
𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= (𝜎𝑔,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑟 𝜎ℎ,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑟 𝜎𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟) 
{𝜎2,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 < 0.75(𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 −  𝜎1,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟)  
or 
𝜎2,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 =
(𝜎𝑔,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑟 𝜎ℎ,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑟 𝜎𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟)} 
≤
4
3
   (𝜎𝑔,𝑛∗ + 𝜎𝑓,𝑛∗ + 𝜎𝑙,𝑛∗
+ 𝜎ℎ,𝑛∗) 
𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟∗ −  (𝜎𝑔,𝑛∗ + 𝜎𝑓,𝑛∗ + 𝜎𝑙,𝑛∗
+ 𝜎ℎ,𝑛∗) ≤ 30 
Exemption for farms where 75% of 
the arable land is covered by 
grassland or other herbaceous 
forage, leguminous crops or lying 
fallow 
Exemption related to eligible 
agricultural area 
 
 
3
4
   ∑ 𝜎𝑐,𝑛∗
𝑐
≤ (𝜎𝑔,𝑛∗ + 𝜎𝑓,𝑛∗) 
𝜌𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟∗ −  (𝜎𝑔,𝑛∗ + 𝜎𝑓,𝑛∗ + 𝜎𝑙,𝑛∗
+ 𝜎ℎ,𝑛∗) ≤ 30 
Exemption for farms where 75% of 
the total el. area is covered by grass 
(permanent–and/or temporary) 
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Finally, the last step is the evaluation of the crop landscape diversity in each proposal. Diversity 
matters more at landscape level than farm level (Swift et al., 2004), hence the SHDI is measured at 
community level (LAU2-level), which serves as a proxy for the former. The SHDI measures the number of 
crops, to calculate the richness (m), and also their relative shares (P), which are used to calculate the evenness 
(Weibull et al., 2003; Brady et al., 2009). 
SHDI = − ∑(𝑃𝑚 × ln 𝑃𝑚)
𝑚
 
(2.10) 
Also, the diversification efforts at farm level are measured, the number of adapting farms is 
calculated and the quantity and quality of land-cover changes; how much land and how many farmers are 
affected and which crops become more or less present. 
2.4. Results 
The simulated crop allocations are presented in this section. First, we look at the impact of the 
different proposals (Table 2-3). In the EC proposal, 35% of all farmers need to change their crop allocation 
to comply and 6% of the eligible farm area is affected. In the EP proposal, due to the exemption of farms 
below 10 ha and the moderate requirements for farms between 10 and 30 ha, only 11% of the farms need 
to adapt their crop configuration and 2% of the eligible farm area is affected. The Council's proposal has 
the lowest impact on farms as well as on eligible farm area. Only 8% of Flemish farms need to change their 
crop areas to comply corresponding to 1% of the eligible farm area being affected. This is because of the 
similar two thresholds system as in the EP proposal, and the adapted definition of crop, plus the exemptions 
relating to grassland, herbaceous forage, fallow land and leguminous crops. Hence, the Council proposal is 
the least constraining proposal for farmers. The final adopted crop diversification proposal is very similar 
to the EP's proposal in terms of impact. 11% of the farms are estimated to change their crop areas which 
affect 2% of the eligible area 
Table 2-3. Non-compliant farmers and eligible farm area affected for all proposals 
 EC EP Council Final 
% of non-compliant farmers 35% 11% 8% 11% 
% of eligible farm area affected 6% 2% 1% 2% 
Danckaert et al. (2012) calculate the number of non-compliant farmers per farm size categories for 
the first draft of EC's proposal using the same data source than us, but use 2010. In the first draft, the EC 
used another definition of crop than in the final EC’s proposal used in this study, nevertheless Danckaert 
et al. found that the first draft of the EC proposal would result in a lower impact on farms with a larger area 
of arable land compared to their smaller counterparts. Figure 2-1 shows that these findings can be confirmed 
for the crop data from 2012 (Agentschap voor Landbouw en Visserij, 2012) in combination with the latest 
proposed crop definition from the EC (European Commission, 2012), the Council (Council of the 
European Union, 2013b) and the final definition (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
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2013a). Note also the difference in compliance in the EC and EP simulations among the largest farms, 
caused by the differences in proportional requirements (max. 70% vs 75% for the first crop). 
 
Figure 2-1. Non-compliant farms represented by arable area for all proposals. 
As for the EC's proposal, the adapting small farms also change a higher proportion of their farm 
areas to become compliant. Figure 2-2 shows the average proportion of the total eligible farm areas adapted 
per affected farm. In the EP, Council and final proposal, the largest among the adapting farms seem to 
diverge most from their original crop configuration. This is partly because of the two threshold system with 
more stringent requirements for the farms above the second threshold. The EP's relaxed requirements for 
farms above the first threshold make the total adapted area in the respective category 61% smaller than in 
the EC case. The implementation in the EC's proposal of this isolated part of the EP amendments would 
result in a decrease of 22% in the EC's total adapted area. Regarding the smallest farms it should be 
mentioned that in the EC's proposal, 7,849 ha or 22% of the adapted farm area comes from farms below 
10 ha. 
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Figure 2-2. Average proportion of the eligible farm area adapted per affected farm, represented by total 
arable area. 
Table 2-4 shows that a substantial part of the aggregated maize area goes to other dominant crops. 
This effect is the most pronounced in the EC's proposal, followed by the proposal of the EP and Council 
respectively (Table 2-4). Given that utility is left undefined and encompasses monetary and non-monetary 
factors while the overlap between individual decision-making context is maximised, the chosen crops are 
the ones maximising utility of the selected compliant peers. Hence, the chosen crops are the ones 
maximising utility of the selected compliant peers. If maize,  winter wheat, potato and sugar beets are the 
most dominant crops in Flanders, it also likely that these dominant crops are grown by the selected 
compliant peers. In fact, dominant crops are the crops with the highest utility in Flanders. The different 
results for temporary grassland also indicate that the exemptions relating to grassland (EC and Council) 
have an effect on the aggregated grassland area. 
Table 2-4. Changes in crop areas compared to the reference (2012). 
 Before 
(ha) 
Eur. Commission 
(%) 
Eur. Parliament 
(%) 
Council of the 
Eur. Union (%) 
Final 
measure (%) 
Maize 191 270 −7 −3 −3 −4 
Permanent 
grassland 
145 531 −1 0 0 0 
Temporary 
grassland 
84 713 +3 −1 +2 +2 
Winter wheat 55.658 +6 +3 +2 +3 
Potato 47 809 +8 +4 +2 +3 
Sugar beets 22 250 +7 +4 +4 +4 
Rest 86 179 +5 +3 +2 +2 
The magnitude of changes in crop areas is in line with the changes to SHDI scores at community 
level. Table 2-5 shows that the EC proposal has the highest SHDI. It has the highest mean SHDI score, 
followed by the final measure, the EP and the Council, respectively. They all are higher than the mean SHDI 
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score before the simulations. The Wilcoxon signed rank test (Table 2-6) was performed on the differences 
between the simulated proposals and the previous situation. The results indicate statistically significant 
increases to the SHDIs in all simulations. Also shown in Table 2-6 are the effect sizes. Since the data is non-
normal, Cliff's delta was used to calculate these. Contrary to the robust statistical significance, there is 
considerable overlap between SHDI scores before and after the simulation. Nevertheless, the EC simulation 
has almost double the effect of the EP – and the final compromise proposal. It triples the effect of the 
Council's proposal. 
Table 2-5. Descriptive statistics of the SHDIs at community level in all simulations. 
 N Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
EC 304 2.035 0.263 0.787 2.604 
Final 304 2.001 0.277 0.796 2.594 
EP 304 2.000 0.274 0.796 2.601 
Council 304 1.992 0.277 0.796 2.573 
Before 304 1.966 0.286 0.796 2.567 
 
Table 2-6. Wilcoxon signed rank test and Cliff's delta. (a Based on negative ranks) 
 EC – before EP – before Council – before Final – before 
Z −14.251a −15.087 a −15.087 a −15.087 a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cliff's delta −0.130 −0.070 −0.050 −0.070 
2.5. Discussion and conclusion 
Several researchers have proclaimed their doubts on the effectiveness of the crop diversification 
measure on farmland diversity and its farm-level impact (Murphy-Bokern and Stoddard, 2012; Westhoek et 
al., 2012; Matthews, 2012). This study has tried to respond to these doubts by elaborating a new approach 
for the modelling of farm behaviour. The results of this intuitive approach, applied to the Flemish case, 
showed that the implementation of the proposed diversification mechanism carries the potential of having 
the following effects. 
Monocultures are the implicit target of the crop diversification measure. At landscape level, it is 
indeed maize, the most dominant crop, which would see the largest reduction in area. In this sense, the 
mechanism is effective. However, the largest part of the ‘freed’ area was absorbed by other dominant crops, 
which reduces the overall crop diversification effect at landscape level. The measure has, in its present form, 
limited effect at landscape level. It is advisable to conduct further research on this issue, on how the crop 
diversification measure can be refined to correspond with the series of goals it has to meet. A plausible 
research direction was indicated by Matthews (2012) who suggested targeting specific types of crop diversity 
through the definition of “crop”. 
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Contrary to the general trend of larger farms determining the impact of a land-use policy (Walford, 
2002), small farms play a significant role in the overall diversification impact in Flanders. In the final 
measure, a discriminatory approach was taken, reducing the impact on small farms but also the diversifying 
impact. Because of this contradiction, and because there are other ways to achieve soil- and ecosystem 
resilience (Angileri, Loudjani and Serafini, 2011), which possibly yield similar diversity effects to the EC's 
proposal, further research on complementary mechanisms should be conducted, including the exemption 
implemented for farms practicing rotation and interchange of land and other types of landscape 
diversification (Lin, 2011). 
With respect to the methodology, there are also some points of discussion and conclusions to be 
mentioned. Because of the trend reversal in largest farm impacts, less farms need to adapt their areas in this 
category, however, if they adapt, they change a larger proportion of their farm area. This might reflect reality 
but it might also indicate a weakness in the model, namely the dependence on closest peers. If the closest 
peer strongly differs from a given farm, the changes might be overestimated. Rare crop configurations have 
a higher chance of this type of overestimation since they have less (close) peers. For these farms, a more 
normative approach could be followed, where crop configuration projections would depend on the 
minimum requirements for compliance, i.e. a farmer would change to the threshold of compliance and no 
further, in between the old and projected crop configuration. 
Related to this, is the problem of ‘outdated’ reference farms. The decision-making environment of 
2012 will be outdated when the crop diversification measure comes into full force (2015). Due to the ceteris 
paribus assumption, the simulated results give an indication of what would have been the impact of an 
isolated implementation of the crop diversification measure in the reference year and region. Furthermore, 
due to the static nature of the reference farms, reactions based on their behaviour can be considered partially 
outdated. This is because coping strategies, and other dynamics specific to crop diversification, are not fully 
simulated - for example, diversification into winter and summer varieties. Ideally, the methodology 
developed should be part of a more dynamic model and comprise a wider geographical scope. 
A third methodological issue relates to the unconsidered cropping possibilities. The option of non-
compliance was not modelled. The crop diversification measure seems to induce a higher burden for some 
farm categories. Full compliance might be unrealistic in those categories. Additionally, two of the options 
for compliance in the Council's proposal were not modelled12. Hence, the reactions of a set of farmers might 
be different from those simulated, and is probably overestimated. 
Depending on the policy context, the methodology might need some refinements to deliver 
accurate impact assessments. Nevertheless, we believe the methodology is innovating in the sense that it 
indicates a path through which the self-selection problem can be tackled. The model allows the many 
variables underlying cropping decisions to play, but could benefit from an ex-post validation. In terms of 
                                                     
12 The one for farms with agri-environmental schemes and for those who interchange their land. 
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policy impact analysis, it would be good to further investigate the effect on the broader biodiversity of both 
increasing crop diversity and the quality of that crop diversity. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3. Parametric versus non-parametric approaches for policy 
modelling: a validation exercise in a controlled environment 
 
Abstract 
As agricultural policies continue to evolve, they integrate environmental and climatic concerns. 
Consequently, ex-ante impact assessment models for agricultural policies incorporate more components of 
environmental models. However, model validation remains a bottleneck in the development of models. This 
paper presents an output validation exercise against a synthetic dataset using two models, a parametric model 
versus a non-parametric model. We use a bio-economic model to generate data to reflect a real world 
scenario where non-linear relationships, such as biophysical relationships, exist. In general, the performance 
of a model is reduced by data heterogeneity or an increase in the uncertainty of input data. When the input 
data is a panel dataset, results show that the non-parametric and the parametric approach are unbiased and 
consistent. However, the non-parametric approach is more efficient for a small sample size. Furthermore, 
the non-parametric approach is less sensitive to data heterogeneity and data uncertainty and is therefore 
deemed superior to the parametric approach.
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3.1. Introduction  
One of the main challenges of agricultural policy models is that they lie at the interface between 
biological and social systems. We understand agricultural policy models as one or several model components 
used to predict the future impact of policy measures on agricultural, environmental and natural resources. 
The integration of these systems creates complex relationships that span different scales from micro to 
macro levels (Antle and Capalbo, 2001). Furthermore, the scope of agricultural policies has grown from 
farm income issues to environmental and societal issues (Buysse et al., 2007; Mattison and Norris, 2005) 
and it is becoming more relevant to accurately simulate the impact of policies on this complex system. For 
instance, the recent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Europe has placed significantly 
more emphasis on the provision of public goods by farmers, such as biodiversity, landscape and climate 
stability (European Commission, 2013). In order to address market failure to account for environmental 
concerns, policy makers have introduced farm level policy measures. For instance, the greening 
requirements under the new CAP post-2013 has introduced three measures imposed at farm level and 
deemed beneficial for the environment and the climate. These measures intend to change the decision 
making process of farmers and the accompanying land use allocation choice. For instance, Chapter 2 
illustrates the impact of the crop diversification measure on crop choices. Therefore, agricultural policy 
models need to account for farm specific context and inherit more structure and components from 
environmental models. 
In order to model farm specific context and account for the production of externalities, three types 
of models are used in the literature: econometric models, Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) 
models and Normative Mathematical Programming (NMP) models (Howitt, 1995; Buysse et al., 2007). 
Econometric and PMP models are rooted in the positive economic philosophy while NMP models are 
rooted in the normative economic philosophy. The distinction between positive and normative economics 
is sometimes hard to make because positive economic is often used as a tool to achieve normative goals. 
Normative economics is concerned by “what ought to be” and rather reflects value judgment, while positive 
economics is concerned by “what is”. In a seminal paper, Friedman defines the role of positive economics 
“to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences 
of any change in circumstances”(Friedman, 1953). In the context of agricultural policy models, researchers 
intend to predict what will be the impact of a policy change, hence any modelling approaches are framed 
within the positive economic philosophy. Therefore, in this study we focus on positive agricultural policy 
models which can only be judged by their predictive power. Unfortunately, the validity of models cannot 
be tested in a “controlled experiment” rendering it difficult to interpret results and reject hypotheses 
underlying the model structure.  
It is well established in the literature that non-linearities exist in biophysical and ecological systems 
(Kinzig et al. 2006, Liu et al. 2007, Crépin et al. 2012, Schlüter et al. 2012) and that they are entangled with 
other hierarchical processes across space and time. Integrated assessment has been promoted as the answer 
Parametric versus non-parametric approaches 
29 
 
to this multi-disciplinary challenge. The most common approach to integrate environmental and agricultural 
policy modelling is by developing “coupled component models” (Kelly (Letcher) et al., 2013). Coupled 
component models involve linking models from different disciplines, implemented at different scales to 
generate economic, environmental and social outcomes. These models are based on quantitative secondary 
data or outputs from sub-models and are used to predict the impact of policies. 
Britz et al. (2011) demonstrates the effect of linking two modelling approaches to assess the impact 
of land changes and their impact on nitrogen input and nitrogen balance in Freiburg, Germany. They 
indicate that linking models is very relevant for policy simulation, but they acknowledge the lack of validation 
in such a large-scale integrated model. 
Uthes et al. (2012) present three policy impact assessment tools and evaluate their policy relevance. 
While they acknowledge that each tool contributes towards better informed political decision-making, given 
their respective focus, they also identify some challenges to be addressed in future research. One of these 
recommendations is to focus on non-linearities and uncertainties at the level of individual components.  
More recently, Doole and Marsh, and Daigneault et al. have exchanged their views on the New 
Zealand Forest and Agriculture Regional Model (NZFARM) (Landcare Research, 2016), including model 
validation (Doole and Marsh, 2014; Daigneault, Greenhalgh and Samarasinghe, 2014; Doole and Marsh, 
2013). The NZFARM model aims to assess land use, farm management and environmental output 
responses to future policy scenarios. Data inputs often come from accounting databases, or have been 
simulated from other models. Hence, the NZFARM illustrates the typical difficulty in representing 
relationships between farm management and environmental processes at different levels. The main critic 
from Doole and March is the use of PMP for calibrating the baseline scenario. More specifically, they argue 
that the introduction of production function and its functional form specification are arbitrary. In fact, they 
suggest that the use of PMP invalidates the application of the NZFARM model, leading to arbitrary and 
counter intuitive output outside of the calibrated baseline. Finally, Doole and Marsh emphasise the absence 
of validation of the NZFARM model and state: “Meaningful output validation is necessary to provide 
confidence in the model to extrapolate away from sample data” The debate between Doole and Marsh, and 
Daigneault highlights the challenge behind the development of validation methodology and the need for 
clear communication from scientists on the validation framework used and their accompanying results.  
In this study we perform a validation exercise. According to literature, verification is the process of 
establishing that the model performs as intended, while validation assesses the predictive power of the model 
(Aumann, 2007; Aumann, 2011; Jakeman, Letcher and Norton, 2006; Jakeman and Letcher, 2003; Doole 
and Pannell, 2013). Hence, verification is rather easily implemented and consists in debugging and ensures 
that the modeller does what he intended to do. However, the main concern of model validation is to choose 
the correct methodology and the correct model. This involves checking if the model accurately represents 
the initial data generating process (DGP) at play, in such a way that we cannot distinguish the output coming 
from the DGP or the developed model.  
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The contribution of this study to the literature is that only a few studies (Schwanitz, 2013; Bennett 
et al., 2013; Kanellopoulos et al., 2010; Janssen and van Ittersum, 2007) have attempted to validate the 
economic component of prediction models. We propose an output validation methodology that enables 
researchers to test the performance of their model when they know that biophysical relationships might 
impact the underlying DGP  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the proposed approach for output 
validation. Section 3.3 describes the DGP and the generated samples and performance criteria used in this 
study. Section 3.4 explains the parametric approach adopted in this paper. Section 3.5 illustrates the non-
parametric methodology. Section 3.6 provides the results of our simulation exercise. Finally, Section 7 
concludes, discusses limitations and further possible research.  
3.2. Positive agricultural policy models 
Farm level econometric models are widely used in the literature (Sckokai and Moro, 2006; Antle 
and Capalbo, 2001; Carpentier et al., 2015). The main limitation of econometric models is the large data 
requirement (Buysse et al., 2007), often leading researchers to develop models at a higher level of 
aggregation, such as sector level. However, by not accounting for farmers heterogeneity , self-selection bias 
can significantly impact model response (Koutchade, Carpentier and Féménia, 2015). In order to address 
the issue of data requirement and to account for biophysical processes, agricultural economists have 
increased the use of PMP. De Frahan et al. (2007). Heckelei et al. (2012) and Mérel and Howitt (2014) review 
the methodological developments and the applications of PMP. PMP enables the explicit introduction of 
farm management practices (nitrogen use, tillage, irrigation etc.), but also requires an econometric estimate 
of a production function, often a variable cost function, typically taking a quadratic form (Buysse et al., 
2007). The main disadvantage of econometrically estimating a production function lies in the rationalisation 
of the chosen functional form and in the bias due to functional form misspecification. It is often assumed 
that a parametric approach is a good approximation of reality, however, only a few studies (Bennett et al., 
2013; Kanellopoulos et al., 2010; Janssen and van Ittersum, 2007; Schroeder, Gocht and Britz, 2015) have 
attempted to assess the substitution patterns driving responses to policy or price shocks and so to validate 
the prediction performance of their models.  
Taking into account farmer heterogeneity ultimately leads to tackle the problem of aggregation bias. 
McCarl (1982) addressed the problem of aggregation bias by developing a linear programming model, where 
the extreme points solutions reflect the full representation of the constraint sets of individual farms. Based 
on the Dantzig-Wolf algorithm, McCarl forced the solution of the linear programming problem to lie within 
the convex hull generated by a set of historical cropping patterns. It is interesting to note that two pans of 
literature, both forcing the solutions to lie within the convex hull of past observations, coexist in parallel 
but without ever being connected namely, the historical crop activities mixes (McCarl, 1982) and the inverse 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Wei, Zhang and Zhang, 2000). In fact, both approaches lend 
themselves to a solution by the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm, and both approaches can be 
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qualified as Positive Linear Programming (PLP) model. PLP models originates from NMP models, however 
a fundamental distinction exist between them. PLP models assume that the observed input and output mixes 
at farm level are optimal which give their positive basis. 
In the context of agricultural policy models, the inverse DEA approach has also been used to estimate 
the impact of policy change at farm level (Oude Lansink and van der Vlist, 2008; Frija et al., 2011; Speelman 
et al., 2009). In these studies, during the first step the authors estimate a production frontier defined by a 
convex hull around the technically efficient observations. In this configuration, inputs and outputs are used 
as parameters to determine objective values, and hence efficiency scores. During the second step, the model 
can estimate the changes required in inputs or outputs due to policy change, while preserving the initial 
technology frontier. The optimal solution is then a weighted average of observations, preserving the initial 
efficiency score.  
We now illustrate the inverse DEA model and its solution method with a simple example. Let’s 
consider one farmer for who we have observations for four years referred as (Year 1, Year 2, Year 3 and 
Year 4), using two inputs (𝑥1; 𝑥2) and producing the same amount of output13 each year. Figure 3-1 shows 
that the isoquant is defined by the extreme point solutions, which are historical observations, also called the 
efficient point. Note that in such configuration all observations are efficient observations. Year 4 is the 
initial situation, where the input prices of 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are respectively 2.3 and 1 and are represented by the 
initial isocost line (plain line). Now, we simulate price changes of both inputs, and the new isocost line is 
depicted by a dash line. In order to maintain the efficiency score of the farmer (here 1), the model will move 
along the isoquant, in the meantime, the model tries to find a point that minimise cost. If we imagine a 
parallel shift of the new isocost line until it becomes tangent to the isoquant, the tangency point Year 1 is 
the inputs combination preserving the efficiency score of the farmer and minimising its costs under the new 
price conditions. Hence, the new simulated input mix is the one observed in Year 1.  
                                                     
13 The exposition could aslo be done by considering three different farmers or different output levels. 
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Figure 3-1. A simple example of the inverse DEA solution method 
This simple example shows that the response to price changes is not linear but characterised by a 
stepwise response. The higher the number of observations, the more likely the steps are to be small and the 
response smooth. Hence, even though the inverse DEA model relies on fewer assumptions than the 
parametric approach, the non-parametric nature of such methodology renders it more sensitive to noise 
than an econometric approach. Indeed, there is no unique derivative at the extreme-(efficient) points. The 
discontinuity of the derivatives is an intrinsic property of the DEA methodology. To the best of our 
knowledge, despite its use to predict the impact of certain policy changes, the performance of non-
parametric estimation of a production function using inverse DEA in order to predict future states has 
never been assessed. 
If partial validation has been conducted against historical data and expert screening, model output 
validation should not rely solely on a peer-review process and traditional “historical matching” but also on 
the development of protocols (Jakeman and Letcher, 2003). Given the need to evaluate model performance 
(Aumann, 2007; Aumann, 2011; Jakeman, Letcher and Norton, 2006; Jakeman and Letcher, 2003; Doole 
and Pannell, 2013), we propose to test two production function estimation methods, an econometric and a 
inverse DEA approach, against synthetic data.  
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3.3. Proposed approach for output model validation 
Doole and Pannell (2013, p. 94) recall three necessary conditions for effective model validation. 
These are: 
(1). “Model structure to be consistent with the stylised facts of important system processes. 
(2). Input data to be consistent with expected or reported values.  
(3). Output to be consistent with expected or reported values for a range of scenarios.” 
In this paper, we focus on point (3): output validation. Output validation is an arduous task because 
ex-ante modelling aims to predict future states, while social scientists are never in a position to know the 
true underlying data-generating process. Therefore, the key issue is to quantify the model’s capabilities, to 
reveal the underlying process and predict future states. Here, we focus on the capabilities of the model to 
reveal the underlying processes, and argue that these capabilities serve as a prerequisite for predicting future 
states. To achieve this, we propose to generate a synthetic dataset. Therefore, we rule out point (2), 
consistency of input data, since we have full control over it. However, in the real world, input data can 
exhibit wide variability due to different sources of uncertainty, such as inappropriate sampling or errors in 
the detailed sub-model. Hence, it is critical to evaluate the ability of the model to cope with input data 
uncertainty. To do this, we artificially introduce errors into our input dataset (see further discussion in 
Section 3.4.1). Finally, concerning the model structure in point (1), both parametric and non-parametric 
approaches do not comprehensively model the complex relationships taken into account by biophysical 
models. Instead, these approaches reduce the set to emerging and more likely behaviour. Hence, both 
approaches fail to satisfy point (1), but are often used in the literature. The validation of our model structure 
is tackled in a more flexible way and is discussed later in this paper. 
Consequently, the objective is to compare two approaches that are applied in the literature, a 
parametric simulation versus a non-parametric simulation, and to then evaluate them against a known DGP. 
As we are in a policy modelling context, we use DGP to produce an input and output dataset expressed in 
physical units with additional price information. 
To evaluate the performance of the methods, many authors have used a parametric specification 
for the DGP (Krüger, 2012; Banker, Gadh and Gorr, 1993). The disadvantage of using either a parametric 
or a non-parametric approach rooted in linear programming as a DGP is that the results are predictable and 
do not provide insights into the reliability of the methods when the DGP is not known. 
Given that integrated assessments are being used more frequently, and that biophysical relationships 
might play a role between environmental and economic outcomes, we compare the results of both models 
against a DGP that is conceptually different from both the parametric and non-parametric policy models. 
Therefore, our approach uses a mathematical programming DGP based on Non-Linear Programming 
(NLP). We refer to this model as a bio-economic model, as it maximises profit subject to biophysical 
constraints. We chose a bio-economic DGP that is relevant to agricultural policy because biophysical, real 
Chapter 3 
34 
 
world situation binding constraints are very common. Hence, any policy model should be able to reveal the 
small changes occurring at lower levels that subsequently impact on the higher levels. For both estimation 
approaches, we test whether or not estimators are consistent, whether or not they are biased and how 
sensitive the models are to input uncertainty. Finally, we assess the extent to which inferences can be drawn. 
3.4. Data Generating Process  
3.4.1. Specification of the DGP 
In this paper we are simulating the optimal feed input ration of a dairy cow. To simplify the model, 
only three different feed inputs can be chosen and only one output is simulated, milk production. The 
objective of the model is to maximise profit given different input prices and output prices, subject to feeding 
constraints. This is computed using General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software and as our 
model is a non-linear optimisation problem we use the CONOPT solver (see Appendix I). 
For a sample of J observations with each observation j (1 to J), where subscript r (1 to R, here R=1) 
and k (1 to K, here K=3) corresponds to outputs and inputs respectively, we can generate our data with the 
following non-linear optimisation problem (3.1): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋𝑘,𝑗 ,𝑌𝑟,𝑗    𝜋𝑗 =  𝑌𝑟,𝑗 × 𝑝𝑟,𝑗 − ∑(𝑋𝑘,𝑗 × 𝑝𝑘,𝑗)
𝑘
 (3.1) 
S.t   
 
∑ 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 × 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘,𝑗
𝑘
≤ (𝑑𝑗 ×  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑗
) + 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑗
+  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑌𝑟,𝑗
2  
 
 ∑ 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 ×
𝑘
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑘,𝑗 ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 × 𝑌𝑟,𝑗
2   
 ∑ 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 ×
𝑘
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑘,𝑗 ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛 × 𝑌𝑟,𝑗
2   
where 𝑌𝑟,𝑗 and 𝑋𝑘,𝑗  are the decision variables of output quantities and input quantities for each j 
observation. The model maximises the profit 𝜋𝑗 given the fact that each observation faces different input 
prices 𝑝𝑘,𝑗, and output prices 𝑝𝑟,𝑗. Prices are drawn from a uniform distribution and reflect the feed 
characteristics in terms of energy, protein and maximum intake (see Appendix I). The first constraint ensures 
that the total feed intake does not exceed the maximum feed intake capacity of the cow. 
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We want to test the extent that sample heterogeneity impacts the predictive power of our tested 
model. Hence, for each sample size generated, we introduce four different disturbance term 𝑑𝑗. 𝑑𝑗 is 
randomly drawn from the following distribution (3.2): 
𝑑𝑗~ 𝑁(0; 0) 𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑗~ 𝑁(0; 0.05) 𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑗~ 𝑁(0; 0.15) 𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑗~ 𝑁(0; 0.2)       (3.2) 
The disturbance term introduces different variances for the maximum feed intake capacity14. When 
the variance is zero, each observation is defined by an identical relationship between inputs and outputs. 
Thus, each observation has an identical maximum feed intake capacity. The generated dataset is considered 
as a time series for one dairy cow. The feed intake of one dairy cow is recorded for different prices that 
could have been observed at different points in time. As soon as the disturbance term is introduced on the 
right hand side of the first constraint, the maximum feed intake capacity is different for each observation. 
Hence, we can consider that we generate a dataset for several dairy cows at one point in time facing different 
prices. The second and the third constraint ensure that the respective energy and protein requirements are 
fulfilled. We also investigate the effect of the sample size using six different sample sizes: 1000, 500, 200, 
100, 50 and 10 observations.  
Researchers often assume statistical errors and input data uncertainty which may have different 
sources of origin, such as data collection errors. To address this, we also add an error term after simulation 
(3.3) that is randomly drawn from the distribution mentioned in (3.4). For each of the four possible 
distributions for 𝑑𝑗 and 𝑒𝑗, knowing that they are mutually exclusive, we generate a dataset with the six 
different sample sizes and we obtain 36 samples15. These 36 samples are used later on to estimate the 
parametric and the non-parametric models. 
𝑋𝑘,𝑗 +  𝑒𝑗  ×  𝑋𝑘,𝑗  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ (𝑘 = 1,2,3)  (3.3) 
𝑌𝑟,𝑗𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ (𝑟 = 1)   
𝑒𝑗~ 𝑁(0; 0)𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑗~ 𝑁(0; 0.05) 𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑗~ 𝑁(0; 0.15) 𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑗~ 𝑁(0; 0.3) (3.4) 
Finally, we need points of reference against which the accuracy of both approaches will be tested. 
In the context of ex-ante agricultural policy models, we intend to predict, for instance, the change of inputs 
used due to price changes. Therefore, we implement price changes for inputs by simulating model (3.1)16 
holding output prices fixed. Subsequently, we only generate samples with different degree of heterogeneity 
 𝑑𝑗 but without introducing a statistical error 𝑒𝑗. The number of samples generated after price changes, 
                                                     
14 The introduction of the disturbance term only has an impact if the maximum feed intake capacity is a 
binding constraint. We visually check that it was the case after simulation. 
15 In order to simplify the notation, samples generated from our DGP are in capital letters (𝑋𝑗 , 𝑌𝑗) while the 
simulated inputs and outputs from the Restricted Linear Regression and the inverse DEA are in lower case letters 
(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗). 
16 Problem (3.1) is a non-linear problem where we use the CONOPT solver. It should be noted that 
CONOPT does not guarantee an optimum solution, but rather a feasible solution. Additionally, for efficiency reasons, 
it is often recommended to specify initial starting values for the variables. In order to avoid bias and remain as close 
as possible to real situations, we use the set of initial inputs 𝑋𝑘,𝑗  as initial starting values. 
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against which the parametric and the non-parametric model are tested, is lower.(16 samples). In fact we run 
the model (3.1) for the six different sample sizes and the four different disturbance terms 𝑑𝑗 mentioned in 
(3.2). Then, we obtain the following set of inputs and outputs: 
𝑋𝑘,𝑗
∗  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ (𝑘 = 1,2,3)  (3.5) 
𝑌𝑟,𝑗
∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ (𝑟 = 1)  
𝑋𝑘,𝑗 
∗ and 𝑌𝑟,𝑗
∗  are the new set of inputs and outputs respectively, optimising profit under the new 
input price conditions. It should be noted that the new input prices are drawn from the same distribution 
as the initial prices. In other words, the parametric and the non-parametric model are tested within the initial 
production set, and the performance of the models outside the production range is not assessed. This will 
indicate how well estimated parametric and non-parametric models can simulate the same set of inputs 𝑋𝑘,𝑗
∗  
and output 𝑌𝑟,𝑗
∗ after price changes, using the dataset 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 +  𝑒𝑗  × 𝑋𝑘,𝑗  and 𝑌𝑟,𝑗 for their estimation. 
3.4.2. Simulation Scenario 
 The models tested are the parametric model, “Restricted Linear Regression model” (RLR) versus 
the non-parametric linear programming, Inverse DEA model under Variable Return to Scale (IDvrs) (see 
Section 3.6). We refer to the parametric approach as a restricted model as we impose the economic 
properties of a production function, such as monotonicity and concavity. Figure 3-2 provides an overview 
of the comparison procedure: 
3.4.3. Performance criteria 
The accuracy of the simulation models can be defined by their bias and their efficiency. Different 
types of statistical bias exist, including measurement, sampling, and estimation (Walther and Moore, 2005). 
Measurement and sampling bias refer to the intrinsic structure of the dataset and do not usually disappear 
with an increase in sampling effort. In our simulation, measurement bias is captured by the introduction of 
the error term 𝑒𝑗 in the DGP. Sampling bias is not introduced and thus not considered in this paper.  
Estimation bias is the difference between the estimated input changes and the “true” input changes due to 
price change. Estimation bias should decrease with an increasing sample size. The model could be unbiased, 
Models Tested Data Generating Process 
Bio-economic model 
Restricted Linear Regression (RLR) 
Inverse DEA model (IDvrs) 
 With  four different 
distributions for 𝑒𝑗 . 
 With  four different 
distributions for 𝑑𝑗 . 
 With  six different 
sample sizes 
 
36 samples 
 
Figure 3-2. Simulation design 
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so it is important to take into account the variance. Indeed, if the model is biased, an increase in the sample 
size simply decreases the variance around a wrong estimate. On the other hand, if both the variance and 
bias tend towards zero our model is consistent.  
 Bias measures typically account for the difference between the estimated value and the true value. 
One common measure is the Mean Deviation (MD), which is the difference between the new quantities of 
the input mix and output after price changes from the DGP (noted 𝑋𝑘,𝑗
∗ , and 𝑌𝑟,𝑗
∗ ), and the predicted 
quantities of the input mix and output after price changes calculated in the different scenarios (noted 𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗  
and 𝑦𝑟,𝑗
∗ ). Another indicator is the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD). It considers the difference between 
the estimated input changes and the true input changes, but also eliminates the direction of the difference, 
which considers the variance of the estimates. The MAD assesses the overall consistency of the model 
taking into account bias and efficiency. The mathematical formulae of the MD and MAD for inputs and 
outputs are as follows: (3.6): 
𝑀𝐷 = [∑ ∑(𝑋𝑘,𝑗
∗ − 𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗ ) + ∑ ∑(𝑌𝑟,𝑗
∗ − 𝑦𝑟,𝑗
∗ )  
𝑟𝑗𝑘𝑗
] ×
1
𝐽 × 𝑅
 
(3.6) 
𝑀𝐴𝐷 = [∑ ∑|𝑋𝑘,𝑗
∗ − 𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗ |  + ∑ ∑   |𝑌𝑟,𝑗
∗ − 𝑦𝑟,𝑗
∗ |
𝑟𝑗𝑘𝑗
] ×  
1
𝐽 × 𝑅
 
 
To gain additional insight, we also used graphical descriptive statistics, such as a boxplot of the MD, 
as a performance criterion.  
3.5. The parametric approach 
As a parametric approach, we test a very flexible functional form as it promises a better fit to the 
data. We tested several polynomial functions until the fourth order. However, in the interests of parsimony 
we only present the results of the most relevant one, a cubic production function. When necessary we 
omitted the non-significant parameters. Unfortunately, a third order flexible functional form comes at the 
cost of violating economic properties such as monotonicity and curvature. Therefore, we impose concavity 
and monotonicity for each observation permitting a choice of input levels that maximize profit (Lau, 1978) 
and refer to our model as the RLR model. 
We use Ordinary Least Square methodology to estimate the unknown parameters. We can derive 
the following non-linear optimisation problem (3.7) where subscript j (1 to J) is observation, subscripts k, l 
and m (1 to K) represent inputs and subscript r (1 to R) is output. We also include the aforementioned term 
𝑒𝑗. 𝑌𝑟,𝑗 and 𝑋𝑟,𝑗, obtained from problem (3.1).  
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𝑀𝑖𝑛𝛽𝑘,𝛿𝑘,𝑙,𝛾𝑘,𝑙,𝑚  ∑ 𝜀𝑗
2
𝑗
 
(3.7) 
S.t 
𝑌𝑟,𝑗 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝑋𝑘,𝑗 +  𝑒𝑗  × 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 )
𝑘
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘,𝑙
𝑙𝑘
(𝑋𝑘,𝑗 +  𝑒𝑗  × 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 )(𝑋𝑙,𝑗 +  𝑒𝑗  
× 𝑋𝑙,𝑗 )
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑘,𝑙,𝑚(𝑋𝑘,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗  × 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 )(𝑋𝑙,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗  × 𝑋𝑙,𝑗 )(𝑋𝑚,𝑗 
𝑚𝑙𝑘
+  𝑒𝑗  × 𝑋𝑚,𝑗 ) + 𝜀𝑗 
 
 𝜕𝑌𝑟,𝑗
𝜕(𝑋𝑘,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗  × 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 )
≥ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝐾 
 
 𝜕²𝑌𝑟,𝑗
𝜕²(𝑋𝑘,𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗  × 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 )
≤ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝐾 
 
where 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 are the parameters to be estimated. Here, it is important to note that 𝑋𝑘,𝑗  and 
𝑌𝑟,𝑗 contrary to the model in (3.1) are not decision variables, but actual input and output values. According 
to economic theory, Y must be monotonic and concave. The first and second constraints ensure local 
monotonicity and concavity respectively. 
Once we have estimated the production function we can simulate changes in input mix and output 
due to a change in input prices. We then solve the following non-linear optimisation model (3.8): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑦𝑟,𝑗𝑥𝑘,𝑗  ∑ [𝑦𝑟,𝑗
∗ × 𝑝𝑟,𝑗 − ∑(𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗ × 𝑝𝑘,𝑗
∗ )
𝑘
]
𝑗
 
(3.8) 
S.t 𝑦𝑟,𝑗
∗ = 𝛼′ + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
′ 𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗
𝑘
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑙 
′
𝑙𝑘
𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗ 𝑥𝑙,𝑗
∗ + ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑙𝑚
′ 𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗
𝑚𝑙𝑘
𝑥𝑙,𝑗
∗ 𝑥𝑚,𝑗
∗  
 
 𝜕𝑦𝑟,𝑗
∗
𝜕𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗ ≥ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝐾 
 
 𝜕²𝑦𝑟,𝑗
∗
𝜕²𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗ ≤ 0𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘, 𝑙, 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝐾 
 
where 𝑦𝑟,𝑗
∗  and 𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗  are the decision variables maximising profit under the new input price 
conditions 𝑝𝑘,𝑗
∗  subject to the production function constraint estimated in problem (3.7), monotonicity and 
concavity constraints. The model (3.8) estimates the optimal 𝑥𝑘,𝑗
∗  and 𝑦𝑟,𝑗
∗  given the estimated 
parameters 𝛼′, 𝛽𝑘
′ , 𝛿𝑘𝑙 
′  and 𝛾𝑘𝑙𝑚
′  derived from model (3.7). 
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3.6. The Inverse DEA approach 
Wei extended the inverse optimization problem beyond efficiency measurement, to the DEA 
framework for short-term input and output estimation (Wei et al., 2000). In this configuration, inputs and 
outputs are used as parameters to determine objective values. The model can estimate the changes required 
in the input combination due to policy change, while preserving the initial technology frontier. The model 
is input oriented and exhibits variable return to scale (VRS). Input substitution is feasible given the change 
in policies. The procedure has two steps. First, the firm-level inefficiency is measured with DEA and 
secondly, the observed peers are used as a piece-wise linear technology frontier during simulation. 
3.6.1. Estimating the production technology with DEA 
DEA uses linear programming methods to construct a non-parametric piece-wise frontier which 
envelops the observed input and output data for all observations. In this paper, we used the DEA models 
under constant and variable return to scale (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984). For a given observation, 
denoted with the subscript o, we can derive the following linear problem, known as the envelopment form (3.9): 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆𝑗 𝜃𝑜   (3.9) 
S.t. ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑌𝑟,𝑗 −  𝑌𝑟,𝑜
𝑗
≥ 0 
 
 
𝜃𝑜(𝑋𝑘,𝑜 +  𝑒𝑜  × 𝑋𝑘,𝑜 ) −   ∑ 𝜆𝑗(𝑋𝑘,𝑗 +  𝑒𝑗  × 𝑋𝑘,𝑗 )
𝑗
≥ 0,  
 
 𝜆𝑗 ≥ 0 
∑ 𝜆𝑗 = 1
𝑗
 
 
where 𝜃 is a scalar and 𝜆 is a 𝐽 × 1 vector of constants and both are the decision variables. Here 
again, note that 𝑋𝑘,𝑗  and 𝑌𝑟,𝑗 contrary to the model in (3.1) are not decision variables, but actual input and 
output values. The value of 𝜃 obtained is the technical efficiency (TE) score for the j-th firm. The value of 
𝜃 lies between zero and one, where one indicates that the considered observations are on the frontier and 
so technically efficient. The problem (3.9) must be solved J times, once for each observation denoted with 
the subscript o. 
3.6.2. Inverse DEA simulation 
The second step is to apply an Inverse DEA model (IDvrs) to simulate the impact of policy changes, 
such as an input price change 𝑝𝑘,𝑗
∗ . Here, we need to calculate the new optimal input level given the new 
prices for a given observation noted 𝑥𝑘,o
∗ which maximises revenue while at the same time preserving the 
TE score of DMUo found in problem (3.9). We can derive the following linear problem (3.10): 
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𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝜆𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑦𝑟,o
∗  ,𝑥𝑘,o
∗
 ∑ 𝑝𝑟,𝑜𝑦𝑟,𝑜
∗
𝑟
− ∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑜
∗ 𝑥𝑘,o
∗
𝑘
  (3.10) 
S.t.                  
∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑌𝑟,𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
≥ 𝑦𝑟,o
∗  
 
 
∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
𝑋𝑘,𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 ≤ 𝜃𝑜
′𝑥𝑘,o
∗  
 
 𝜆𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 ≥ 0 
∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
𝑗𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= 1 
 
The model maximizes the profit for observation o given its output price 𝑝𝑟,𝑜 and its new input 
prices 𝑝𝑘,𝑜
∗ . The constraints make sure that the efficiency score 𝜃𝑜
′ derived from model (3.9) remains the 
same and jpeer refers to the peer observations defining the production frontier. In other words, jpeer are the 
observations in model (3.9) with an efficiency score of one and, consequently, they are the support points 
for the piece-wise production frontier. The new optimal input vector 𝑥𝑘,o
∗  and output vector 𝑦𝑟,o
∗  calculated 
by the model maximise profit under the new market conditions and preserve the initial efficiency score. 
3.7. Results  
First, we examine the MAD and MD for the IDvrs and the RLR models over six sample sizes and 
with 𝑑𝑗=𝑒𝑗=0. The solid lines in Figure 3-3(A) show the changes in the MAD scores with changing sample 
size, while the dashed line illustrates the impact of the sample size on the MD scores. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3. MAD and MD of the different tested models from a DGP with 𝑑𝑗=𝑒𝑗=017 
                                                     
17 Note, that from a sample size of 50 to 1000 observations, the MAD and the MD of the IDvrs models are 
close to zero. As a results both lines are confounded with the horizontal axis.  
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In this ideal scenario, we can consider that our DGP generates a time series dataset for one dairy 
cow for different prices, free of measurement bias (see Section 3.4.1). Figure 3-3(A) shows that the MD for 
the RLR and the IDvrs models both converge towards zero. For small sample sizes, the IDvrs model 
performs better than the RLR model. The MD of the IDvrs model is close to zero for a sample size of 10 
observations, while the RLR starts to converge towards zero from a sample size of 100 observations. The 
non-parametric approach does not require a large sample size, and in the context of a panel dataset, 10 
observations appear to be sufficient for reliable results. 
If we look at the variance of both models, the MAD of the IDvrs model in Figure 3-3(A) converges 
towards zero, but the MAD of the RLR model converges towards a value. Figure 3-3(B) shows the boxplots 
of the MD from the IDvrs model and the RLR model. Recalling that the efficiency is measured by the 
variance of our estimates, we can observe that the variance of IDvrs is almost zero, demonstrating that the 
model is unbiased, consistent and hence efficient. The interquartile range (IQR) for the RLR’s boxplot is 
still low. Hence, the RLR model is unbiased but less efficient. In such a setting, where each observation 
results from the same technology, and without any data collection errors, both modelling approaches are 
efficient.  
In the second step of the assessment, a disturbance term 𝑑𝑗 or an error term 𝑒𝑗, are introduced in 
the specification of our DGP. By introducing a disturbance term within the feed intake capacity constraint, 
we introduce variation in the stomach capacity of ± 5%, 15% and 20%. Therefore, we do not simulate the 
DGP of one cow but of several cows, indicating that it mimics the situation of cross-sectional data. The 
first column of Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 illustrate the impact of the introduction of 𝑑𝑗 on the MAD and 
the MD of both models. As real datasets contain some measurement errors, we also investigate the impact 
of error term 𝑒𝑗. This is illustrated in the second column of Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5. We introduce ± 5%, 
15% and 30% in the three inputs used. In both situations, the introduction of the disturbance term 𝑑𝑗 
excludes the introduction of the error term 𝑒𝑗 and vice versa. 
The first column of Figure 3-4 shows that the IDvrs model performs better than the RLR model. 
For 𝑑𝑗 randomly drawn from N~(0,0.05), the MD of the IDvrs converges towards a value close to zero, so 
the model is consistent but slightly biased upward. Similar findings can be drawn from the MAD’s trend. 
The MAD of the IDvrs model converges with an increase in the sample size, so the model is consistent but 
towards a value, meaning the model is biased. With an increase in the variance of 𝑑𝑗, the performance of 
the IDvrs model decreases. The MAD and MD are stable around a value, which indicates that the model is 
consistent, although bias increases along with the heterogeneity of the sample. In fact, the introduction of 
the disturbance term 𝑑𝑗 does not change the value 𝜃𝑜 found in problem (3.9). In problem (3.9) we assume 
a single technology for all observations. Therefore every observation is technically efficient, but the scale 
efficiency could differ. In problem (3.10), we simulate changes in inputs and output due to changes in input 
prices. However, we define only one technology for all cows, while in reality each cow has a different 
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stomach capacity, hence different technologies. Consequently, a cow can ‘adopt’ the input mix and output 
of another one that it is the most profitable given the new market conditions. As a result, given the fact we 
introduce a disturbance term in the maximum intake capacity constraint and that this constraint is binding, 
one cow might adopt the input mix and output of another cow with a bigger stomach capacity. This explains 
why the IDvrs overestimates the changes in inputs and output when the variance of 𝑑𝑗 increases. 
For the RLR model, the MD does not converge clearly towards a value. The performance of the 
model decreases with increased sample heterogeneity. Our results show that the RLR model is more 
sensitive to the heterogeneity of the dataset. However, even though the MD or the MAD of the RLR are 
not zero, the lack of a clear trend with an increase in the sample size questions the consistency of the model. 
For the most extreme case where 𝑑𝑗 is randomly drawn from N~(0,0.2), the MAD and the MD increase 
along with the sample size. 
Although IDvrs appear to have a greater performance, such non-parametric methods rely heavily 
on the quality of the dataset and are sensitive to noise. The second column of Figure 3-4 shows the impact 
of introducing an error term after generating the data. We recall that in such a configuration where the 
disturbance term 𝑑𝑗 = 0, we generate a panel dataset where we introduce measurement bias. For the RLR 
and IDvrs models, the introduction of an error term increases the bias of the model, but both are consistent 
as the MD tends to converge towards a value. 
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Figure 3-4. MAD and MD of the different tested models from a DGP including a disturbance term or an 
error term 
Interestingly, both models are now underestimating changes in the input mix and output. By 
introducing an error term, some observations artificially perform better as they use fewer inputs to produce 
the same amount of output. In the case of the IDvrs, some observations are now technically inefficient and 
are benchmarked against observations that artificially perform better. Consequently, in problem (3.10), all 
observations are going to preserve their efficiency scores. However, their new input mix and output are a 
weighted average of the best performing artificial observations that use less inputs for the same amount of 
output. Similar reasoning can be applied to the RLR.  
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Figure 3-5 shows the variance of the MD for a sample size of 1000 observations for each scenario 
and demonstrates the efficiency of the model. The first column of Figure 3-5 shows the impact of the 
introduction of a disturbance term. For a variation of ± 5% in maximum intake capacity, the height of the 
notches and the IQR of the IDvrs remain small, indicating that the model is efficient. However, an increase 
in the variance of 𝑑𝑗 results in a loss of efficiency of the model towards being more upward biased and with 
greater variance. The introduction of a disturbance term has a greater impact on the RLR model, especially 
in terms of model bias, while the variance increases slightly. 
The second column of Figure 3-5 shows the impact of introducing the error term 𝑒𝑗. The variance 
of the MD for the IDvrs model increases with increasing 𝑒𝑗, but the IDvrs appears to cope better with 
uncertainty rather than the heterogeneity of the dataset. Indeed, the height of the IQR notches are smaller 
than when 𝑑𝑗 is introduced. However, the model becomes more downward biased with an increase in 𝑒𝑗. 
For the RLR model, the variance of the MD remains large. Furthermore, the presence of outliers when 𝑒𝑗 
is randomly drawn from N~(0,0.3) demonstrates the model’s lack of efficiency. 
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Figure 3-5. Variance of the MD for the different models tested from a DGP including an error term. 
In this experiment, we chose a bio-economic DGP that we ran for a different set of prices in order 
to generate our production function. Such a DGP is peculiar and results must be interpreted with caution 
because a small change in price may trigger discontinuous changes in inputs or output. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in section 0, such DGP plays a role in complex systems and assessing the model’s accuracy is not 
trivial. We propose a new approach for partial output validation, where the researcher has full control over 
the DGP. The DGP reflects the behaviour that researchers intend  to predict or know to be at play. Such 
approach enables researchers to assess the performance of the economic component in capturing emerging 
behaviour. When the DGP generates a cross-sectional dataset, we observe that the IDvrs model performs 
well only if the technologies do not differ too much between observations. The IDvrs model tends to 
overestimate changes. The RLR is affected more by data heterogeneity. Nevertheless, RLR performance 
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remains satisfactory with panel datasets. When we introduce an error term, we evaluate the performance of 
the model to cope with data uncertainty. The IDvrs and the RLR models are consistent and perform well 
for a small error term but underestimate changes. 
3.8. Conclusion  
One of the main challenges in ex-ante policy modelling is to construct the most accurate model that 
captures the underlying behaviour of the DGP. As researchers are never in a position to know the ‘true’ 
DGP, they often cast reasonable assumptions. These assumptions involve using estimators that have 
desirable properties to allow these properties to be inferred. Furthermore, these assumptions should not 
impose any restriction that does not reflect reality, which could lead to misleading conclusions. The different 
estimation techniques are like a continuum ranging from fully parametric estimation, through semi-
parametric estimation, to fully non-parametric estimation. This also applies to the number and the strength 
of assumptions made.  
Often researchers choose to parametrically estimate a functional form. By adopting a functional 
form we assume a continuous relationship between variables. The continuity of these relationships does not 
always occur in the real world, but as researchers never know the true functional form, this approach is 
compelling enough to be chosen. The problem becomes even more complex as there are a large number of 
possible functional forms. Indeed any parametric estimation is, by design, incorrect, and biases may increase 
if the wrong functional form is chosen. In order to account for non-linearities intrinsic to biological systems, 
researchers approximate a production function via a Taylor polynomial (Qureshi et al., 2013). However, 
such an approach may have some drawbacks. First of all, we can question the interpretability of estimated 
parameters such as interaction terms (Greene, 2010; Heckelei et al., 2012; Mérel and Howitt, 2014). Second, 
non-linear phenomena such as threshold effects are frequent. Biological systems may respond to an 
incremental change with a sudden regime shift. For example, a response in milk production to an increase 
in energy intake is nonlinear. In addition to biological systems, farm management decisions may also respond 
in a non-linear way. In particular, the allocation and the expansion of fixed costs, such as machinery and 
labour, exhibit threshold effects. The main disadvantage of such a method lies in the rationalisation of the 
chosen functional form and in the bias in the case of misspecification. 
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a methodology for the partial validation of a 
model output. Partial output validation involves testing model output accuracy within the initial production 
possibility set. Validation of policy models is very complex because there is no opportunity to conduct real 
world experimental design. Researchers often use ex-post experiments and/or peer-review processes. Ex-
post experiments assume that model performance is solely driven by model specifications. However, 
external factors, such as structural and environmental changes, could potentially improve model 
performance by chance. Therefore, this paper attempts to compare methods in a controlled environment. 
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This is one of the few attempts in policy modelling to test or validate methods. The findings 
highlight the main challenge for social scientists in the practice of agricultural policy modelling when non-
linearities and thresholds might hold. In general, the RLR model performs poorly as we have generated 
datasets of 1000 observations with different prices and free of any measurement or sampling bias. This 
amount of data is far beyond the real world policy simulation, where typically less than 20 observations per 
farm are available and the amount of price variation is limited. One of the main strengths of the IDvrs 
model is the ability to obtain reliable results for a small sample.  
In this paper, we have tested a specific situation where non-linearities exist in the DGP. For the 
RLR model, we have used a very flexible form of the production function. Our results show the importance 
of using panel data or robust grouping technics in order to maximise homogeneity in the sample. Model 
performance is negatively affected by an increase in heterogeneity and it tends to overestimate change if 
heterogeneity is large. Both modelling approaches remain consistent when uncertainty is introduced, 
however they underestimate change when it prevails. Another advantage of the IDvrs model is the 
computing speed. The IDvrs model is a linear programming model, and consequently does not require 
complex algorithms to find optimal solution. 
 Further research could be conducted in two ways. First, the proposed output validation 
methodology could be extended. For instance, we could generate data at a higher level, such as farm level.  
Farms exhibit greater variation in their technology and may change behaviour more gradually. Second, 
assuming we have access to panel data at farm level, the IDvrs model could be improved to correct for bias 
in using bootstrapping technics and drawn inferences. If access to panel data is not feasible, we could further 
develop the IDvrs models in order to cope with data heterogeneity by preserving technical and scale 
efficiency scores.

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Greening and the maintenance of Permanent grassland: an 
analysis of farm activity changes in France 
 
Abstract 
The contribution of permanent grassland to biodiversity and environmental services is well 
recognised by scientists and policy makers and it has been addressed in agricultural policy. Under the new 
greening requirements in the Common Agricultural Policy, farmers are required to maintain their ratio of 
permanent grassland to utilised agricultural area. In this paper, we study the case of France and investigate 
the opportunity cost at farm-type regional level for maintaining the ratio of permanent grassland at the 2009 
level. Additionally, we compare the effectiveness of this greening requirement to the introduction of an 
alternative policy: a premium per hectare for permanent grassland. Results show that a premium of 100€/ha 
for permanent grassland for all farmers in France would, as a minimum, maintain permanent grassland at 
the 2009 level. Furthermore, a premium per hectare would increase diversification in farm production by 
increasing cattle production for every farm type and so strengthen the link, at farm level, between crop and 
livestock production. Such a policy would match current budget expenditure under the Voluntary Coupled 
Support scheme introduced by the Common Agricultural Policy reform in 2013.
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4.1. Introduction 
Permanent grassland provides more environmental and societal benefits than cropland. Therefore, 
the importance of integrating environmental concerns into agricultural policy has been increasingly 
emphasised. According to the European regulation, permanent grassland (PG) is defined as “the land used 
to grow grasses or other herbaceous forage naturally (self-seeded) or through cultivation (sown) and that is 
not included in the crop rotation of the holding for five years or longer”. Grassland, including temporary 
and permanent grassland, is mainly valorised through forage production for grazing livestock (EIP-AGRI, 
2016). However its contribution to biodiversity (Nilsson, 2009; Gardi et al., 2002), carbon sequestration into 
soils (Conant, Paustian and Elliott, 2001; Michael Abberton, 2010; Lugato et al., 2014), clean surface and 
ground water (Xiao et al., 2015; Souchère et al., 2003; Benoît et al., 2004), and the provision of an attractive 
landscape are well recognized in scientific literature. Nevertheless, livestock production is increasingly 
shifting from a forage-based system18 to a feed and crop feed system (Naylor et al., 2005). A reduction in 
the competitiveness of grassland and, to a greater extent, permanent grassland has led to the progressive 
conversion of permanent grassland to the profit of arable land. 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in 2013 
permanent grassland represented 68% of the total agricultural area in the world. However, areas of 
permanent grassland vary considerably across the world (see Figure 4-1). In the European Union (EU), 
permanent grassland represented 34% of the total agricultural area in 2013, but between 2000 and 2013, its 
area decreased by about 8 %, a loss of approximately 5.45 million hectares.  
 
Figure 4-1. Share of Permanent meadows and pastures in the total agricultural area in 2013 (FAOstat, 2016) 
                                                     
18 Forage is defined as “Edible parts of plants, other than separated grain, that can provide feed for grazing 
animals or that can be harvested for feeding” (Allen et al., 2011) 
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Due to the importance of permanent grassland to farmers’ livelihoods and the ecological benefits, 
permanent grassland is specifically addressed in agricultural policies. In the United States (Feng, Hennessy 
and Miao, 2013), the loss of grassland has been addressed by the Grassland Reserve Program. China has 
implemented a program for ‘restoring grazing land to grassland’, and a grassland eco-compensation 
mechanism (Li, Wang and Schwarze, 2014; Wang et al., 2016). In the EU, the maintenance of permanent 
grassland was formerly addressed by the Cross-Compliance policy and it is now part of the greening 
requirements in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Under the new greening requirements in the CAP, Members States (MS) need to ensure that the 
ratio of permanent grassland area to total Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) does not fall by more than 5% 
compared to the baseline year (2012), plus arable land converted to permanent grassland in 2015. MS could 
choose whether to implement this ratio at national, regional or farm level. Almost all MS decided to manage 
the ratio of permanent grassland at national level. Only four MS opted for implementation at the regional 
level (Belgium, France, Denmark, and the United Kingdom) (European Commission, 2015a). Nevertheless, 
during the former period of the CAP, permanent grassland was addressed twice in EU regulations: the ratio 
of permanent grassland area to the total agricultural area could not decrease by more than 10 % compared 
to the base year and, with the definition of “Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition” standards 
for the protection of permanent grassland defined at MS level (such as the maintenance of permanent 
grassland in Natura 2000 areas). 
In France, the new greening requirements for permanent grassland are not expected to have a large 
impact. Indeed, since 2010 (Ministere de l’alimentation de l’agriculture et de la pêche, 2010) farmers are 
under an obligation to maintain 100% of their reference area under permanent grassland. Derogation to 
convert permanent grassland is granted up to a maximum of 5% by the local authority and is potentially 
revertible. Faïq et al (2013) observed a decline in permanent grassland between 2006 and 2010 by -6.3%. If 
they acknowledge that the Cross-Compliance policy may slow down the loss of permanent grassland, part 
of the decrease could be attributed to farmers’ declarative19 artefacts on their land use in order to limit future 
constraints. Permanent grassland might have been declared as temporary grassland or fallow land. Pflimlin 
(2013) observed similar trends and accuses the 2003 reform of having sanctioned farmers who kept 
permanent grassland and did not convert permanent grassland ahead of the legislation. Additionally, he 
questions the effectiveness of such a measure given its untargeted nature. 
The introduction of permanent grassland requirements, the change of reference year, and the 
uncertainty around future reforms to the CAP may have created an incentive for farmers to convert 
permanent grassland to arable land in advance, whether this is factual or not. Indeed, farmers wishing to 
retain some flexibility in their land allocation in the future, may have decided to reduce permanent grassland 
                                                     
19 In order to receive direct payments, farmers have to declare their land use to the authority. A declarative 
artefact refers to for instance a farmer declaring one land use for another such as permanent grassland declared as 
temporary grassland. 
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area to the profit of arable area, even though arable areas are subject to the crop diversification measure and 
ecological focus area requirement. This phenomenon has also been reported recently by Natural England 
(Pinches and Chaplin, 2014) in the United Kingdom. They have observed a decline in the absolute area 
under permanent grassland since the implementation of the Cross-compliance policy in 2005. Additionally, 
in 2012, they witnessed an increased number of applications to plough up or intensify grassland.  
Nitsch et al. (2012) investigate the land-use change between permanent grassland and arable land 
in four German federal states. They identify the loss of permanent grassland due to its conversion into 
arable land, or due to a loss of UAA. They found an overall loss of permanent grassland between 2005 and 
2007 of 80 000 hectares, from which 41 300 hectares was attributed to conversion to arable land. They 
identify decoupled payments as one of the drivers for the conversion of permanent grassland. Indeed, 
Germany implemented an Single Payment Scheme hybrid model20 which has progressively smoothed the 
difference in payments between sectors. Historically, the livestock sector received a coupled premium 
payment per head, turning grassland into an attractive source of feed via grazing. Over the years, the 
redistribution of payments decreased the competiveness of permanent grassland to the profit of arable land. 
Consequently, the internal convergence policy implemented in the post 2013 CAP and the current low 
prices for livestock products will certainly increase the pressure on permanent grassland. 
In 2010, eighty experts from Europe co-signed a declaration (Balmann et al., 2010) and advocated 
that: “All subsidies should be closely linked to the provision of public goods. Any subsidy that is not 
differentiated according to farmers’ provision of public goods, such as the Single Farm Payment, should be 
progressively phased out.” The strengthening of the link between land and livestock is also recognized as a 
means to internalize negative externalities (Naylor et al., 2005; Lemaire et al., 2014; Herrero et al., 2015). If 
the goal of the greening requirement is to internalize negative externalities, the production costs of the 
farmers should reflect the value of negative externalities produced (Polluter-Pays-Principle), and the rules 
should apply to all farmers uniformly. If the goal of the greening requirement is to promote the provision 
of public good using subsidy, the costs should be bared by the society (Provider-Gets-Principle). Whether 
the greening requirements tend to internalize negative externalities or promote the provision of public good 
is unclear (Matthews, 2013). Indeed, given that greening requirements apply uniformly across agricultural 
sectors and European regions without taking into account individual specificities, some farmers will 
potentially opt to reduce the payments received and not respect what is stated in “[…] adopting and 
maintaining farming systems and practices that are particularly favourable to environmental and climate 
objectives because market prices do not reflect the provision of such public goods.”(European Commission, 
2011d). Furthermore, the reform of the CAP has introduced the possibility of granting Voluntary Coupled 
Supports (VCS) to specific farm types or sectors, representing 4.1% of the total amount for direct support 
                                                     
20 Member States had three main options for calculating the value of payment entitlements: (1) on the basis 
of the payments received by the individual farmer during a reference period ("historical model"), (2) taking all payments 
received in a region and dividing them by the number of eligible hectares ("regional model"), (3) a mixture between 
these two models ("hybrid model"). 
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in the EU. Twenty four MS chose to support the beef and veal sectors, accounting for 41% of the budget 
dedicated to VCS (European Commission, 2015c). For France, the provision of support represents an 
average premium per suckler cow of 71 to 132 euros per annum, depending on the farm size. Coupled 
support is also applied in the milk sector and the sheep and goat sectors. Coupled support is classified by 
the OECD as an environmentally harmful (Schmid et al., 2007) and trade distortive instrument. The reforms 
of 2000 and 2003 intended to eliminate such types of support. 
Given the questions regarding the environmental effectiveness of the maintenance of permanent 
grassland (Mouysset, 2014; Hauck et al., 2014), the ongoing internal convergence of support and the 
observed recoupling of support, we consider the option of a premium per hectare for permanent grassland 
in France. Increasing the competitiveness of permanent grassland would ultimately lead to a decrease in 
forage costs and would support the livestock sector per se. The provision of coupled support linked to 
permanent grassland is expected to favour extensive livestock production and enhance the provision of 
environmental benefits. By simulating the introduction of a premium per hectare for permanent grassland, 
we can determine the premium level for which permanent grassland would be maintained according to a 
given base year. Hence, the derived premium reflects the current opportunity costs for the maintenance of 
permanent grassland. Furthermore, we differentiate support per farm type and region, enabling us to 
investigate the effectiveness of such a premium, its impact on production and to compare it to the current 
greening requirement. The case of France is particularly relevant, since its agricultural sector and landscape 
characteristics are very diversified. Hence, any supports provided uniformly might have severe impact on 
the overall budget. 
In section 4.2, we examine the evolution of permanent grassland areas in France during the period 
1995-2009, and compare our observations to studies using other data sources. Section 4.3 explains the 
methodology used and section 4.4 illustrates the results found. Finally, section 4.5 discusses the main 
findings, the limitations and section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2. Current state of permanent grassland in France 
In this study, data are extracted from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) for the period 
1995-2009. Holdings are selected to take part in the survey on the basis of a sampling plan. The sampling 
plan provides a representative dataset along three dimensions: region, economic size and type of farming. 
An individual weight is defined for each holding, corresponding to the number of holdings sampled divided 
by the number of farms they intend to represent. In France, the total number of holdings selected cover 
93.1% of the total UAA and 97.2% of the total number of holdings. 
 According to FADN data, in 2009, permanent grassland represented between 86% of the total 
UAA (Corsica) and 1.6% of the total UAA (Île-de-France). Figure 4 2 illustrates the variation in permanent 
grassland in the UAA between the different regions.  
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We observe that permanent grassland dominates other land use in mountainous areas such as 
Franche-Comté and Auvergne, except for Lower-Normandy on the West coast which is characterized by 
wooded pasture. Regions oriented towards cereal production (Ile de France region), or intensive livestock 
production (Brittany region) have the lowest share of permanent grassland. Even though we use FADN 
data, we do not observe any significant differences with land-cover data (Faïq et al., 2013; Xiao et al., 2015).  
Figure 4-3 illustrates the use of permanent grassland depending on the farm-type21 activities. Not 
surprisingly, beef cattle and dairy producers have the highest share of permanent grassland in their UAA. In 
regions with limited potential to plough clay soils, agricultural production is oriented towards grazing-
                                                     
21 We use TF8 grouping as defined by the European Regulation 2003/369 (EC). 
Figure 4-2. Share of permanent grassland in the total UAA in 2009. 
Source: authors calculation based on FADN 
Figure 4-3. Share of permanent grassland in the total UAA per type of farmer in 2009. 
Source: authors calculation based on FADN 
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livestock production. Consequently, permanent grassland is the main component of the fodder mix 
(Caillaud et al., 2013).  
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 show different trends regarding the share of permanent grassland in the 
UAA across regions compared to the absolute change in permanent grassland. Expansion of permanent 
grassland occurred in eastern mountainous regions. On the other hand, we observed a strong reduction in 
permanent grassland in Brittany and the Centre region. In fact, permanent grassland decreases in regions 
where intensive livestock production or combined crop and livestock production are important activities. 
These observations concur with other studies, identifying a shift from permanent grassland to temporary 
grassland and crops (Bouty, Barbottin and Martin, 2014; Faïq et al., 2013; Xiao et al., 2015).  
 
Figure 4-4. Change in the share of permanent grassland in the total UAA between 1995 and 2009 
Source: authors calculation based on FADN 
Figure 4-5. Change in permanent grassland (1000ha) between 1995 and 2009 
Source: authors calculation based on FADN 
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In contrast to Faïq et al (2013), we do not observe a net loss of permanent grassland in the FADN. 
Overall, the share of permanent grassland in the UAA stayed stable at around 26% between 1995 and 2009. 
Figure 4-6 depicts the absolute change in permanent grassland and UAA per type of farming activity along 
with the relative change between the year 1995 and 2005. On the one hand, some sectors reduced their 
UAA. Roots crops (Field crops), beef and dairy combined (Mix Cattle), and mixed cropping (Mix Crops) 
sectors experienced the most important reduction in UAA (Figure 4-6 b and d), but the associated decrease 
in permanent grassland is less than proportional to their loss of UAA (Figure 4-6 c). Specialized dairy farmers 
reduced their permanent grassland in terms of absolute value, but their UAA remained stable, indicating 
intensification in their farming systems. On the other hand, during the same period, some sectors saw their 
UAA increase. Interestingly, specialists in cereals, farmers combining field crops and grazing livestock, and 
specialist granivores have increased permanent grassland; proportionally more than their UAA, indicating a 
gain in permanent grassland over other land uses (Figure 4-6 c and d). For specialist granivore (Granivore), 
fruit and citrus (Fruit&Citrus) and various crops and livestock combined (Mix LS_Crops), the relative 
change is important, but corresponds to small absolute values and may be due to important variations in 
the dataset or conversion to organic farming. Finally, specialist cattle-rearing and fattening (Cattle) 
experienced the greatest increase in both UAA and permanent grassland (Figure 4-6 a and b) but with a 
relatively lower change for permanent grassland than for UAA. A more detailed analysis shows that grazing 
livestock production is the sector that experiences the highest increase or decrease in permanent grassland 
depending on the region. Consequently, permanent grassland in this sector shows the highest degree of 
substitution with other land use and we expect that this sector will be the most price-sensitive to a premium 
per hectare of permanent grassland.  
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Figure 4-6. Change in permanent grassland and UAA between 1995 and 2009. 
Source: authors calculation based on FADN 
The difference in trends observed between FADN data and the Faïq et al (2013) study may be due 
to several factors. First of all, as explained above, FADN data does not account for every farmer and the 
sampling method does not guarantee a good representation of permanent grassland. However, our results 
are in line with the Farm Structure Survey that reports a relative constant share of permanent grassland in 
the UAA of about 29% between 2000 and 2013 (see Appendix III for further details), but shows an overall 
loss of permanent grassland (specifically between 1995 and 2000) along with a loss of UAA. Nevertheless, 
the French FADN excludes farmers with a Standard Output below 25 000 euros, and they are not 
considered within this study per se. Yet, it is likely that farmers with a Standard Output below 25 000 euros 
receive lower direct payments. Since ‘small farmers’ are exempted from greening requirements, their 
exclusion from the FADN will not affect the results of this policy simulation. 
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4.3. Data and methodology 
Mathematical programming models are widely used for policy impact assessment at the farm, 
regional, and sectoral levels. They originate from the normative mathematical programming model, where 
farmers’ decisions are represented by a series of linear constraints under explicit specification of their goal, 
usually profit maximization. One of the major drawbacks to using a normative approach in policy impact 
assessment is that solutions do not always represent the observed reality, and might exhibit jumpy behaviour, 
otherwise termed the “extreme specialization problem” (Baker and McCarl, 1982; Buysse et al., 2007).  
When using a normative approach at sectoral or regional level, the problem of extreme 
specialization becomes more severe due to aggregation bias (Önal and McCarl, 1991; Chen and Onal, 2012; 
Paris and Howitt, 1998; Baker and McCarl, 1982). To remedy this situation, several alternatives have been 
developed by modellers: the use of additional constraints, the crop mix approach and the introduction of 
risk (Mérel and Howitt, 2014). To obtain a smooth supply response, to reproduce the observed reference 
situation and enhance reliability in the results, positive mathematical programming models have been 
developed. This approach involves introducing nonlinearity into the objective function, and calibrates the 
unknown parameters to the given reference situation (comprehensive reviews of the methods and its 
applications are provided by Mérel and Howitt 2014; Heckelei et al. 2012). 
Despite the methodological developments mentioned above, policy impact assessments have been 
mostly carried out with a certain level of aggregation, and this also applies to the analysis of the greening 
measures (Pelikan et al., 2015; Cortignani and Dono, 2015; Solazzo et al., 2015). Often, representative farms 
are constructed representing a subset of farmers and encompassing all farmers’ activities. Aggregation was 
necessary due to data availability constraints, or computational difficulties in modelling all farmers. 
Furthermore, for agricultural policy focused on market policy instruments (import/export taxes/subsidies, 
quota etc…) an aggregate supply response was sufficient (Buysse et al., 2007). Nowadays agricultural policy 
and more specifically the CAP tends to internalize negative externalities. Policy makers design new 
instruments, such as the maintenance of permanent grassland, in order to change the production system at 
farm level. Consequently, aggregated models implicitly assume a certain degree of substitution between 
farmers, leading to unrealistic results. 
We develop a farm-type regional model using historical activity mixes that we extend using 
individual farm production frontier constraints defined by the historical activity mix for the observed 
farmers and their associated peers. Such an approach enables us to take full advantage of the information 
available within the FADN dataset, from individual farm information to regional information and even 
though full calibration is not obtained, it greatly mitigates the problem of overspecialization. Nevertheless, 
the impact assessment of policy instruments is only feasible to the extent that policy instruments and market 
conditions resemble those of the past and do not fall outside the production possibility set. Our approach, 
which we will discuss below, is a partial answer to aggregation bias and remains easy to implement at a 
practical level. 
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4.3.1. Using all dimensions of FADN data 
In order to get a clear understanding of what is meant by a farm-type regional model, a short 
description of the information available in FADN is required. Table 4-1 shows what information is available 
within our dataset. The strength of FADN data is to be an unbalanced panel dataset that is representative 
of the population each year. For instance, some farmers have their information recorded for the full duration 
of our dataset (1995-2009). Other farmers can be recorded for a single year (Farmer 3). In fact, FADN data 
provides three dimensional information: panel information at farm level (e.g. Farmer 2), cross-sectional 
information at farm level (e.g. Column 2007 ) and panel information at farm-type regional level ( the bottom 
row). 
Table 4-1. FADN dataset description 
Regions 
Type of 
farm 
Farmers 1995 … 2007 2008 2009 
A
ls
ac
e 
S
p
ec
ia
lis
t 
d
ai
ry
 Farmer 1 𝑥𝑓1,1995 𝑥𝑓1,..    
Farmer 2 𝑥𝑓2,1995 𝑥𝑓2,.. 𝑥𝑓3,2007 𝑥𝑓3,2008 𝑥𝑓3,2009 
Farmer 3     𝑥𝑓4,2009 
Farmer 4   𝑥𝑓4,2007 𝑥𝑓4,2008 𝑥𝑓5,2009 
Total for the specialist dairy 
farm in Alsace 
𝑿𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟓
= ∑ 𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒇,𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟓 . 𝒙𝒇,𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟓
𝒇
 𝑿… 𝑿𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕 𝑿𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖 𝑿𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟗 
Our approach maximizes profit at farm-type regional level where the optimal solution: 
(1). is a linear weighted average of historical farm-type regional activities mixes. 
(2). is the sum of individual solutions which themselves are a linear weighted average of their historical 
and/or peer activity mix. 
Point 1 above is derived from the historical crop mix approach suggested by McCarl (1982) and 
based on the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition principle (Dantzig and Wolfe, 1961) introducing the notion of 
extreme point representation. Önal and McCarl (1991) show that the optimal solution for an aggregate 
model including all decision makers is one-to-one correspondence with the optimal solutions for individual 
models. In fact, an extreme point (the corner solution of a linear programming model) of the aggregate 
model is formed by stacking the extreme points (the different corner solutions) of the individual models 
and conversely, the extreme points of individual models can be obtained by partitioning the extreme points 
of the aggregate model. This approach was used in order to alleviate the researcher’s need for full 
information about micro-level input-output data (Chen and Onal, 2012). Our approach, discussed here, is 
different in nature to what is suggested, in the sense that despite generating an aggregate farm-type regional 
model, we also partition the aggregate optimal solution into an individual optimal solution (given the weight 
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provided in FADN) in order to improve the model accuracy and model farmer’s adoption outside her 
historical production set. 
Point 2 ensures that the individual optimal solution is a convex combination of the individual 
and/or peer historical activities. As shown in Table 4-1, FADN is an unbalanced panel dataset and some 
farmers are only present for a single year (e.g. Farmer 3). In order to obtain correct representation, we only 
simulate the policy impact for farmers present in 2009. For those without records prior to 2009, it would 
be infeasible to model input/output changes without a set of agronomic and economic constraints. Instead, 
we assume that a farmer can partially or fully adopt the activity mix of his peers. This approach is similar to 
Oude Lansink and van der Vlist (2008), Frija et al. (2011) and Speelman et al. (2009). In these studies, the 
authors estimate a production frontier defined by a convex hull around the technically efficient observations. 
In this configuration, inputs and outputs are used as parameters to determine objective values (similar to 
the historical activity mix approach), and hence efficiency scores. Subsequently, the model can estimate the 
changes required in inputs or outputs due to policy change, while preserving the initial technology frontier. 
The optimal solution is a linear weighted average of peer observations, preserving the initial efficiency score. 
Consequently, the first step of our modelling exercise is to define peer farmers. Similar to the 
aforementioned studies, we will first calculate the efficiency scores for all farmers present in 2009 against all 
farmers from 1995 to 2009 in their farm-type category and region. Then peer farmers are defined as the 
farmers against which individual farmers are benchmarked (for complete details of the model selecting peer 
see Appendix IV). Additionally, using peer behaviour enables farmers to adopt farm activities outside their 
individual production possibility set, while the farm-type regional activities remain within the production 
possibility set. Similar to chapter 2, the use of peers for simulating adoption addresses the self-selection 
problem defined in Paris (2001). 
4.3.2. A farm-type regional model using Mathematical programming and farm 
activity mix 
The model consists of farm-type regional models with the goal to maximize their profits 𝜋𝐹𝑇𝑅. For 
clarity, and to avoid too many indexes, we illustrate the case of a single farm-type regional model. 
Nevertheless, the model is solved for every farm type in each region. This gives, for a specific farm type in 
a given region: 
max
 𝑦,𝑐,𝑥
 𝜋   = ∑ 𝑊𝑓
𝑓
. (∑ 𝑃𝑘 . 𝑦𝑓,𝑘
𝑘
− ∑ 𝐷𝑗 . 𝑐𝑓,𝑗 + ∑ 𝑆𝑖. 𝑥𝑓,𝑖, + 𝐷𝑆𝑓
𝑖𝑗
) 
  
 
(4.1) 
where 𝑓 indexes the farm, 𝑘  the outputs of the farmers, 𝑗 the different categories of input costs 
and 𝑖 the different inputs used by the farmers. 𝑊𝑓 is the weight for each farmer in the sample. 𝑦𝑓,𝑘 is a 
column vector of production quantities, 𝑥𝑓,𝑖 is a column of vector of input activities, such as crops areas, 
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and 𝑐𝑓,𝑗 is a column vector of input costs recorder in euros, such as fertiliser costs. 𝑃𝑘 is the average outprice 
observed in 2009 per farm type in a given region and 𝐷𝑗 is the index price for the different input cost 
categories in 2009. 𝑆𝑖 is a possible premium for a given activity or any coupled subsidies received in 2009 
by a farmer, and 𝐷𝑆𝑓 is the sum of decoupled payments and rural development subsidies received by a 
farmer in 2009.  
One of the limitations of the FADN data is that it does not provide data on input quantities, such 
as fertilizer or concentrate use, and does not allocate them to specific farm activities. Instead, FADN 
provides the total amount spent by the farmers for specific cost categories. One of the options could be to 
partition input costs per activity. Yet, partitioning input costs given, for instance, the participation share of 
such activities to farm income is somewhat arbitrary. Another option is to directly use input costs as an 
endogenous variable. Indeed, Eurostat provides a detailed input price index for the different input cost 
categories, allowing us to deflate them and use input costs as variables. This approach is in line with the 
model logic. Since the optimal solution is a linear weighted average of past observations, input costs from 
the past certainly reflect the activity set. 
Three sets of constraints ensure that the farm-type regional endogenous variables, 𝑌𝑘 the produce 
quantities, 𝑋𝑖 the input activities and 𝐶𝑗 the input costs, are partitioned according to the weight of each 
farmer. 
𝑌𝑘 = ∑ 𝑊𝑓 . 𝑦𝑓,𝑘
𝑓
 
(4.2) 
𝑋𝑖 = ∑ 𝑊𝑓 . 𝑥𝑓,𝑖
𝑓
 
(4.3) 
𝐶𝑗 = ∑ 𝑊𝑓 . 𝑐𝑓,𝑗
𝑓
 
(4.4) 
Four sets of constraints illustrate the historical activity mix approach proposed by McCarl in 1981: 
𝑌𝑘 −  ∑ 𝜆𝑡 𝑌𝑡,?̂?
𝑡
= 0 
(4.5) 
𝑋𝑖 −  ∑ 𝜆𝑡 𝑋𝑡,?̂?
𝑡
= 0 
(4.6) 
𝐶𝑗 −  ∑ 𝜆𝑡 𝐶𝑡,?̂?
𝑡
= 0 
(4.7) 
∑ 𝜆𝑡 
𝑡
= 1  
(4.8) 
where t indexes the different years from 1995 to 2009. 𝑌𝑡,?̂?,  𝑋𝑡,?̂?, and  𝐶𝑡,?̂? are, respectively, the 
historical farm-type regional observations for production quantities, input activities, and input costs and are 
exogenous to the model. Hence, constraints (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) restrict production quantities, input 
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activities, and input costs to a weighted sum of historical observations, where the weights 𝜆𝑦 are to be 
determined by the mathematical program as endogenous variables. Constraint (4.8) restricts the sum of the 
weight to 1. 
Finally, the last set of constraints ensure that farm level solutions are themselves a linear weighted 
average of their historical or/and peer activity mix. 
𝑦𝑓,𝑘 −  ∑ 𝛿𝑓,𝑡  𝑦𝑓,?̂?
𝑡
− ∑ 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑘̂ /𝜃𝑓
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= 0 
(4.9) 
𝑥𝑓,𝑖 −  ∑ 𝛿𝑓,𝑡 𝑥𝑓,?̂?
𝑡
− ∑ 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑖̂ /𝜃𝑓
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= 0 
(4.10) 
𝑐𝑓,𝑗 −  ∑ 𝛿𝑓,𝑡 𝑐𝑓,?̂?
𝑡
− ∑ 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑗̂ /𝜃𝑓
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= 0 
(4.11) 
∑ 𝛿𝑓,𝑡
𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= 1 
(4.12) 
∑ 𝑥𝑓,𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑓
𝑖
 
where 𝑖 corresponds to crops acreage. 
(4.13) 
𝛿𝑓,𝑡, 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟, 𝑐𝑓,𝑗, 𝑥𝑓,𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑓,𝑘  ≥ 0  (4.14) 
where 𝑦𝑓,?̂?, 𝑥𝑓,?̂? and 𝑐𝑓,?̂? are, respectively, the historical farm observations for production quantities, 
input activities, and input costs and are exogenous to the model. 𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑘̂  , 𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑖̂  and 𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑗̂  are, 
respectively, the historical peer observations of production quantities, input activities, and input costs and 
are exogenous to the model. 𝜃𝑓 is the efficiency score for each individual farmer and its value lies between 
0 and 1. Hence, constraints (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11) restrict the production quantities at farm level, input 
activities and input costs to a weighted sum of the farmer’s historical and peer observations. However, a 
farmer will adopt the production set of another farmer reduced by the efficiency score. Appendix IV 
provides a more detailed explanation of how we derived the efficiency score for each farmer and defined 
his peers. Constraint (4.12) restricts the sum of weights to 1. Constraint (4.13) restricts the total UAA of the 
farmers to the maximum observed UAA for the same given farmer. Finally, constraint (4.14) imposes a non-
negativity restriction on all endogenous variables. 
We run the above model for 50 different premiums for permanent grassland (𝑆𝑖) from 0€/ ha to 
500€/ha. Here, we intend to determine for which premium level we will observe the same allocation of 
permanent grassland as in 2009 at farm-type regional level. As mentioned in the introduction section, the 
new greening requirements for permanent grassland in France is not expected to have a large impact. Under 
the standards for good agricultural and environmental conditions, farmers could not convert permanent 
grassland. Hence we considered that farmer in 2009 could not reduce their amount of permanent grassland. 
In estimating the premium level for which farmers allocate the same amount of permanent grassland than 
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in 2009, we can determine their opportunity costs (equal to the level of premium per ha that leads to the 
same level of permanent grassland), and the impact on production. Additionally, we can determine a farm-
type regional level or regional level area-based payment that would ensure the ‘maintenance of permanent 
grassland’ according to the 2009 base year.  
By integrating farm-type regional constraints and farm-level constraints, we reduce the problem of 
overspecialization. Indeed, if the model was run at farm level, every farmer would adopt the production set 
of the most profitable farmer. On the other hand, if the model was run at regional level, without farm 
constraints, it would be infeasible to simulate policy at farm level, for instance the adoption of new activities 
at farm level. This approach enables us to reconcile ‘regional’ versus ‘individual’ modelling in a rather simple 
framework. 
4.4. Results 
In this section, we first run our model given 2009 prices while not imposing any obligations 
regarding permanent grassland. The baseline scenario reveals which farm type in each region is sub-optimal 
in 2009 and would change their production possibility set. In other words, given that in 2009 farmers were 
obliged to maintain permanent grassland, the baseline scenario determines which farmers change their 
amount of permanent grassland if there is no obligations. Second, we determine the opportunity costs for 
maintaining permanent grassland at farm-type regional level. Third, we determine the opportunity costs at 
regional level, and look at the impact of the introduction of a regional premium on production. Finally, we 
take the highest observed regional opportunity cost and implement a premium for permanent grassland 
equal to it for all regions and farm types. We also illustrate the impact on production. 
4.4.1. Baseline scenario: no greening and no premium 
The baseline scenario takes into account the 2009 prices, but does not impose the maintenance of 
permanent grassland or implement a premium per hectare of permanent grassland. In this scenario, given 
the market and policy conditions, we identify farm-type regions that reduce their amount of permanent 
grassland and so are sub-optimal in 2009 - in other words, farm-type regions that reduce their permanent 
grassland area when there is no requirement to maintain permanent grassland. 
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Figure 4-7 shows the relative change in permanent grassland area and UAA. Overall, the change to 
UAA remains small, since constraint (4.13) in our model imposes a restriction at farm level, in the sense 
that farmers can reduce/increase their UAA to the extent that they remain below the maximum historical 
value observed. Nevertheless, the regions plotted in shades of grey show an increase in permanent grassland. 
For those regions, the maintenance of permanent grassland, and how it is implemented today, does not 
change their land use and it is considered as having no impact. We expect that the opportunity costs will be 
close to zero. Three other categories of regions all experience a decrease in permanent grassland (regions 
plotted yellow, orange and red). The regions plotted with the lightest shade of yellow exhibit a decrease in 
permanent grassland along with an increase in UAA and, for the regions plotted in orange and red of the 
decrease in permanent grassland is partly due to the decrease in UAA. 
Figure 4-8 shows the absolute change in permanent grassland given the different type of farming 
activities for a simulation model without subsidies and compared to the base year 2009. If we look at the 
average change between regions, as expected, specialist cattle-rearing and fattening displays the largest 
decrease, followed by specialist dairy, specialist cereals, oilseed and protein crops. However, taking into 
account the variation between regions, sheep and goat farming and, mixed crop farming, despite having a 
positive average, exhibit wide variation and also tend to reduce permanent grassland. For other farm types, 
the change in permanent grassland is not very significant.  
Figure 4-7. Relative change in permanent grassland and UAA for a simulation model without subsidies, 
compared to 2009. 
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Figure 4-8. Box plot of the change in permanent grassland at farm-type level between the baseline scenario 
and observations in 2009. 
4.4.2. The opportunity cost of permanent grassland 
In this scenario, we run our model for 50 different premiums for permanent grassland (𝑆𝑖) from 
0€/ ha to 500€/ha, and identify the premium level for each farm-type region that results in the same 
permanent grassland area as in 2009. Thus, the premium paid corresponds to the opportunity cost for the 
current maintenance of permanent grassland under the greening requirements. Table 4-2 shows the results 
at farm-type regional level with an opportunity cost above zero. For all other farm-type regions they have 
the same amount of permanent grassland as in 2009, or above, without any premium. As expected, regions 
in grey shades in Figure 4-7 are not present in Table 4-2, except for three regions: Centre, Champagne-
Ardenne and Haute-Normandie. For these three regions, only one farm type is involved and the opportunity 
costs, along with the area of permanent grassland concerned, remain relatively small. In these specific 
regions, when the premium is zero, some farm types within the region compensate for the loss of permanent 
grassland for other farm types in the same region. This will be discussed in more detail below. The 
opportunity cost for permanent grassland varies from 5.9 €/ha to 240€/ha depending on the region and the 
farm type. The area of permanent grassland concerned represents about 22% of the total area of permanent 
grassland in 2009.  
The total budget spent on such coupled payments is approximately 72M€, which is much lower 
than the VCS for the beef sector in France for the year 2015, which is approximately 652M€. This illustrates 
that targeted policies taking farmers’ and regional specificities into account can increase efficiency. If we 
assume that, from a legal perspective, policy makers could decide to implement a farm-type regional area 
base payment for permanent grassland, they would reduce their budget drastically. If we sum the total area 
of permanent grassland and the budget spent on specialist dairy farming, specialist cattle-rearing and 
fattening, and sheep and goats, they represent 97% of the permanent grassland area receiving support and 
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97% of the total budget spend. Hence, any coupled support to permanent grassland would benefit current 
targeted sectors under VCS, but would also be a partial answer to the societal demand to link support to 
positive externalities. 
Table 4-2. Opportunity costs for maintenance of permanent grassland for the different French regions. 
Regions Type of farming Opportunity 
costs (€/ha) 
PG area (ha) 
Budget 
spent (€) 
Auvergne Specialist cereals, oilseed and 
protein crops 
20.0 13 293 265 856 
Auvergne Specialist vineyards 30.0 165 4 935 
Basse-Normandie Specialist cattle-rearing and 
fattening 
20.0 111 602 2 232 032 
Basse-Normandie Specialist dairy 70.0 301 196 21 083 713 
Basse-Normandie Specialist horticulture 240.0 358 86 016 
Centre Specialist dairy 9.5 6 847 65 049 
Champagne-Ardenne Sheep, goats and other grazing 
livestock 
10.0 1 786 17 860 
Franche-Comté Specialist dairy 100.0 307 789 30 778 880 
Haute-Normandie General field cropping 30.0 17 886 536 580 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
Specialist cattle-rearing and 
fattening 
5.9 145 743 859 883 
Languedoc-
Roussillon 
Specialist dairy 
12.6 29 296 369 132 
Lorraine Specialist cereals, oilseed and 
protein crops 
20.0 54 835 1 096 700 
Midi-Pyrénées Specialist cattle-rearing and 
fattening 
10.0 250 109 2 501 093 
Midi-Pyrénées Specialist dairy 10.0 31 086 310 862 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais Field crops - grazing livestock 
combined 
100.0 60 410 6 040 980 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais Specialist cereals, oilseed and 
protein crops 
40.0 5 895 235 788 
Picardie Specialist cereals, oilseed and 
protein crops 
90.0 16 937 1 524 366 
Poitou-Charentes Mixed cropping 40.0 10 682 427 292 
Poitou-Charentes Specialist cattle-rearing and 
fattening 
20.0 44 835 896 694 
Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur 
Sheep, goats and other grazing 
livestock 
7.9 109 162 862 380 
Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur 
Specialist granivores 
30.0 58 1 752 
Rhône-Alpes Specialist cereals, oilseed and 
protein crops 
70.0 29 048 2 033 367 
France 
 
 1 549 018 72 231 210 
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4.4.3. Policy scenarios at regional and country level 
Let’s assume first, that instead of determining a premium at farm-type regional level, we seek a 
regional premium identical across farm types. Then, the premium level is set when the permanent grassland 
allocation at regional level (and not at farm-type regional level) is the same as in 2009. Table 4-3 shows the 
opportunity costs for the maintenance of permanent grassland for the different French regions. Regions in 
yellow in Figure 4-9 are all regions for which we do not observe any change in permanent grassland 
allocation (as explained above) and for which the opportunity cost is zero. The highest opportunity cost is 
in the region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais and is about 100€/ha at regional level. However, it varies a lot from 
region to region, ranging from 5.8€/ha to 100€/ha. 
Table 4-3 shows that in order to maintain permanent grassland at the 2009 level, a premium per 
hectare defined at regional rather than farm-type regional level (Table 4-2) would multiply the budget by 
about 2.5 and the area of permanent grassland affected by the measure would be multiplied by three. Indeed, 
about 66% of the area under permanent grassland in France would receive a premium per ha, compared to 
22% of the total area of permanent grassland in the case of a premium determined at farm-type regional 
level. Also, three regions – Centre, Haute-Normandie and Languedoc-Roussillon – do not receive any 
premium, while we observe a non-zero opportunity cost for certain farm types in these regions. As 
mentioned earlier, some farm types will compensate for the loss of permanent grassland in others, resulting 
in the absence of opportunity costs at regional level. Consequently, the variation in opportunity costs is also 
smaller, ranging from 5.8€/ha to 100€/ha. 
  
Figure 4-9.Opportunity costs for maintenance of permanent grassland for the different French regions 
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Table 4-3. Opportunity costs for maintenance of permanent grassland for the different French regions. 
Regions 
Opportunity costs 
(€/ha) 
PG area (ha) 
Budget spent 
(€) 
Auvergne 30 885 291 26 558 730 
Basse-Normandie 69.7 582 580 40 605 805 
Champagne-
Ardenne 
10 277 457 2 774 572 
Franche-Comté 29.8 447 478 13 334 841 
Lorraine 18.7 504 254 9 429 555 
Midi-Pyrénées 9.4 561 285 5 276 080 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 100 159 279 15 927 880 
Picardie 83.5 126 755 10 584 034 
Poitou-Charentes 37.6 159 267 5 988 443 
Provence-Alpes-
Côte d'Azur 
5.8 189 496 1 099 076 
Rhône-Alpes 63.7 752 327 47 923 204 
Total  4 645 468 179 502 221 
Table 4-4 shows the impact on financial results of the introduction of a premium per hectare for 
permanent grassland derived from the opportunity costs in Table 4-3. The highest impact on profit is 
observed for specialist cattle-rearing and fattening, followed by farm-type categories where grazing livestock 
is the most important source of income. Even though specialists in dairy farming receive the biggest share 
of the subsidy (about 35% of the total budget), the introduction of a premium for permanent grassland, has 
less impact on their profitability than for specialist cattle-rearing and fattening. This phenomenon can be 
explained by the higher profitability of the dairy sector, and the capacity of the dairy sector to obtain the 
highest added value for permanent grassland (Caillaud et al., 2013; Kellermann and Salhofer, 2014; Havet 
et al., 2010). By comparing the absolute change in profit and subsidy, we can conclude that most of the 
change in profit is due to the introduction of a premium (except for specialist horticulture and specialist 
vineyards). However, this positive change in profit is not only due to the increased amount of subsidies that 
farmers received. Indeed, the model picks the most optimal farm-type regional production set, and a change 
at farm level impacts the complete production possibility set. For instance, for specialist dairy farming we 
observe an increase in the total cost and a decrease in revenue compared to the baseline. Farmers who 
change their production and increase their permanent grassland partially adopt the production possibility 
set of another farmer and/or their own historical production possibilities and therefore also the 
accompanying costs and revenue structures. Some farm types, such as mixed livestock, mainly grazing 
livestock, do not change their production but still benefit from the premium since the premium is set at 
region level and not at farm-type regional level. 
  
Greening and the maintenance of Permanent grassland 
69 
 
Table 4-4. Impact of a regional premium for permanent grassland on financial results. 
  
Relative change compared to 
baseline (%) 
Absolute change 
compared to baseline 
(M€) 
 
Type of farming Cost Revenue Profit Profit Subsidies 
% of Subsidies 
received from the 
total budget 
Specialist horticulture 0.03 0.12 0.89 3.20 3.26 0.02 
Specialist vineyards -0.05 -0.02 3.29 86.22 86.47 0.46 
Specialist fruit and 
citrus fruit 
0.00 0.00 10.28 54.61 54.61 0.29 
Various permanent 
crops combined 
0.00 0.00 35.51 14.20 14.20 0.08 
Specialist granivores -0.09 -0.09 62.10 31.57 31.57 0.17 
Mixed cropping 0.15 -0.06 66.95 213.76 214.57 1.15 
Specialist cereals, 
oilseed and protein 
crops 
3.84 0.56 71.35 717.51 765.31 4.11 
Various crops and 
livestock combined 
0.00 0.00 76.06 118.71 118.71 0.64 
General field cropping -0.01 -0.01 114.97 576.34 576.39 3.10 
Field crops - grazing 
livestock combined 
1.55 0.70 307.13 2674.50 2685.96 14.44 
Specialist dairy 1.08 -0.20 466.67 6513.70 6545.79 35.19 
Cattle-dairy, rearing and 
fattening combined 
0.00 0.00 598.28 1172.21 1172.21 6.30 
Mixed livestock, mainly 
granivores 
0.00 0.00 677.27 104.26 104.26 0.56 
Mixed livestock, mainly 
grazing livestock 
0.00 0.00 857.36 283.66 283.66 1.53 
Sheep, goats and other 
grazing livestock 
0.70 0.23 972.73 1824.45 1827.04 9.82 
Specialist cattle-rearing 
and fattening 
0.41 -1.30 2223.71 4103.84 4115.17 22.12 
Figure 4-10 shows the major impacts on land use, livestock and input use per type of farming. For 
specialist cattle-rearing and fattening, the introduction of a premium leads to an increase in permanent 
pasture. They substitute temporary grassland, common wheat and rough grazing areas for permanent 
grassland. At the same time, they reduce their livestock density (we observe a decrease in pigs LU, indeed 
despite being specialist some farmers raise pigs as a small proportion). Interestingly, their consumption of 
fodder purchased outside the farm also increases, indicating that the increase in permanent grassland along 
with a reduction in livestock density does not fully compensate for the loss of fodder production. Specialist 
cereals, oilseed and protein crops reduce fallow land, common wheat and dry pulse areas to the profit of 
permanent grassland but also to the profit of oilseed crops and fodder maize. The introduction of a premium 
for permanent grassland gives them an incentive to diversify their production and increase their cattle 
production. As mentioned before, although being classified as specialist cereals, oilseed and protein crops, 
some farmers in these categories have a small share in cattle production. In the case of the introduction of 
a premium for permanent grassland, those farmers are selected as peers. Other farmers partially adopt their 
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production structure and so increase their number of cattle. Given that grassland is mainly valorised through 
forage production for grazing livestock, specialist cereals, oilseed and protein crops have an incentive to 
increase their livestock production if permanent grassland is subsidised. The increase in livestock for 
specialist cereals, oilseed and proteins crop farm types can explain the increase in rapeseed production. 
Indeed, rapeseed cake is a source of protein in the feeding ration and the oil can be used for the biodiesel 
market (Britz and Hertel, 2011; Bernard and Prieur, 2007). Besides, the results show that specialist cereals, 
oilseed and protein crops would also rely on the purchase of fodder. For specialist dairy farming, a similar 
phenomenon is observed and they diversify their production by decreasing the dairy herd and increasing 
the cattle herd. Additionally, they replace fodder maize with grassland, while they rely more on the purchase 
of fodder. Field crops/grazing livestock combined farm types do not increase permanent pasture area; 
instead they intensify their livestock production by increasing the cattle number, the fodder maize area, 
fertilizer use and concentrate purchase. By implementing a homogenous premium per hectare across farm 
type, other farm types with lower opportunity costs will produce permanent grassland. Finally, no major 
changes are observed for mixed cropping or sheep, goats and other grazing livestock farm types except for 
rough grazing area. Rough grazing area is defined as permanent pasture and received the same premium in 
our simulation exercise (similar to the legislation), nevertheless farmers prefer permanent pasture to rough 
grazing areas except for sheep, goats and other grazing livestock farm types. It is likely that sheep and goats 
can access, and so valorise, rough grazing areas more easily. During the period 1995 to 2009, the UAA for 
the sheep, goats and other grazing livestock farm types has decreased. In our simulation exercise, this farm 
type has the largest relative increase in UAA due to the existing variation in our dataset. The relatively low 
level of information for the sheep and goats farm type, and the large variations observed, limit the 
interpretability of the results. 
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Figure 4-10. Impact on production of the introduction of a regional premium per ha for permanent 
grassland. 
Even though from an effectiveness and budgetary point of view, asymmetric premium levels for 
permanent grassland among farm types and regions perform the best, such policy might hamper the level 
playing field for farmers. National authorities might choose a symmetric premium across farm type and 
region. According to our results, the highest opportunity cost is observed in Nord Pas De Calais and it is 
estimated at 100€/ha. In this last scenario, we assume a premium of 100€/ha for permanent grassland for 
all farmers in every region. In such a case, the total budget is about 720M€, where 46% (339M€) is allocated 
to specialist cattle-rearing and fattening and field crops/grazing livestock combined, 22% (163M€) to 
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specialist dairying, and 13% (91M€) to sheep, goats and other grazing livestock. In comparison, the VCS 
scheme adopted in France for the beef and veal, dairy cow and dairy product and, sheep and goats sectors 
amounts to 922.62M€ with the following respective distribution: 70%, 15%, 15%. Nevertheless, such 
support does not guarantee the delivery of public goods.  
The impact of a symmetric premium across farm types and regions varies between regions. Figure 
4-11 shows the impact of a premium for permanent grassland on farmers’ profits depending on the share 
of budget allocated to them. We define budget as the total amount of subsidies potentially spent by the 
national authority for permanent grassland. In general, regions with the highest impact are regions with the 
highest opportunity costs and the largest share of permanent grassland in the UAA. 
 
Figure 4-11. Impact of premium of 100€/ha on profit, given the respective budget share. 
Whether we introduce an asymmetric premium per hectare base for the regional opportunity costs, 
or a symmetric premium of 100€/ha for everyone, the impact on production follows the same trend. Figure 
4-12 shows the impact on land use, livestock, input use and their relative changes at French level. Regarding 
land use changes, specialist cattle rearing and fattening, specialist cereals, oilseeds and protein crops and 
specialist dairy all substitute fodder crops (such as temporary grassland and fodder maize) for permanent 
grassland. Regarding livestock, a similar diversification phenomenon is observed, where cattle production 
decreases for specialist cattle rearing and fattening, but increases for other farm types. Regarding input use, 
every type of farmer relies more heavily on the external purchase of fodder. Nevertheless, the bottom right 
corner of Figure 4-12 shows the relative change at the French level of all variables. We observe a decrease 
above 1% only for equine livestock, and land allocated to seed products, fodder crops and fallow land. On 
the other hand, we observe an increase above 1% for fertilizer, permanent grassland (meadow, permanent 
pasture and rough grazing area) and purchased fodder. 
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Figure 4-12. Impact of the introduction of a premium of 100€/ha for permanent grassland on French 
production. 
4.5. Discussion  
The opportunity cost for the maintenance of permanent grassland under the greening requirement 
of the CAP varies greatly between farm types and regions, from 5.9€/ha for specialist cattle-rearing and 
fattening in Languedoc-Roussillon to 240€/ha for specialist horticulture in Basse-Normandie. In this study, 
we propose to introduce a premium per hectare for permanent grassland based on the opportunity cost 
found in our simulation exercise. The European Commission (2011a), in its impact assessment, estimates 
the opportunity costs for the maintenance of permanent grassland at between 5€/ha and 620€/ha. If 
estimated for the potential eligible area, the average opportunity costs among farmers is lower, varying 
between 0€/ha and 99€/ha, with an average in France of 22€/ha. The European Commission assumes in 
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its baseline scenario that all permanent grasslands are under threat. However, in practice, farmers might 
have no opportunity to convert permanent grassland due to agronomic constraints or feeding constraints. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, part of the loss of permanent grassland can be attributed to 
a declarative artefact with no consequences for land cover. Farmers might declare permanent grassland as 
fallow land or temporary grassland in order to avoid future constraints on land use. The original data and 
the original assumption in the European Commission impact assessment tend to overestimate the 
opportunity costs. 
The introduction of a regional premium for permanent grassland results in a national budget of 
about 180M€ - the equivalent of 20% of the VCS budget adopted in France for the livestock sector. The 
introduction of a national premium at 100€/ha for permanent grassland significantly increases the national 
budget to 720M€, representing about 78% of the VCS budget for the livestock sector. In such a scenario, 
the permanent grassland area increases by about 1% compared to 2009, a gain of 77 235ha. In both cases, 
the profitability of the livestock sector is the most positively impacted, whilst permanent grassland area is, 
at the minimum, equal to the 2009 level. 
Our results show that changes in land allocation to the profit of permanent grassland lead to a 
reduction in fodder crops (temporary grassland, fodder maize), fallow land and cereals, in a smaller 
proportion. The changes in land allocations are in line with studies investigating the opposite effect, meaning 
the conversion of permanent grassland to arable land. Bouty et al. (2014) studied the conversion of 
permanent grassland in the south Niort plain and they found that in 80% of cases, farmers converted 
permanent grassland to temporary grassland, maize, wheat and sunflowers. Faïq et al. (2013) reconstructed 
the crop sequence patterns between 2009 and 2010 in France using graphical land-parcel registration 
declarations. They estimate a loss of 96 000 ha of permanent grassland, replaced by temporary grassland 
and fallow land. 
The changes in land allocation translate to a change in livestock production. The introduction of a 
premium for permanent grassland indirectly subsidizes the grazing livestock sectors. Accordingly, we 
observe a diversification phenomenon. Farm types that do not specialize in cattle production, such as 
specialist dairy farming, specialist cereals, oilseed and proteins crops and, field crops/grazing livestock 
combined increase the cattle production. Specialist cattle rearing and fattening and, sheep and goats and 
other grazing livestock decrease cattle and, sheep and goat production. The overall increase in cattle leads 
to an increase in purchased fodder and fertilizer use. Consequently, the increase in permanent grassland 
does not fully compensate for the loss of fodder production. If fertilizers are traded on the international 
market, the fodder market is more local as transport costs are relatively high. A small increase in demand 
could significantly affect prices. Consequently, an increase in cattle production, especially for specialist 
cereals, oilseeds and proteins crops, might become unprofitable. This result illustrates the limitations of the 
model since prices are exogenous. 
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In this study, we investigate the impact of the maintenance of permanent grassland as a standalone 
policy. Nevertheless, in practice, the greening requirement is accompanied by two other measures: crop 
diversification and ecological focus areas. Fallow land can be declared as an ecological focus area. 
Consequently, farmers had an incentive prior to the reform and afterwards to declare permanent pasture as 
fallow land while, in reality, not changing the land cover. The introduction of a premium in our policy 
simulation might overestimate the conversion of fallow land to permanent grassland. 
Another limitation of our model is that it is a bounded production possibility set to observed 
production possibility sets. For the maintenance of permanent grassland, policy makers intend to slow down 
the loss of permanent grassland, so a bounded production possibility set is theoretically not a problem. 
From a policy perspective, the introduction of a premium for permanent grassland has to be defined within 
quantitative limits in order to remain compliant with the Word Trade Organization 'blue box' criteria22. We 
could imagine determining this quantitative limit by multiplying the amount of permanent grassland for the 
reference year by the premium level, as is currently done in the context of the VCS scheme. 
4.6. Conclusion 
Scientists across the world advocate linking subsides for the provision of public goods (Balmann et 
al., 2010), and more integrated crop and livestock systems (Naylor et al., 2005; Lemaire et al., 2014). The 
introduction of a premium per hectare for permanent grassland would achieve both objectives. A premium 
of 100€/ha for permanent grassland for all farmers in France would, as a minimum, maintain permanent 
grassland at the 2009 level and would enhance the provision of environmental goods. However, a 
differentiated premium for permanent grassland for different farm types and regions would divide the 
overall budget by ten from 720M€ to 72€M€. A differentiated payment would be paid to farmers with the 
highest opportunity cost for permanent grassland and would avoid farmers who would grow permanent 
grassland independently of the policy context to perceive such payment. Hence, from a cost-benefit point 
of view, we can wondered, if the argument of insuring the same level playing among farmers, is still valid. 
Finally, our results also show that a premium for permanent grassland would increase farm 
production diversification by increasing cattle production for every farm type and so strengthen the link, at 
farm level, between crop and livestock production. Such a policy would match current budget expenditure 
under the VCS scheme introduced in the CAP reform and could be compliant with the World Trade 
Organization rules. 
                                                     
22 Direct payments under production limiting programmes (often referred to as “Blue Box” measures) are 
exempt from commitments if such payments are made on fixed areas and yield or a fixed number of livestock. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5. Counter cyclical capacity payment for set-aside land under 
price uncertainty: the case of French arable farmers in the Centre region 
 
Abstract 
This study presents a Counter Cyclical Capacity Payment (CCCP) for set-aside land and determines 
its impact on arable farm income variability and land use change in the Centre region in France. In light of 
the debate around the effectiveness of the Ecological Focus Area requirement within the greening package, 
we suggest a CCCP which could play two roles: mitigate farm income variability and enhance the provision 
of environmental services at the lowest cost. To capture output price uncertainty and price a CCCP, we 
apply a Copula model based on the joint distribution of the three most common commodities in the region: 
wheat, barley and rapeseed. Then using a Monte-Carlo setting, we generate the probability distribution of 
the three commodity prices and the CCCP. A farm-type regional model simulates activity changes for each 
stochastic price and CCCP generated. The results show that by pooling commodity price risk under one 
policy instrument and linking it to set-aside, we could achieve a higher level of set-aside at farm and regional 
level compared to the current requirement, while at the same time decreasing production  in times of low 
commodity prices and reducing farm income volatility.
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5.1. Introduction 
Instability is inherent in agricultural markets and policy interventions for stabilising market prices 
have been common across the world (FAO et al., 2011; Galtier, 2013). The common explanations for 
agricultural price volatility are the natural dependence of agricultural production on its environment, such 
as weather and pests; the inelasticity of aggregate food demand; and the relatively low supply elasticity in 
the short term given the natural life cycle of crops. Galtier (2013) distinguishes two non-exclusive strategies 
to manage price instability: it can either be reduced, or its effects can be buffered using market-based 
instruments or through public interventions. The European Union (EU) has chosen to provide a safety-net 
to farmer by granting a direct decoupled payment in the form of a lump-sum. The United States (US) has 
chosen a market-based approach where payments are made when price or revenue fall below a their 
respective established reference level23. Meanwhile, the provision of environmental goods has been 
recognised as part of farming activities. In the EU, among other measures, farmers must ensure that at least 
5% of their arable land is set aside as an “ecological focus area24”. In the US, the Conservation Reserve 
Program provides payment to set aside erodible and environmentally sensitive land and to implement 
resource-conserving practices for at least 10 years. In this paper, we introduce the notion of a capacity 
payment and suggest considering set-aside land as a reserve agricultural capacity. The rationale underpinning 
reserve agricultural capacity is that in times of low commodity prices farmers will receive an incentive to 
withdraw land from production and vice-versa. In this configuration, set-aside land could play a role beyond 
the provision of environmental goods by mitigating farm income volatility and even price volatility for 
processors or consumers of agricultural commodities. 
Historically, set-aside policy was associated with payments coupled to production. The abolition of 
coupled support has been accompanied by a decrease in fallow area and an increase in farmers’ exposure to 
price risk. In the US, until the 1996 Fair Act, the government controlled production via the Acreage 
Reduction Programme (Gardner, 2002). In times of production surplus and coupled production payments, 
farmers participating in the government programme had to withdraw a certain percentage of their arable 
land. Set-aside policy25 was fully abolished in 1996, as price stabilisation and policy support moved away 
from production towards market-based instruments or farm income support. Similar trends were observed 
in Europe where price support linked to production level led to a costly build-up of stocks. In 1992, the EU 
introduced direct payments to compensate cuts in price support and compulsory set-aside. Progressively, 
the EU has decoupled income support from production, achieving full decoupling in 2008. Furthermore, 
                                                     
23 Three types of support can be distinguished: Price Loss Coverage payment, Agriculture Risk Coverage 
payment, and Marketing Assistance Loan. All programs are triggered when price or revenue falls below the established 
reference levels. For more information see (Shields, 2014). 
24 Areas considered as ecological focus areas are defined in the European regulation (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2013a), but final implementation is left to Member States’ decision. However, 
ecological focus areas should consist of areas directly affecting biodiversity, such as land lying fallow, landscape 
features, terraces, buffer strips, afforested areas and agro-forestry areas, or indirectly affecting biodiversity through the 
reduced use of inputs on the farm, such as areas covered by catch crops and winter green cover. 
25 In this article we consider set-aside policy in the broad senses consisting of payments to farmers for the 
purpose of fallowing parts of their land, or a compulsory obligation to fallow part of their land. 
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in light of the surge in commodity price in 2007-2008 and concerns relating to food security, under the 
agreement of the European Commission and a qualified majority of member states the rate of set-aside was 
altered and set to 0%. Finally, during the Health check of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)  
compulsory set-aside were abolished in 2008 (Morris et al., 2011). Today, risk management policy 
instruments, such as counter-cyclical programs and crop insurance programs, represent the greatest budget 
share (47 % see UMR SMART-LERECO and Cordier 2014) under the US agricultural policy. In Europe, 
most of the CAP budget (77% see UMR SMART-LERECO and Cordier 2014) is allocated to farm income 
support. The recent commodity price surged in 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 and this has reignited policy 
debates around volatility and risk management, for instance the G20 agenda in 2011 specifically tried to 
address food security.  
While agricultural support shifting from production-linked subsidies to income support or risk 
management programmes, environmental concerns and the role of farming activities entered the policy 
arena (OECD, 2011a; OECD, 2011b). Voluntary or compulsory set-aside policies26 have been re-introduced 
for environmental purposes in different countries, such as the land retirement program in the US (Stubbs, 
2014), the introduction of “environmental set-aside” through the ecological focus area measure under the 
greening of the CAP in the EU (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2013a) or “the 
Grain for Green” programme in China (Uchida, Xu and Rozelle, 2005). Set-aside lands are recognised for 
their positive environmental impact. They increase carbon sequestration (Sperow, 2016) and biodiversity 
(Van Buskirk and Willi, 2004; Toivonen, Herzon and Helenius, 2013). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of 
set-aside policy has been questioned. First, current set-aside programs do not take into account the large 
heterogeneity in terms of landscape, production, and current erosion and biodiversity status (Boellstorff and 
Benito, 2005; Tscharntke, Batáry and Dormann, 2011). Second, the environmental gain from set-aside may 
be offset by other agricultural policy programmes (Goodwin and Smith, 2003). Third, on a global level set-
aside policy might increase agricultural commodity price and could therefore lead to overall agricultural 
intensification. Pelikan, Britz and Hertel (2015) quantify the economic and environmental impact of 
devoting 7% of arable land to ecological focus areas in the EU. They show that for each additional hectare 
of land which the EU sets aside, land-based greenhouse gas emissions in the rest of world will increase by 
about 21 tonnes CO2 equivalent. While set-aside policy can be viewed through an environmental lens, we 
suggest also looking at set-aside land in terms of agricultural capacity.  
Capacity payments have emerged in the electricity sector as a mechanism to stabilise investment in 
generating electricity capacity (De Vries, 2007). Given the risk averse nature of investors, the high volatility 
of electricity prices, the capital intensive nature of generation and the long lead time for new facilities, 
governments have implemented capacity mechanisms to promote investment in power plants and avoid 
blackout. Similar to the electricity market, the agricultural commodity market exhibits high volatility with an 
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inelastic demand. Furthermore, assuming risk averse farmers, we suggest considering set-aside land as a 
reserve agricultural capacity. 
Theoretically, farmers already receive direct payments decoupled from production and, 
consequently, they should not have any incentive to produce and their decisions should be market driven. 
Mary (2013) examines the distortive effect of two types of decoupled payments: the Counter Cyclical 
Payment (CCP) in place in the US and the Single Farm Payment (SFP) in place in the EU. The author shows 
that both types of payment are not truly decoupled. However SFP creates the opposite incentive in terms 
of decision - whichever effect is the greater will drive the impact on production. CCP is found to have a 
significant impact but is relatively small in terms of output. This is in line with former literature indicating 
that CCP may induce risk-reducing incentives to produce (Antón and Le Mouël, 2004). Given, the current 
call for a risk management tool and the environmental benefits of set-aside land we investigate the possibility 
of a “Counter Cyclical Capacity Payment” (CCCP) for fallow land. 
A CCCP for fallow land can theoretically fulfil two objectives. First, in times of low agricultural 
commodity prices, fallow land would be attractive since the CCCP payment would be relatively high 
compared to the agricultural commodity price. In that sense, its countercyclical nature would involve the 
farmer income in risk mitigation without dampening responsiveness to market price signals while providing 
environmental goods at the lowest opportunity cost. However, in case of long term price decline, a CCCP 
would have no impact on farm income, only structural changes of the agricultural sector could restore farm 
income. A CCCP should take into account several commodity prices into account in order to mitigate farm 
income volatility, meaning that payment should be triggered by multiple, sometimes correlated sources of 
risks, such as low wheat and barley prices resulting in an decrease of income. Section 5.2 describes the 
methodology used to derive the probability distribution of commodity prices, taking into account 
dependence between them, and then briefly discusses how we model farmers’ behaviour. Section 5.3 
presents the results. Finally, section 5.4 discusses the main findings, the limitations and section 5.5 
concludes. 
5.2. Methodology 
In order to design an effective CCCP that pools the risks from different commodity prices, we need 
to define the degree of risk exposure for farmers for each commodity. To do so, section 5.2.1 uses the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) to define the average land use during the period 1995-2009. Then, 
analysis of risk management policy should take account of the origin of price volatility and reproduce its 
main features, such as the degree of correlation between commodity prices or tail dependence or the 
variance of each commodity price. Section 5.2.2 generates the stochastic prices used later in a farm-type 
regional model. The joint multivariate distribution is estimated using a Copula approach and using a Monte-
Carlo setting we generate the probability distribution for each commodity price and the CCCP. Finally, 
section 5.2.3 describes the farm-type regional model that we run for each stochastic price and CCCP 
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generated. This procedure allows us to derive probability distributions for each variable defined by the farm-
type regional model. 
5.2.1.  Case study: specialist arable famers in the Centre region in France. 
Data on specialist cereals, oilseed and protein crop farms in the Centre region, covering the period 
1995-2009, were obtained from the FADN. Holdings were selected to take part in the survey on the basis 
of a sampling plan. The sampling plan provides a representative dataset along three dimensions: region, 
economic size and type of farming. An individual weight is defined for each holding corresponding to the 
number of holdings sampled divided by the number of farms they intend to represent. FADN data is an 
unbalanced panel dataset and provides a unique identification number for each farmer survey, allowing us 
to track farmers over time. However, the number of farmers varies over time with a minimum of 138 
farmers in 2009 and a maximum of 227 farmers in 2000 (for a full description of the structure of FADN 
data see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1).  
Regarding land use in the reference period, common wheat, rapeseed and barley are the dominant 
crops and represent about 66% of the Utilised Agricultural Area (UAA) during the period 1995-2009, 
followed by fallow land representing between 5.4 % and 12.4 % of the UAA (see Table 5-1). However, no 
clear time trends are observed regarding land allocation, particularly for fallow land. 
Table 5-1. Main land use in the Centre region for specialist arable farmers during the period 1995-2009. 
Main crops representing 
96% of the UAA on average 
Mean (% of 
UAA) 
Min (% of 
UAA) 
Max (% of 
UAA) 
SD (% of 
UAA) 
Common wheat 39.83 35.88 44.18 2.49 
Rapeseed 14.81 7.97 19.05 3.09 
Barley  11.49 7.97 14.76 1.93 
Fallow land 7.94 5.42 12.37 1.82 
Grain maize 7.92 6.40 9.47 0.95 
Sunflowers 5.34 3.40 9.83 1.63 
Dry pulses  4.35 1.57 7.96 1.99 
Durum wheat 4.26 1.32 7.79 1.90 
5.2.2. Price uncertainty and CCCP payment for fallow land 
In order to model price uncertainty, it is important to design a realistic Monte Carlo experiment. 
We take into account the price distribution for the three most dominant crops: common wheat, rapeseed 
and barley, since they represent about 66% of the UAA for specialist arable farmers in the Centre region. 
Not only do we simulated different prices, but we also account for possible interactions. Hence, we build 
and index price using the joint price distribution for the three commodities, from which we derive a CCCP 
perfectly inversely correlated to the index price. Although yield uncertainty is a relevant variable for arable 
farmers, we assume that farmers face no yield uncertainty. Given that crop prices are not perfectly 
correlated, taking into account the most dominant crops allows us to provide a more efficient coverage than 
developing a specific policy for each commodity. Consequently, the CCCP for fallow land pools all farm 
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price risk into a single policy that will help to mitigate farm income volatility and, additionally, may generate 
environmental benefits. 
In the literature, copula models have been used extensively to design the current commodity 
programs in the US (Ahmed and Goodwin, 2015; Zhu, Ghosh and Goodwin, 2008; Goodwin and 
Hungerford, 2015). The strength of a “copula” function is to link, the univariate marginal probability 
distributions for one or more random variables (here our three dominant crop price distributions) to their 
joint multivariate probability distribution. Hence, a copula is a multivariate probability distribution for which 
the marginal probability distribution of each variable is uniform. Let us consider the marginal probability 
distribution 𝐹𝑤(𝑝𝑤), 𝐹𝑏(𝑝𝑏), 𝐹𝑟(𝑝𝑟), where 𝑝𝑤 , 𝑝𝑏, and 𝑝𝑟 are respectively the prices of common wheat, 
barley and rapeseed. Sklar theorem (1959) states that a unique copula C in the unit hypercube [0,1]3 with 
uniform 𝑈[0,1] marginal distribution is associated with the joint distribution 𝐹(𝑝𝑤 , 𝑝𝑏 , 𝑝𝑟) such as: 
𝐹(𝑝𝑤 , 𝑝𝑏 , 𝑝𝑟) = 𝐶(𝐹𝑤(𝑝𝑤), 𝐹𝑏(𝑝𝑏), 𝐹𝑟(𝑝𝑟);  𝜃)  (5.1) 
where 𝜃 is a vector parameter of the copula, reflecting the dependence structure among the marginal 
distributions. Consequently, a copula approach first allows us to specify the univariate distribution for each 
random variable independently. They may or may not belong to the same parametric family. Then the copula 
model defines the degree and the structure of the dependence between our variables. 
The first step is to estimate the marginal distributions for wheat, barley and rapeseed. We use the 
average observed regional price for these three commodities during the period 1995-2009 in the FADN 
dataset. We use the Maximum Likelihood Estimators (MLE) to fit several probability distributions27. For 
reasons of parsimony, we just report the relevant results. However, the full results are available in the 
Appendix V.  Based on the Akaike (AIC), Bayesian (BIC) information criteria and Chi-Square statistical test, 
we found the following marginal distribution: 
𝐹𝑤(𝑝𝑤) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 (0; 119,37; 10,15) 
(5.2) 
𝐹𝑏(𝑝𝑏) = 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛5(37,03; 4209,60) 
(5.3) 
𝐹𝑟(𝑝𝑟) = 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛5(27,47; 5861,60) 
(5.4) 
The second step is to estimate the degree and the dependence structure among commodity prices. 
The two most common families of copulas are elliptical copulas, such as the Gaussian and t copulas, and 
Archimedean copulas, such as Clayton and Gumbel copulas. A full evaluation of appropriate copulas is 
beyond the scope of this study. Instead, we fit several copulas using MLE and rely on the information 
criterion (AIC and BIC) (for further information on this topic see Goodwin and Hungerford 2015; Woodard 
                                                     
27 For the estimation of the marginal distributions and the copula model we used the software @Risk 
developed by Palisade. 
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et al. 2011). Table 5-2 shows the goodness of fit for the different estimated copulas. The BIC and the average 
log-likelihood are the highest for the t-copula. However, the Gaussian performs better according to the AIC. 
Table 5-2. Goodness of fit of the different copulas. 
Copulas type AIC BIC Average log-likelihood 
Gaussian -17.82 -17.88 0.87 
t -17.66 -18.83 0.99 
Clayton with all variables reversed -15.34 -14.94 0.59 
Gumbel -8.99 -8.59 0.38 
Gumbel with all variables reversed -8.01 -7.61 0.34 
Frank -5.04 -4.64 0.24 
Clayton -1.48 -1.08 0.13 
A Gaussian copula assumes linear correlation and zero dependence in the tails of the distributions, 
while a t-copula allows dependence in the tails but imposes symmetry between them. In our case, we are 
studying the prices in the Centre region. Hence, we can expect that the external forces influencing prices, 
such as weather or pests are common to the three marginal distributions. In other words, it is likely that if 
bad weather has impacted wheat price, it also has impacted barley price. This phenomenon is called tail 
dependence. Hence we opt for a t-copula. Table 5-3 shows the dependence structure for our marginal 
distributions implied by the t-Copula. 
Table 5-3. Dependence structure implied by the t-Copula. 
Type: t-copula Wheat Barley Rape seed 
Wheat 1   
Barley 0.89 1  
Rape seed 0.34 0.09 1 
The Index price is a linear weighted average of wheat, barley and rapeseed price and has the 
following formula: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
(𝑝𝑤 × 40 +  𝑝𝑏 × 15 + 𝑝𝑟 × 11)
(40 + 15 + 11)
 (5.5) 
where the weight 40, 15 and 11 are respectively the observed mean of land allocation for each crop 
(see Table 5-1). Our simulation model is based on 2000 iterations and uses a Latin Hypercube sampling 
method. We then obtain the following Index price distribution in Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1.Index price distribution. 
From the index price distribution we wish to build a CCCP perfectly inversely correlated to the 
index price, where the minimum value of the index price corresponds to the maximum value of the CCCP 
and the maximum value of the index price corresponds to the minimum value of the CCCP. We assume 
that the minimum value for the CCCP is zero. As regards the maximum, we assume a value of 500€/ha. 
This is obtained using the formula (5.6)28. Figure 5-2 shows the obtained distribution for the CCCP. 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃 =  −2.5 × 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 674 (5.6) 
 
 
Figure 5-2. Distribution of the CCCP 
                                                     
28 We estimate a linear equation 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 based on two points: (MaxIndexPrice ; MinCCCP) and 
(MinIndexPrice ; MaxCCPP) which gives (270;0) and (69.6;500). 𝑎 = −
500
270−69.6
≅ −2.5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏 ≅ 674 
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The mean for the CCCP is about 332€/ha. This is in line with the impact assessment by the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2011b) who estimate that 14% of farmers have an 
opportunity cost for an ecological focus area of between €200 and €400/ha but acknowledge that it varies 
greatly from farm to farm. 
5.2.3. Modelling farmers’ behaviour 
In this section, we describe the model used for policy analysis. We assume that farmers decide upon 
their land use, know their selling prices and the amount of CCCP they will receive. These prices are derived 
from the Monte Carlo experiments. However, the model does not draw a distinction between future prices 
and stock market prices. Implicitly, we therefore assume that at the time farmers determine their land use, 
they protect themselves and fix their selling prices using future markets or forward contracts. 
We use a similar farm-type regional model to the model discussed in Chapter 4 (for a detailed 
explanation, please refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2) where the objective is to maximize the profit for arable 
land in the Centre region 𝜋 . This gives, for a given iteration, (the model is run for 2000 iterations using 
price distributions obtained from the Monte Carlo simulation): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
 𝑦,𝑐,𝑥
 𝜋   = ∑ 𝑊𝑓
𝑓
. (∑ 𝑃𝑘 . 𝑦𝑓,𝑘
𝑘
− ∑ 𝐷𝑗 . 𝑐𝑓,𝑗 + ∑ CCCP. 𝑥𝑓,fallow land + 𝐷𝑆𝑓
𝑖𝑗
) (5.7) 
S.t.  
𝑌𝑘 = ∑ 𝑊𝑓 . 𝑦𝑓,𝑘
𝑓
 (5.8) 
𝑋𝑖 = ∑ 𝑊𝑓 . 𝑥𝑓,𝑖
𝑓
 (5.9) 
𝐶𝑗 = ∑ 𝑊𝑓 . 𝑐𝑓,𝑗
𝑓
 (5.10) 
∑ 𝜆𝑡 𝑌𝑡,?̂?
𝑡
≥ 𝑌𝑘 (5.11) 
∑ 𝜆𝑡 𝑋𝑡,?̂?
𝑡
≤ 𝑋𝑖 (5.12) 
∑ 𝜆𝑡 𝐶𝑡,?̂?
𝑡
≤ 𝐶𝑗 (5.13) 
∑ 𝜆𝑡 
𝑡
= 1  (5.14) 
𝑦𝑓,𝑘 −  ∑ 𝛿𝑓,𝑡  𝑦𝑓,?̂?
𝑡
− ∑ 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑘̂ /𝜃𝑓
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= 0 (5.15) 
𝑥𝑓,𝑖 −  ∑ 𝛿𝑓,𝑡 𝑥𝑓,?̂?
𝑡
− ∑ 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑖̂ /𝜃𝑓
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= 0 (5.16) 
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𝑐𝑓,𝑗 −  ∑ 𝛿𝑓,𝑡 𝑐𝑓,?̂?
𝑡
− ∑ 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑗̂ /𝜃𝑓
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= 0 (5.17) 
∑ 𝛿𝑓,𝑡
𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
= 1 (5.18) 
∑ 𝑥𝑓,𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑓
𝑖
 
where 𝑖 corresponds to crop acreage. 
(5.19) 
𝛿𝑓,𝑡, 𝛽𝑓,𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟, 𝑐𝑓,𝑗, 𝑥𝑓,𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑓,𝑘  ≥ 0   
where 𝑓 indexes the farm, 𝑘  the outputs of the farmers, 𝑗 the different categories of input costs 
and 𝑖 the different inputs used by the farmers. 𝑊𝑓 is the weight for each farmer in the sample. 𝑦𝑓,𝑘 is a 
column vector of production quantities, 𝑥𝑓,𝑖 is a column for the vector of input activities and 𝑐𝑓,𝑘 is a 
column vector of input costs. 𝑃𝑘 is the  price derived from the Monte Carlo simulation for wheat, barley 
and rapeseed and the average outprice observed in 2009 for all the other crops.  𝐷𝑗 is the index price of the 
different input cost categories in 2009. CCCP is the counter cycle payment for fallow land which is 
dependent on the wheat, barley and rapeseed prices. Finally, 𝐷𝑆𝑓 is the sum of the decoupled payment and 
rural development subsidies received by a farmer in 2009.  
Three sets of constraints (5.8, 5.9, 5.10) ensure that the farm-type regional endogenous variables, 𝑌𝑘 
the produce quantities, 𝑋𝑖 the input activities and 𝐶𝑗 the input costs, are partitioned according to the weight 
for each farmer. Four sets of constraints (5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14) illustrate the historical activities mixed 
approach proposed by McCarl in 1981. Where t indexes the different years from 1995 to 2009, 𝑌𝑡,?̂?,  𝑋𝑡,?̂?, 
and  𝐶𝑡,?̂? are the historical farm-type regional observations for production quantities, input activities, and 
input costs, respectively, and are exogenous to the model. However, contrary to Chapter 4, this set of 
constraints is transformed in terms of inequality where we assume strong disposability. In other words, an 
increase or decrease in fallow land does not always lead to a change in other land use at farm-type regional 
level. The last set of constraints (5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19) ensures that farm-level solutions are themselves 
a linear weighted average of their historical and/or peer activity mix. Where 𝑦𝑓,?̂?, 𝑥𝑓,?̂? and 𝑐𝑓,?̂? are, 
respectively, the historical farm observations for production quantities, input activities, and input costs and 
are exogenous to the model. 𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑘̂  , 𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑖̂  and 𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑗̂  are the historical peer observations for production 
quantities, input activities, and input costs. Respectively, and are exogenous to the model. 𝜃𝑓 is the efficiency 
score for each individual farmer and its value lies between 0 and 1. 
5.3. Results 
In this section, we compare two scenarios. As mentioned previously, the model does not draw a 
distinction between future prices and spot market prices. Therefore, at the beginning of the campaign 
farmers fix their selling prices and determine their land use based on them  In the first scenario “No CCCP”, 
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no obligation to set aside arable land is implemented. Farmers are free to choose land allocation given the 
market conditions. The model from (5.7) to (5.19) is run for 2000 iterations taking into account the 
dependence structure between our three commodity prices (see Section 5.2.2) and the CCCP in equation 
(5.7) is equal to zero. The second scenario “With CCCP” differs only from the first scenario in the 
implementation of a CCCP for fallow land. In other words, farmers have a financial incentive to set aside 
part of their arable land. The lower the price for wheat, barley and rapeseed, the higher the CCCP. 
Figure 5-3 shows the difference in income distribution at regional (Figure 5-3.A) and farm level 
(Figure 5-3.B). Here, we are not interested in the absolute change in income, since in the scenario “With 
CCCP” income will be inflated by the subsidy. Instead, we investigate the impact of a CCCP on the variance 
in the income distribution. At regional level, the percentage change in income varies between plus and minus 
50 % for both scenarios. Nevertheless, we observed a standard deviation (SD) of 18.9% for regional income 
when a CCCP is in place, compared to 21.6% in the absence of a CCCP. The difference is more pronounced 
at farm level. Figure 5-3.B shows the distribution of the SD for the percentage change in farm income. 
Clearly, the implementation of a CCCP decreases the volatility of farm income. The average SD drops from 
47% to 35% with a CCCP. 
  
Figure 5-3. Income distribution at regional and farm level. 
In theory, a countercyclical payment based on wheat, barley and rapeseed prices and linked to fallow 
land should limit over-production in times of low commodity prices. We expect, on average, a decrease in 
land allocated to these commodities and an increase in fallow land. However, equation (5.19) binds the total 
UAA at farm level to the maximum historical value. The observed change to UAA at farm level in the 
FADN data could be due to several factors: structural change to the farm, small errors in the recording of 
areas, land abonnement. However, we did not observe significant trends in the change to UAA, since for 
all farmers, the average maximum increase in UAA is about 4.6% at farm level. In other words, farmers can 
to slightly extend or adjust their UAA and set aside part of their land leading to an overall increase in fallow 
land and UAA at farm and regional level. 
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 Table 5-4 shows land allocation for both scenarios and the percentage change in the mean when a 
CCCP is implemented compared to no CCCP. As expected, the highest increase is observed for fallow land 
(70%), corresponding to an average addition of 50 431ha set-aside. The land allocated to rapeseed and barley 
decreased by about 20 000ha, while we observed a small increase for common wheat. The total UAA, at a 
regional increase of 3%, corresponded to an addition of about 30 000 ha. The area for maize, sunflowers 
and dry pulses increased by about 12 500 ha overall, while areas allocated to other cereals and industrial 
crops, durum wheat and summer cereals decreased by 12 000 ha in total. Looking at the difference in SD 
between the two scenarios, the SD of rapeseed, grain maize, durum wheat and sunflowers increase the most, 
while the SD for common wheat increase slightly relative to its mean and the one for barley even decrease. 
These results indicate that common wheat and barley are the two crops the least substitutable with fallow 
land and so the most resilient to price changes. Results regarding minor crops (below 10 000ha in average 
area) might be misleading. Their percentage changes seem important, but looking at the absolute mean value 
and the SD, we observe that the SD deviation for those crops is relatively high. We do not consider these 
results in our interpretation. This phenomenon highlights one of the model’s weakness and strengths. The 
weakness is that it relies on dependence on peers, as already reported in Chapter 2. If the chosen peer 
strongly differs from a given farm, the changes might be overestimated or underestimated. The less 
dominant crops, such as “other industrial crops”, have a higher chance of this type of overestimation or 
underestimation, since the number of peers growing such crops is likely to be low. Actually, other 
approaches that parametrically estimate farmers’ responses also become less precise with a lower number 
of observations. Therefore, it is a positive aspect of the model and how it is implemented here that standard 
deviations on the outcome are reported, which is not common in agricultural policy simulation models.  
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Table 5-4. Land use with and without CCCP. 
Land use Scenarios % change 
Mean 
(ha) 
Median 
(ha) 
Max 
(ha) 
Min 
(ha) 
SD 
(ha) 
UAA 
With CCCP 
3% 
1 181 240 1 181 286 1 185 369 1 143 697 1 858 
No CCCP 1 151 087 1 147 658 1 182 046 1 130 561 12 132 
Common wheat 
With CCCP 
0% 
455 297 455 800 467 206 410 360 3 147 
No CCCP 453 196 453 933 467 206 410 360 2 819 
Rapeseed 
With CCCP 
-9% 
179 728 175 348 223 985 165 041 10 378 
No CCCP 197 817 195 855 223 985 165 041 8 230 
Barley 
With CCCP 
-2% 
148 207 148 624 170 769 119 025 2 004 
No CCCP 150 707 148 624 170 769 119 025 4 305 
Fallow land 
With CCCP 
70% 
122 529 116 448 129 832 62 654 7 352 
No CCCP 72 098 70 638 114 760 62 654 4 282 
Grain maize 
With CCCP 
3% 
84 729 85 891 109 373 73 928 2 598 
No CCCP 82 227 82 628 109 373 73 928 1 185 
Durum wheat 
With CCCP 
-11% 
54 909 58 937 89 972 32 564 6 193 
No CCCP 61 980 59 958 89 972 32 564 4 609 
Sunflowers 
With CCCP 
8% 
54 707 53 724 59 607 39 278 3 361 
No CCCP 50 786 50 584 58 028 39 278 1 782 
Dry pulses 
With CCCP 
20% 
36 386 38 788 49 474 18 127 5 079 
No CCCP 30 281 31 471 49 474 18 127 4 557 
Other cereals 
With CCCP 
-16% 
7 903 9 040 20 071 6 404 1 344 
No CCCP 9 436 9 040 20 071 8 189 935 
Sugar beet 
With CCCP 
-8% 
8 157 8 596 11 612 7 374 684 
No CCCP 8 902 8 596 12 114 7 795 522 
Other industrial crops 
With CCCP 
-27% 
6 409 5 886 9 799 166 992 
No CCCP 8 729 8 765 12 453 166 1 168 
Potatoes 
With CCCP 
-15% 
3 345 3 169 5 071 2 018 450 
No CCCP 3 951 3 836 5 465 2 018 372 
Oats 
With CCCP 
-4% 
3 201 3 209 6 118 1 482 146 
No CCCP 3 343 3 262 6 118 1 482 183 
Meadow+permanent 
pasture 
With CCCP 
-3% 
3 199 3 368 4 473 992 358 
No CCCP 3 293 2 963 6 526 992 563 
Rye 
With CCCP 
-11% 
2 648 2 688 7 567 1 337 197 
No CCCP 2 987 3 011 7 567 1 337 292 
Fresh vegetables 
With CCCP 
7% 
2 575 2 594 5 014 1 413 111 
No CCCP 2 405 2 503 5 014 1 413 322 
Rough grazing 
With CCCP 
12% 
1 762 1 683 4 796 327 237 
No CCCP 1 577 1 683 4 796 327 226 
Summer cereals mixed 
With CCCP 
-55% 
732 569 8 922 169 450 
No CCCP 1 640 1 158 8 922 231 815 
Temporary grass 
With CCCP 
-24% 
996 925 2 991 143 221 
No CCCP 1 318 1 285 2 991 143 289 
Other seeds 
With CCCP 
-27% 
801 722 2 962 344 183 
No CCCP 1 098 1 018 2 962 344 310 
Other 
With CCCP 
34% 
982 1 157 2 278 221 293 
No CCCP 732 695 4 205 9 188 
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Figure 5-4 shows the share of the main crops in the UAA for both scenarios. It is interesting to 
note that despite an increase in absolute terms (Table 5.1) for areas of common wheat, its relative share in 
the UAA decreases, meaning that its increase in area is less than proportional to the increase in UAA. For 
common wheat, barley, rapeseed and durum wheat we observed a decrease in the share of UAA when a 
CCCP is implemented. In the absence of CCCP, fallow land represents about 6% of the UAA and increases 
to 10% when a CCCP is implemented. The increase in areas for dry pulses, sunflowers and grain maize 
reflects a relatively small increase in their respective share of UAA. 
 
Figure 5-4. Share of the main crops in the UAA for the scenarios "No CCCP" and "With CCCP". 
The post-2013 CAP requires that 5% of arable land is covered with an “ecological focus area”. For 
practical reasons (mostly data availability), we assume that only fallow land (including voluntary set-aside) is 
counted towards this goal. Then, we investigate three different minimum thresholds. First, we look at the 
number of compliant farmers with 5% of fallow land. Second, the post-2013 CAP establishes the full 
greening provision for a minimum of 7% in ecological focus area (which may be implemented in 2017), so 
the second minimum threshold for fallow land is set at 7%. Finally, we investigate a threshold of 10% for 
fallow land. Figure 5-5 shows the distribution of the share of compliant farmers for the three minimum 
levels of fallow land, with and without CCCP. For a minimum requirement of 5% of fallow land, in the 
presence of a CCCP, 82% of farmers are compliant against 57% in the absence of a CCCP. In the case of a 
minimum requirement of 7%, 72% of farmers comply when they receive a CCCP, against 38% without it. 
The gap in terms of the number of compliant farmers is smaller (10 points) with a CCCP than without a 
CCCP (19 points). However, for a minimum level of 7% and 10% with a CCCP, the distribution of 
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compliant farmers is bimodal. A bimodal distribution suggests that there are threshold effects in the 
implementation of fallow land, which is also illustrated in Figure 5-6. 
 
Figure 5-5. Probability distributions for the share of farmers complying with three different minimum levels 
of fallow land under the different Monte Carlo generated prices and CCCP. 
Figure 5-6 shows the relationship between the number of compliant farmers for different levels of 
greening requirement and the level of the CCCP. Each circle on the graph represents one Monte Carlo 
simulation, i.e. a generated set of prices and CCCP. In the case of a 5% requirement, the number of 
compliant farmers increases almost linearly with an increase in the CCCP. As commodity prices fall and 
CCCP increases, the number of farmers setting aside land gradually increases. In the case of a 7% 
requirement, and even more so for a 10% requirement, we can distinguish a threshold effect in the outcomes 
of the price-CCCP scenarios. There are few settings where there are between 75% and 80% of the farmers 
complying with the 7% set-aside requirement and there are two groups of farmers (plotted in grey and 
black), 65% and 45% of the farmers for 7% and 10% greening requirements, respectively, who would be 
compliant if the CCCP was around 300€/ha. However, to convince 75% and 55% of the farmers to comply 
with the 7% and 10% greening requirements, the CCCP would need to be around 370€/ha. Consequently 
farmers respond non-linearly to CCCP.  
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Figure 5-6. Relationship between the level of CCCP received and the number of compliant farmers. 
5.4. Discussion 
The objective of this research was to determine whether a CCCP, similar to capacity payments 
implemented in the electrical sector, could mitigate farm income risk and provide environmental benefits. 
The results show that by pooling commodity price risk under one policy instrument and linking it to set-
aside, we could achieve a higher level of set-aside at farm and regional level compared to the current 
requirement, while at the same time decreasing  production in times of low commodity prices and reducing 
farm income volatility.  
These results are in line with Dörschner and Musshoff (2013) who found that in the case of an 
agro-environmental measure leading to a decrease in income risks, risk aversion will, in turn, increase the 
acceptance of such a measure. Though, our simulation exercise looks at the impact of a CCCP on farm 
income volatility, it does not consider risk behaviour of farmers. In the context of mathematical 
programming models, risk is often model using linear mean-variance under maximisation of expected utility. 
In order to recover risk coefficients, often models are calibrated to the observed farmer behaviour and 
regional price distributions are used (Gómez-Limón, Arriaza and Riesgo, 2003). A major drawback of such 
approach is it assumes that behaviour differing from the optimum under profit maximisation is purely 
imputable to risk. More recently, Petsakos and Rozakis (2015) proposed a non-linear mean-variance model 
that they calibrate using PMP based procedure. Yet, the authors acknowledge that the obtained results might 
lead to negative profit per hectare indicating mystification of the underlying distributions. Furthermore, due 
to the introduction of non-linearities such approach could be computationally challenging to calibrate. 
Hence, the integration of risk in agricultural policy model remains a path to explore in future research. 
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Another limitation of our approach is that prices are not simulated endogenously and so impacts 
on the supply side is not fully taken into account. More specifically, one of the main challenge of climate 
policy is to defeat the “Green paradox”(Sinn, 2008). In our case, the green paradox infers that an increase 
of set-aside in Europe might lead to an agricultural intensification in the rest of the world which could 
eventually lead to a more problems globally than before. Hence, in future research it would be critical to 
take into account market feedbacks in order to assess the environmental impact of policies (Fölster and 
Nyström, 2010). For instance, we could run our model for the entire EU and link it to a general or partial 
equilibrium model. An interesting point would be to compare the current EFA requirement to a CCCP. 
Indeed a CCCP will not alleviate pressure on set-aside in times of high commodity price and it is likely that 
set-aside land will be low. Nevertheless, Pelikan et al. (2015) show that a mandatory minimum level of set-
aside, without taking into account commodity prices, may intensify production in the rest of the world. We 
can wonder whether policy makers value the production location for positive and/or negative externalities. 
Here, although a CCCP does not alleviate pressure on set-aside when prices are high, it does partially reduce 
pressure on the agricultural commodity market. Besides, the past milk crises have led the EU to offer a 
premium per liter of milk non-produced during a period of 3 months given the fall in milk price (European 
Comission, 2016). The system that offers a premium for production cuts is conceptually similar to the 
propose CCCP. Here, we propose a first step in the calculation and the assessment of such policy 
instruments.  
Assuming that farms will set aside the least profitable land, one could argue that a mandatory 
requirement for fallow land will ensure a perennial supply of ecological benefits at a fixed location. Although 
there is legitimate concern, the current policy does not prevent rotations, and contrary evidence on the 
impact of set-aside management and rotational effects exist. On the one hand, some authors (Van Buskirk 
and Willi, 2004) conclude that short rotations enhance biodiversity; on the other hand, others (Kovács-
Hostyánszki and Báldi, 2012) find a positive correlation between set-aside age and farm land biodiversity. 
Promoting set-aside in locations where it likely increases ecological benefits would require linking policy 
incentives to a spatial location that reports the current ecological status (Maes et al., 2012). 
The results also illustrate the difficulty for policy-makers in designing policy instruments that fit all 
objectives. Despite a relatively homogenous sample in a given region, farmers’ responses to CCCP exhibit 
threshold effects. From a policy point of view, the simulated model implements a CCCP that is linearly 
dependant on the Index price (see equation (5.6)). We could take into account such an effect and impose 
non-linearity. However, it is likely that the observed threshold effects differ between  geographical areas, 
farm management practices and in time. Hence, such a tailored CCCP could be impractical in real life. 
Another question is: knowing that for around 300€/ha , 65% and 45% of farmers comply with the 7% and 
the 10% requirement, is it worth trying to convince the remaining farmers and what is the cost-benefit? 
Furthermore, from an environmental point of view, the pressure on biodiversity might be different 
depending on the landscape context (Tscharntke et al., 2011; Tzilivakis et al., 2016; Pe’er et al., 2014). If 
European policy makers intend to enhance biodiversity via the first pillar of the CAP, the more uniform the 
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policy mechanism is, the less efficient it gets. Such results highlight the need to develop methodologies that 
take into account farmers’ heterogeneity. Recently, the European Commission reviewed the impact of 
greening measures after one year of implementation (European Commission, 2016). Regarding the 
ecological focus area measure, they used the CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regionalised Impact) 
model (Britz et al., 2014), a comparative-static, farm-type regional model. Such an approach does not take 
into account the farm context specificity, leading to aggregation bias and over or under estimations of the 
impacts. Our approach addresses this issue by partitioning regional solutions from farm-level solutions and 
ensuring they represent historical or/and peer activity mix.  
Although our modelling approach takes farmers’ heterogeneity into account, historical behaviours 
may not reflect future behaviour. Any price development beyond historical observations cannot be captured 
by our model. To address this issue, one possibility would be to extend the historical observations by 
appending synthetic observations. Several options to generate synthetic observations are feasible. Chen and 
Onal (2012) simulate synthetic crop mix based on a set price for acreage elasticity and elasticity lagged 
acreages, all estimated using the historical supply responses. However, such an approach still relies on past 
observations. Another possibility would be to simulate land-use response using a detailed bio-economic 
model and then estimate land-use elasticity taking into account past observations and simulated 
observations. Another limitation of our study is the number of commodity prices taken into account. If a 
CCCP were designed by policymakers, potentially all output prices could be taken into account and other 
data sources could be used to derive more realistic probability distributions. 
5.5. Conclusion 
A price risk management instrument could be combined with the provision of positive externalities. 
A CCCP promotes the building of an agricultural production capacity, mitigates farm income risk and 
provides environmental benefits. In the EU, in the long term, results show that a CCCP could potentially 
surpass the current ecological focus area measure implemented in the post-2013 CAP, with 10% of set-aside 
land out of total UAA at farm level. In the US, CCCP could be an alternative to both the crop insurance 
program and the conservation reserve program. In doing so, it would address the criticism that government 
support has crowded out the insurance market and that the interaction between programs might have offset 
the benefits of the conservation program. Although our study does not investigate the price effects of a 
CCCP, the wide adoption of such a policy would certainly reduce pressure on commodity prices leading to 
greater stability and would help towards building a long term agricultural generation capacity. 
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6.1. Research objectives and conclusions 
The last reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has introduced three new greening 
measures - crop diversification, permanent grassland and Ecological Focus Area (EFA)– with which farmers 
must comply in order to receive their full allocation of direct payments. The introduction of the greening 
measures poses new challenges for agricultural policy modellers. Measures are farm specific and are designed 
to change the land allocation at farm level. Consequently, any ex-ante assessment should be able to take into 
account farm-level specificity and should tackle the following modelling challenges: self-selection bias, 
substitution patterns, aggregation bias and uncertainty. Besides the introduction of the greening 
requirements, farmers can also receive coupled payment support. Indeed, the post 2013 CAP has 
reintroduced support coupled to agricultural production, representing 4.1% of the total budget for direct 
support in the EU. We suggest that coupled support could instead be linked to the provision of 
environmental services that underpin a more environmentally friendly production model and achieve similar 
objectives to current greening requirements. We propose two types of alternative coupled payment linked 
to environmental services: a premium per hectare for permanent grassland and a Counter Cyclical Capacity 
Payment (CCCP) for set-aside land. Hence, the dissertation evaluates the impact of the greening 
requirements at farm level, compares the greening requirements to alternative policy instruments while, at 
the same time, developing a non-parametric mathematical programming model to tackle the different 
modelling challenges.  
Chapter 2 addresses the crop diversification measure. By its nature, this measure forces some 
farmers to adopt a new crop. Traditionally, in agricultural policy models, the newly adopted crop is the crop 
with the lowest opportunity cost at regional level. Such an approach implicitly smoothens farmers' 
heterogeneity by assuming that the opportunity cost for each crop is the same for all. Instead, we introduce 
the notion of ‘mimicking peer behaviour’ where the main assumption is that a farmer is likely to do the 
same as his peers. We show that if the intention of the crop diversification measure is to deter monoculture, 
the policy is effective. However, at landscape level, the measure has limited impact on crop diversity since 
adopted crops are also dominant crops in the landscape. The results also show the limitations of such a 
methodological approach. In fact, the key element is the selection of peers. Can a farmer have several peers? 
Which variables are taken into account and what is their weight in the selection of peer farmers? In chapter 
2, non-compliant farmers adopt the production choices of their peers. Only one peer can be selected for 
each farmer, based on four variables: crop area, total farm area, number of crops and geographical distance, 
where the latter is a discriminant variable ensuring the selection of a single peer. However, if the model 
minimises the difference between the selected peer and the associated farmer, it does not indicate to what 
extent they are alike. For instance, the selected peer could have a rare crop configuration. Hence, peer 
selection is driven by the dimensions of our problem and the underlying heterogeneity of our dataset.  
In order to assess the capability of models to reproduce the substitution patterns observed in reality, 
chapter 3 tests the ability of two modelling approaches given data heterogeneity and input uncertainty. The 
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parametric approach is a standard econometric model where we estimate a cubic production function. The 
non-parametric approach is an inverse DEA model. Here, it is important to stress that an inverse DEA 
model is not used in the context of productivity analysis, but as a method to select peer Decision Making 
Units (DMUs) based on input and output variables. Indeed, distance functions provide the conceptual 
underpinning of efficiency measurement and allow one to describe a multi-input multi-output production 
function leaving the behavioural objective undefined. In that sense, DEA is just a mathematical 
programming model used to compute input and output radial distances. Compared to chapter 2, each DMU 
has multiple peers and management is implicitly taken into account by preserving efficiency scores. 
However, in chapter 3 we assume profit maximisation behaviour for the selection of peers when price 
changes. Hence, DMUs fully or partially adopt their own production technology or that of their peers to 
maximise their profit. The results show the importance of using panel data, or robust grouping technics, in 
order to maximise homogeneity in the sample. The models’ performance is negatively affected by an increase 
in heterogeneity and they tend to overestimate change if there is a high level of heterogeneity. Both 
modelling approaches remain consistent when uncertainty is introduced. However, they underestimate 
change when it prevails. In terms of substitution pattern, the inverse DEA model outperforms the 
parametric approach and performs well with a small sample size. The parametric approach performs poorly 
given that in the most favourable situation we have generated a panel dataset of 1000 observations with 
different prices and free of any measurement or sampling bias. This quantity of data is far beyond the real 
world policy simulation, where, typically, less than 20 observations per farm are available and the amount 
of price variation is limited. 
Chapter 2 introduces a non-parametric approach to tackle the self-selection problem and simulates 
land-use change based on a “pure” mimicking of peer behaviour. Chapter 3 further elaborates this approach 
assuming multiple peers per DMU and profit maximisation behaviour. Additionally, chapter 3 provides 
evidence that when the underlying data-generating process exhibits non-linearity and threshold effects, the 
non-parametric approach is superior to a Taylor polynomial approximation. This reflection has been 
considered in chapter 4 where we seek to simulate the impact of the maintenance of permanent grassland 
on farmers’ activity changes using FADN data. The problem is that the amount of information per farm is 
insufficient to transpose the inverse DEA model from chapter 3 onto chapter 4. Indeed, in the case of a 
panel specification for the inverse DEA model, peer farmers are past observations for the farmer under 
consideration. The number of observations per farm is smaller, along with the number of peers. This would 
result in a strong inelasticity of input and output to prices or policy changes. One solution is to augment the 
number of possible peers by taking into account farmers in the same region and with the same farm type. 
Here, the drawback is that under profit maximisation, the chosen activity mix is the one for the most 
profitable peer. This phenomenon is known as the “extreme specialization problem” (Baker and McCarl, 
1982; Buysse et al., 2007). To remedy this problem, Önal and McCarl (1991) show that by stacking the 
individual optimal solutions (for instance a farm model) we obtain the optimal solution for an aggregate 
model (for instance a farm-type regional model). Hence, we developed a farm-type regional model that is 
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constrained by the farm-type regional historical activities mix, but also partitions the farm-type regional 
solution into individual solutions that are themselves a convex combination of the individual and/or peer 
historical activities. Such an approach enables us to tackle the problem of self-selection, to ensure a good 
representation of substitution patterns and finally to avoid aggregation bias. 
Regarding the maintenance of the permanent grassland measure under the greening package, we 
study the case of France. France is an interesting country to study, since agricultural land covers about 43% 
of the French territory (Farm Structure Survey, 2010) and was the highest among the EU-27 in 2010. Results 
highlight the importance of taking into account farm diversity. Indeed, to maintain the ratio of permanent 
grassland at the 2009 level, the opportunity cost varies greatly between farm types and regions, from 5.9€/ha 
for specialist cattle-rearing and fattening in Languedoc-Roussillon to 240€/ha for specialist horticulture in 
Basse-Normandie. Chapter 4 also demonstrates that the introduction of a premium of 100€/ha for 
permanent grassland would increase permanent grassland area by about 1% compared to the 2009 level. 
Furthermore, the introduction of such a premium would represent only 78% of the current Voluntary 
Coupled Support (VCS) budget for the livestock sector, would benefit the same targeted sectors under the 
current VCS, would promote the provision of permanent grassland and strengthen the link at farm level 
between crop and livestock production. 
Finally, chapter 5 presents a CCCP for set-aside and analyses its impact on arable farmers’ income 
variability and land-use changes in the Centre region in France. In the light of the debate around the 
effectiveness of the Ecological Focus Area requirement within the greening package, we suggest a CCCP 
which could play two roles: mitigate farm income variability and enhance the provision of environmental 
services at the lowest cost. To capture output price uncertainty and the price of the CCCP, we apply a 
Copula model based on the joint distribution of prices over the past 10 years for the three most common 
commodities: wheat, barley and rapeseed. Then, using a Monte-Carlo setting, we generate the probability 
distribution for each commodity price and the CCCP. This is the same farm-type regional model that, in 
chapter 4, simulates activity change for each stochastic price and the CCCP generated. In order to account 
for price uncertainty, we assume that farmers decide upon their land use, know their selling prices and the 
amount of CCCP they will receive. However, the model does not draw a distinction between future prices 
and stock market prices. We therefore assume that when farmers determine their land allocation, they 
protect themselves and fix their selling prices using future markets or forward contracts. The results show 
that by pooling commodity price risk under one policy instrument and linking it to set-aside, we could 
achieve a higher level of set-aside at farm and regional level compared to the current requirement, while at 
the same time decreasing  production surplus in times of low commodity prices and reducing farm income 
volatility. 
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6.2. Policy recommendations 
According to the European regulation No 1306/2013 (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2013b), the European Commission should monitor and evaluate the performance of the 
CAP in relation to the following three objectives: 
“(a) viable food production, with a focus on agricultural income, agricultural productivity and price 
stability; 
(b) sustainable management of natural resources and climate action, with a focus on greenhouse gas 
emissions, biodiversity, soil and water; 
(c) balanced territorial development, with a focus on rural employment, growth and poverty in rural 
areas.” 
The greening measures are intended to contribute to objective (b), although they may impact on all 
objectives. In this dissertation, we contribute to the objective (a) and (b) in analysing the potential impact 
of the greening measures on land-use change and farm income. We show that the current policy design 
might have limited effects and impacts might vary widely between farmers and regions. A successful 
greening package should take into account several factors. Beside the specific results of each chapter 
discussed in section 6.1, each chapter has been confronted with at least one of the following issue: 
determining the minim baseline level, whether or not to account for interaction among policy instruments, 
and to which extent current available data are sufficient to conduct a robust assessment.  
First, the success of a policy measure can only be assessed given a point of reference. Yet, under 
the current legislation, the minimum baseline is not clearly stated. Farmers might decide not to comply with 
the greening package. For simplification, in chapter 2 we assume that all farmers want to comply. In chapter 
4, given that the costs of maintaining permanent grassland differ across farmers, but are unknown to the 
authority, we determine farm-type regional opportunity costs, implicitly assuming that within a group some 
farmers will compensate for others. Such approach is in line with the choice made by Member States to 
maintain the ratio of permanent grassland to agricultural area at best at regional level. By imposing a ratio 
at regional level and not at farm level, the minimum baseline level differ across farmers and it is dependant 
of the decision made by other farmers. Additionally, the current design of the policy does not sanction 
farmers who have the most environmentally harmful practices, but those who historically received the 
highest level of direct payment for their eligible land. In the case of permanent grassland, farmers with a 
historically large area of permanent pasture are now the most constrained in terms of land allocation 
compared to those who converted permanent pasture into arable land ahead of the reform. Hence, we 
suggest that the integration of environmental concerns into pillar I of the CAP should also clearly define 
the rationale under which it operates. The greening of pillar I could apply the “Polluter-Pays-Principle”, in 
which case a baseline indicator should be defined at farm level. For instance, for the crop diversification 
measure, three crops on a large farm have a different impact on biodiversity and the landscape than three 
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crops on a small farm (Pe’er et al., 2014). For the maintenance of permanent grassland, the current 
requirement does not influence management practices, but instead freezes the geo-location of permanent 
grassland to where it was historically observed and not where it is the most beneficial. For EFA, the current 
logic does not ensure the deliverance of ecosystem services. For instance, nitrogen-fixing crops are 
considered as EFA, although their ecological interest in mitigating nitrogen and phosphorus losses or 
improving biodiversity greatly depends on management practices (Williams et al., 2014). The greening of 
pillar I could also apply the “Provider-Gets-Principle”. However, in this case payments should be made in 
accordance with the environmental value produced and the individual opportunity costs of the measure. 
Such an approach would fit under the rationale of pillar II of the CAP, which leaves flexibility to MS and 
their regions to translate European objectives into specific regional objectives. However, from a budgetary 
point of view, MS are reluctant to transfer further funds from pillar I to pillar II, since the pillar II budget 
is co-financed by MS. A possible option to reconcile both approaches would be to reinforce and extend 
cross-compliance policy and introduce coupled payments linked to the production of environmental 
services. Cross-compliance policy could establish the minimum baseline level applicable to all arable land. 
However, the effectiveness of cross-compliance policy largely depends on the effectiveness of the control 
and sanction systems. The introduction of voluntary payments coupled to environmental goods would go 
beyond cross-compliance policy and could potentially target management systems that deliver 
environmental services. 
Second, policy makers should take into account the interaction between policy instruments and 
impacts beyond the EU. This dissertation does not simulate possible interactions, but rather look at possible 
budget transfer from the VCS to payment for permanent grassland. The EU intends to address climate 
change, in order to measure the impact of any policy instruments on climate, impact indicators should take 
into account impacts on third countries (Pelikan et al., 2015). The positive impact from one policy 
instrument might be offset by another. In that sense, the re-introduction of support coupled to production 
is a major step back. We argue that coupled support should be linked to the provision of environmental 
benefits. Coupled payments for permanent grassland will not only increase areas under permanent grassland 
but they would incentivize farmers to change their management practices and they would indirectly target 
farmers currently considered under the VCS. Additionally, some policy instruments might exhibit synergy 
effects. Several authors suggest that the risk attitude of farmers might partially explain the adoption of 
environmentally friendly practices (Vollenweider, Di Falco and O’Donoghue, 2011; Till Dörschner and 
Musshoff, 2013; Finger and Buchmann, 2015). A counter cyclical payment linked to more environmentally 
friendly practices would explicitly take into account the risk attitude of farmers, while the provision of 
environmental goods would be achieved at the lowest cost and negative environmental impacts on third 
countries would be minimised. 
Third, the reform of the CAP has also introduced a new monitoring and evaluation system 
(European Commission, 2015b), the goal being to assess the performance of the CAP and its main 
instruments. Chapter 3 illustrates the impact of sample size on the predicting performance of ex-ante policy 
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models. It shows that a reduction in sample size hampers the performance of the models. Additionally, the 
development of Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) has been partially motivated to remediate to 
the data intensive nature of econometric technics, yet PMP suffers from other limitation such as self-
selection bias in order to model the impact of greening measures. If new objectives such as environmental 
objectives are integrated into the CAP, it goes without saying that we need to extend the data collection. 
For instance, the European Commission recently published a review of greening measures after one year 
(European Commission, 2016). They used two different data sources, the Farm Structure Survey and the 
FADN data. Regarding the crop diversification measure, they stressed that the selection of crops might 
differ from the regulation as some crops are not listed or are, in some cases, bundled together in the dataset. 
Policy makers have two choices; they can develop policy instruments taking into account the current data 
availability or they can extend the current dataset in order to allow for a robust assessment of the policy. 
However, they cannot ask for a robust evaluation framework without the required underlying data. Beyond 
the findings of this dissertation, we believe that today, farmers capture valuable data through the multiple 
sensors on their equipment that would be beneficial for researchers and policy makers. Most machinery 
suppliers provide services to improve farmers’ efficiency based on this data. However, the European 
legislation does not address the issue of property rights for the data. So far, private companies have gained 
a privileged position with unique insights into farmers’ decision behaviour. In the US, the Agricultural Data 
Coalition has created the first farmers’ data repository cooperative where farmers can store and control their 
information. In France, the biggest agricultural cooperative InVivo is seeking to build a big agri-data 
business model. It is just the right time for the European regulators to create the appropriate framework to 
ensure privacy of information and partnerships with the private sector in order to link current public datasets 
to site-specific private datasets (Antle, Capalbo and Houston, 2015; Michener and Jones, 2012; Horlings 
and Marsden, 2011; Zaks and Kucharik, 2011).  
6.3. Future research 
This dissertation evaluates the greening measures individually and assumes that all farmers are 
affected. However, in reality, not all farmers are concerned by the greening measures, for example small 
farmers and organic farmers. Additionally, interactions between the different policy instruments within the 
CAP are not taken into account. Interactions between policy instruments might play a major role in the 
deliverance of ecosystem services. In the US, Goodwin and Smith (2003) show that while the Conservation 
Reserve Programme contributed to erosion reduction, approximately half of this reduction has been offset 
by an increase in erosion resulting from the income-supporting federal programs. Miao et al. (2016) shows 
that incorporating crop insurance subsidies into the design of the Conservation Reserve Programme, would 
significantly increase the efficiency of the programme and the area enrolled. Such findings show the 
existence of trade-offs and synergies between the delivery of environmental and agricultural goods (Kirchner 
et al., 2015; Bryan and David, 2013). More research could be done in order to evaluate the overall impact 
of the CAP and assess to what extent the impact of a given policy instrument is offset by another. 
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Additionally results suggest that one-size-fits-all measures might hamper the effectiveness of the 
policy. For instance the opportunity costs of maintaining permanent grassland varies greatly between 
farmers and regions. Bateman et al. (2013) shows that spatially targeted objectives increase the net value of 
land to the society. If additionally the provision of public good were taken into account (where economic 
value can be estimated), they show that a gain in public goods will overcompensate the lost in farm income 
in some locations. These results highlights one limitation of our proposed approach. Indeed, in this 
dissertation we do not measure the impact on the environment such as greenhouse gas emission or 
biodiversity, nor attribute to them an economic value. Nevertheless, the literature shows that accounting for 
multi-criteria could lead to the identification of policy measures with synergy effects between economic and 
environmental performances (Mouysset et al., 2015; Mouysset, 2014; Mouysset, Doyen and Jiguet, 2014; Ay 
et al., 2014). One possible options would be to integrate multi-criteria in order to identify synergies and 
tradeoffs (Ay et al., 2014). 
Building on the aforementioned improvements, a next step could be to determine prices 
endogenously by linking our model to a general or partial equilibrium model. Indeed, extensification of the 
European agricultural systems to account for the provision of public good might lead to an intensification 
of the agricultural system in other parts of the world. The problem becomes even more complex depending 
if the location of positive or negative externalities matter to the society and if different societies value the 
produced positive or negative externalities differently. For instance, do Europeans value equally a loss of 
biodiversity in Europe and in Brazil and vice versa.  
In this dissertation, we introduce the notion of a capacity payment and suggest considering set-aside 
land as a reserve agricultural capacity. The rationale underpinning reserve agricultural capacity is that in 
times of low commodity prices farmers would receive an incentive to withdraw land from production and 
vice-versa. In this configuration, set-aside land could play a role beyond the provision of environmental 
goods by mitigating farm income volatility. However, this dissertation is just a first step that illustrates 
possible interactions between the delivery of environmental and agricultural goods. Further research would 
need to be conducted that takes into account yield and price risks. Furthermore, we assume that farmers are 
risk neutral. Evidence in the literature shows that farmers tend to be risk averse (Finger and Buchmann, 
2015). Accounting for risk preferences might help to better understand farmers’ decisions and design more 
effective policy instruments. The proposed policy instruments (CCCP and premium of permanent 
grassland) are largely inspired by the greening package logic, although other options exist. Pirard (2012) 
investigates the different market-based instruments for ecosystem services. He distinguishes five categories: 
direct market for environmental products ( e.g. genetic resources), tradable permits (e.g. emission quota in 
the EU), reverse auctions (e.g. Conservation Reserve Program in the US), Coasean type agreements (e.g. 
The Vittel payments for ecosystem services (Perrot-maître, 2006)), regulatory price signals (e.g. Agro-
environmental measures in the EU) and voluntary price signals (e.g. labels and certifications). Payments for 
ecosystem services might belong to one or several categories. However, payment design is context specific 
and its efficiency can only be assessed if the context is documented in a systematic way. Multidisciplinary 
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research plays a key role in reported policy outcomes in an environmental, economic, social and political 
context from micro level to macro level. Regarding, the greening package within the CAP, efficient policy 
instruments still need to be invented. 
Finally, the development of mathematical programming models for ex-ante impact assessment is, 
by definition, an approximate reconstruction of the reality that today integrates complex phenomena from 
biological to social systems and from micro to macro level. A multitude of approaches coexist between and 
within disciplines. One of the main challenges for modellers is to assess to what extent the developed model 
represents the relevant policy drivers. The problem becomes even more complex in policy modelling since 
natural experiments cannot be conducted. If partial validation has been conducted against historical data 
and expert screening, model output validation should not solely rely on a peer-review process and traditional 
“historical matching” but also on the development of protocols (Jakeman and Letcher, 2003). Indeed, ex-
ante mathematical programming is often a mixture between causal relationships within the systems and 
observed associations. In the case of a pure causal model, the model is refuted if a causal relationship does 
not make sense, even though model outputs match the observed data. In the case of pure non-causal models, 
model outputs must match the observed data for the model to be considered valid. This difference in 
paradigm illustrates the complexity in determining model validity. Recently, the Nobel Laureate Daniel 
Kahneman has sent an open email to researchers in psychology working on social priming in order to create 
a replication ring to check each other’s results (Kahneman, 2012). The priming effect infers that exposure 
to socially relevant stimuli can facilitate, or prime, a host response, often without people’s intention or 
awareness. If the advice of Kahneman to create a replicating ring to check each other’s results is valid for 
every discipline, I also argue that researchers could be themselves subject to the priming effect for two 
reasons. First, “negative results” or “dull results” are often not published, thereby skewing the scientific 
literature. Second, model validation is bound to be a relative, semiformal, and conversational process (Barlas 
and Carpenter, 1990). Hence, model validation exercises are rarely published and it is often assumed that if 
a large number of papers use a similar methodology, the methodology must be valid. However, researchers 
should systematically accompany model development with model validation results. Furthermore, validation 
methodology should be further researched and validation exercises revealing negative or dull performance 
of the model should be better appreciated by the scientific community and funding agencies. 
6.4. Concluding remarks 
 “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” from the economist Thomas Piketty was published in 2013 
and since then it has generated a lot of ink flow from economists, journalists and policy makers (Avent, 
2014; Góes, 2016; Milanovic, 2014; Piketty, 2014). Beyond the focus of the book on wealth and income 
inequality, the success of Thomas Piketty relaunched the debate around natural capital (Mace et al., 2015; 
Maseyk et al., 2016; Barbier, 2014). One of the main critics of Piketty’s theory was that he did not account 
for the depreciation of natural capital in appraising wealth. Accounting for natural capital and formalising 
its link with the provision of environmental services is a challenging task. In fact, natural capital is the stock 
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giving rise to ecosystem services (Maseyk et al., 2016). The United Nations and the World Bank have started 
to address the issue of natural capital (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014; WAVES, 2015) and have adjusted 
income indicators to account for agricultural land, for instance. This dissertation introduces the notion of 
agricultural capacity. Agricultural land can be considered as a natural capital stock providing agricultural 
output and ecosystem services that are valued by people. Hence, the formalisation of such an approach by 
policy makers would help to design more transparent policy instruments, taking into account the existing 
trade-off or synergy between agricultural capacity, agricultural production and ecosystem services. 
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Appendix I. GAMS code for the specification of the DGP 
*---------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*              Define Bioeconomic model to generate data 
* 
*---------------------------------------------------------------------* 
Set 
j                Observations "Decision Making Unit"       /dmu1 * dmu1000/ 
i              Inputs (feeds)                          /input1 * input3/ 
o              Output                                          /output1/ 
sRequirement   Feed requirements              /capacity, energy, protein/ 
d              Scenario with endogenous error term               /d1*d4/ 
e              Scenario with exogenous error term                /e1*e4/ 
; 
Table pFeedcontent(i,sRequirement)  Feed characteristics 
           capacity         energy           protein 
input1     - 0.2             0.2              0.7 
input2     - 0.4             0.7              0.5 
input3     - 0.4             0.5              0.6 
; 
Parameters 
Pbasicrequirement(j,sRequirement)          Feed requirements for each DMU 
Pconversionefficiency(j,sRequirement)             Conversion coefficients 
po(j,o)                                              Initial output price 
pi(j,i)                                             Initial input prices 
pin(j,i)                                                New input prices 
pon(j,o)                                                 New output prices 
disturbancebasicrequirement(j,sRequirement)         Endogenous error term 
error(i,j,e)                                        Exogenous error term 
disturbance(j,d) 
; 
 
Pbasicrequirement(j,'capacity') =  -2.5; 
Pconversionefficiency(j,'capacity') = -0.2 ; 
 
Pbasicrequirement(j,'energy') =  1.36; 
Pconversionefficiency(j,'energy') =  0.3 ; 
 
Pbasicrequirement(j,'protein') =  1.4; 
Pconversionefficiency(j,'protein') =  0.4 ; 
 
 
*initial input and output prices * 
po(j,o) = uniform(20,21) ; 
pi(j,'input1')=uniform(3,4); 
pi(j,'input2')=uniform(1,2); 
pi(j,'input3')=uniform(0.5,2.5); 
 
* option to change input and output prices * 
option seed = 123 ; 
pon(j,o)=po(j,o); 
pin(j,'input1')=uniform(3,4); 
pin(j,'input2')=uniform(1,2); 
pin(j,'input3')=uniform(0.5,2.5); 
 
 
* disturbance term with four possible standard deviations * 
disturbance(j,'d1')   = 0; 
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disturbance(j,'d2')  = normal(0,0.05 ); 
disturbance(j,'d3')  = normal(0,0.15 ); 
disturbance(j,'d4')  = normal(0,0.2 ); 
 
* Added error term after simulation with four possible standard deviations 
* 
error(i,j,'e1')=0; 
error(i,j,'e2')=normal(0,0.05); 
error(i,j,'e3')=normal(0,0.15); 
error(i,j,'e4')=normal(0,0.3); 
 
 
Parameters 
*parameters used to store results 
x(i,j,d,e)  Initial dataset of inputs used for the estimation of the 
RLR model and the Inverse DEA model 
y(o,j,d,e)  Initial dataset of outputs used for the estimation of  
the RLR model and the Inverse DEA model 
xbio(i,j,d) New dataset of inputs under the new market conditions  
used to compare with the RLR model and the Inverse DEA  
model 
ybio(o,j,d) New dataset of output under the new market conditions  
used to compare with the RLR model adnd the Inverse DEA  
model 
profit(j)  Initial profit 
profitbio(j) New profit 
addedError(i,j,e)Error term x*e 
; 
 
Positive variables 
vinputuse(j,i)  Inputs generated X 
voutputproduction(j,o) Output generated Y 
; 
Variable 
vZ    Profit 
; 
Equations 
Eqprofit    Profit definition with initial input and  
output prices 
EqprofitNew   Profit definition with new input and output  
prices 
Eqfeeding(j,sRequirement) Feeding constraints 
; 
 
Eqprofit..  vZ =e= sum(j, sum(o, voutputproduction(j,o) *po(j,o) ) 
- sum(i, vinputuse(j,i) * pi(j,i) )) ; 
 
EqprofitNew.. vZ =e= sum(j, sum(o, voutputproduction(j,o) *pon(j,o) ) 
- sum(i, vinputuse(j,i) * pin(j,i) )) ; 
 
Eqfeeding(j,sRequirement).. 
 sum(i,vinputuse(j,i)*pFeedcontent(i,sRequirement))=g= 
disturbancebasicrequirement(j,sRequirement)*Pbasicrequirement(j,sRequir
ement)+Pbasicrequirement(j,sRequirement)+Pconversionefficiency(j,sRequi
rement)*sqr(sum(o,voutputproduction(j,o))); 
 
*model equation with initial input and output prices 
Model Bioeconomic /Eqprofit,Eqfeeding/; 
Appendixes 
iii 
 
*model equation with new input and output prices (however we only change 
input prices) 
Model Bioeconomic2 /EqprofitNew, Eqfeeding/; 
 
*---------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*Run and Store results in a GDX file for each combination of disturbance 
*and error terms 
*---------------------------------------------------------------------* 
*Import dataset 
$GDXIN startingValDGP.gdx 
 
Parameters 
xDGP(i,j,d,e)       starting value 
yDGP(o,j,d,e)       starting value 
xbioDGP(i,j,d)      starting value 
ybioDGP(o,j,d)      starting value 
; 
 
$load xDGP=x, yDGP=y, ybioDGP=ybio, xbioDGP=xbio 
 
$GDXin 
 
Set 
Mod/bioeconomic,bioeconomic2/ 
 
Parameter 
M(d,Mod) model status 
S(d,Mod) model solve statement 
; 
loop((d), 
 
disturbancebasicrequirement(j,'capacity')=disturbance(j,d) ; 
 
Solve bioeconomic maximising vZ using nlp ; 
 
x(i,j,d,'e1')=vinputuse.l(j,i) ; 
y(o,j,d,e)=voutputproduction.l(j,o); 
                  M(d,'bioeconomic')=bioeconomic.modelstat ; 
                  S(d,'bioeconomic')=bioeconomic.solvestat; 
 
         loop(e,addederror(i,j,e)=vinputuse.l(j,i)*error(i,j,e);); 
 
x(i,j,d,'e2')=vinputuse.l(j,i)+addederror(i,j,'e2') ; 
x(i,j,d,'e3')=vinputuse.l(j,i)+addederror(i,j,'e3') ; 
x(i,j,d,'e4')=vinputuse.l(j,i)+addederror(i,j,'e4') ; 
x(i,j,d,e) $(x(i,j,d,e)<0)=0 ; 
 
Solve bioeconomic2 maximising vZ using nlp ; 
*Store results of the new data set* 
xbio(i,j,d)= vinputuse.l(j,i)   ; 
ybio(o,j,d)= voutputproduction.l(j,o) ; 
 
                  M(d,'bioeconomic2')=bioeconomic2.modelstat ; 
                  S(d,'bioeconomic2')=bioeconomic2.solvestat; 
*execute_unload 'startingValDGP.gdx' x,y,xbio,ybio; 
execute_unload 'bioeconomic.gdx' 
i,o,j,x,y,pi,po,xbio,ybio,pin,pon,d,e,M,S; 
;);
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Appendix II. French regions 
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Appendix III. Evolution of the permanent grassland area in France 
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Appendix IV. Peers selection 
For each farmers f present in the FADN in 2009, we use the DEA model under constant return to 
scale (Banker et al., 1984) to identify peer farmers and obtain the efficiency score of farmer in 2009. Each 
farmers are benchmarked against peer farmers belonging to the same farm type (TF8) and the same region 
(NUTS2) and present in the data between 1995 and 2009. Hence, the problem must be solved F (1 x f)  
times, once for each farmers.  
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝜃𝑓    
S.t. ∑ 𝜆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑘̂ −  𝑦𝑓,?̂?
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
≥ 0 
 
 
𝜃𝑓𝑥𝑓,𝑖 ̂ −   ∑ 𝜆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑖 ̂
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
≥ 0,  
 
 
𝜃𝑓𝑐𝑓,𝑗 ̂ −   ∑ 𝜆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟,𝑗 ̂
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟
≥ 0, 
 
 𝜆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 ≥ 0 
 
 
 
Indexes Description 
𝒇 Farmers under consideration. They are farmers present 
in the dataset in 2009. 
𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 Potential peer farmers. They are all farmers present in 
the dataset between 1995 and 2009 and belonging to the 
same NUTS2 region and the same TF8 group. 
𝒌 Outputs 
𝒊 Inputs 
𝒋 Input costs 
 
Parameters Description 
𝒚
𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓,?̂?
 Observed outputs of peer farmers 
𝒚
𝒇,?̂?
 Observed outputs of the farmer under consideration 
𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓,𝒊 ̂  Observed inputs of peer farmers 
𝒙𝒇,𝒊 ̂  Observed inputs of the farmer under consideration 
𝒄𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓,𝒋 ̂  Observed input costs of peer farmers 
𝒄𝒇,𝒋 ̂  Observed input costs of the farmer under consideration 
 
Variables Descriptions 
𝜽𝒇 Efficiency score of the farmer under consideration 
𝝀𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 Vector of constants 
Here, the problem takes the f-th farm and seeks to radially contract the input vector 𝑥𝑓,𝑖 ̂  and the 
input costs vector 𝑐𝑓,𝑗 ̂  as much as possible, while still remaining within the production possibility set 
  
 
determined by the observed data points (farmers in the sample). The radial contraction of the input vector 
𝑥𝑓,𝑖 ̂  and the input costs vector 𝑐𝑓,𝑗 ̂  produces a projected point (X 𝜆, C 𝜆, Y 𝜆). This project point is a linear 
combination of these observed data points referred as peer farmers. Then, we obtain a list of peer farmers 
defining the production possibility set and against which farmers in 2009 are benchmarked.
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Appendix V. Fitting results of the marginal distributions for wheat, barley and rapeseed. 
Table-Appendix V 1. Fitting results of the marginal distribution for wheat 
 
LogLogistic Pearson5 Lognorm InvGauss Gamma Pearson6 Weibull Triang Uniform Expon Levy 
 Method  MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE (Modified) MLE MLE MLE (Bias Corrected) MLE MLE  
           
 Num. Est. Parameters  2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 
 Fitted Parameter #1  beta alpha mu mu alpha alpha1 alpha M. likely Max beta c 
 Fitted Value  119.37 31.45 123.43 123.59 27.36 120 423 445.40 4.39 122.28 217.28 123.59 119.41 
 Fitted Parameter #2  alpha beta sigma lambda beta alpha2 beta Max    
 Fitted Value  10.15 3 755.58 23.03 3 534.63 4.52 31.45 134.32 216.80    
 Fitted Parameter #3       beta      
 Fitted Value       3.12E-05      
 Akaike (AIC)  139.81 139.96 140.90 140.95 142.07 143.14 147.96 153.02 163.74 176.82 189.07 
 Bayesian (BIC)  140.22 140.37 141.32 141.37 142.49 143.08 148.37 153.43 164.14 177.22 189.47 
 Av. LogL  -4.49 -4.50 -4.53 -4.53 -4.57 -4.50 -4.77 -4.93 -5.38 -5.82 -6.23 
 Chi-Sq Statistic  0.40 0.40 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.40 3.60 15.60 19.60 15.60 8.40 
 A-D Statistic  0.23 0.32 0.39 0.40 0.49 0.32 1.08 1.90 3.15 4.74 6.41 
 K-S Statistic  0.09 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.34 0.44 0.54 0.57 
 
  
  
 
Table-Appendix V 2. Fitting results of the marginal distribution for barley 
 Pearson5 InvGauss Lognorm LogLogistic Gamma Pearson6 Weibull Triang BetaGeneral Uniform Expon Levy 
Method MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE 
MLE 
(Modified) 
MLE MLE 
MLE 
(Approximate) 
MLE (Bias 
Corrected) 
MLE MLE 
Num. Est. 
Parameters 
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 
Fitted Parameter 
#1 
alpha mu mu beta alpha alpha1 alpha M. likely alpha1 Max beta c 
Fitted Value 37.03 116.94 116.88 113.77 34.44 3.2E-05 5.45 116.14 5.21 182.18 116.94 113.69 
Fitted Parameter 
#2 
beta lambda sigma alpha beta alpha2 beta Max alpha2    
Fitted Value 4 209.60 4 095.35 19.75 10.58 3.40 37.03 125.94 183.61 2.33    
Fitted Parameter 
#3 
     beta   Max    
Fitted Value      0.00   172.09    
Akaike (AIC) 135.94 136.42 136.43 136.56 137.04 139.12 141.05 148.24 148.35 158.46 175.16 187.49 
Bayesian (BIC) 136.36 136.84 136.85 136.97 137.45 139.07 141.46 148.66 148.29 158.86 175.56 187.89 
Av. LogL -4.36 -4.38 -4.38 -4.39 -4.40 -4.36 -4.53 -4.77 -4.67 -5.21 -5.76 -6.17 
Chi-Sq Statistic 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 12.40 2.80 12.40 15.60 12.40 
A-D Statistic 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.79 2.42 1.39 3.84 4.87 6.49 
K-S Statistic 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.26 0.39 0.31 0.50 0.54 0.59 
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Table-Appendix V 3. Fitting results of the marginal distribution for rapeseed 
  Pearson5 LogLogistic InvGauss Lognorm Gamma Pearson6 Weibull Triang Uniform Expon Levy 
 Method  MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE (Modified) MLE MLE MLE (Bias Corrected) MLE MLE 
 Num. Est. Parameters  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Fitted Parameter #1  alpha beta mu mu alpha alpha1 alpha M. likely Max beta c 
 Fitted Value  27.47 214.83 221.63 221.49 25.71 16 896 390.30 4.78 219.74 360.47 221.63 213.39 
 Fitted Parameter #2  beta alpha lambda sigma beta alpha2 beta Max    
 Fitted Value  5 861.63 9.25 5 739.33 43.52 8.62 27.47 240.67 364.31    
 Fitted Parameter #3       beta      
 Fitted Value       0.00      
 Akaike (AIC)  159.50 159.83 159.91 159.91 160.50 162.68 164.15 169.46 178.93 194.34 206.59 
 Bayesian (BIC)  159.91 160.25 160.32 160.33 160.92 162.62 164.57 169.87 179.33 194.74 206.99 
 Av. LogL  -5.15 -5.16 -5.16 -5.16 -5.18 -5.15 -5.31 -5.48 -5.89 -6.40 -6.81 
 Chi-Sq Statistic  0.40 0.40 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.40 2.80 3.60 15.60 15.60 10.00 
 A-D Statistic  0.29 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.29 0.72 1.81 3.20 4.58 6.26 
 K-S Statistic  0.13 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.32 0.44 0.51 0.57 
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Summary 
Today, governments across the globe integrate environmental issues into policy by whether 
sponsoring environmental programs aimed at more environmentally friendly farming practices, and/or 
sanctioning farmers who fail to comply with a set of environmental rules. In the European Union; the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reflects this dichotomy between promoting and sanctioning with its 
two pillar structure. Pillar I is oriented towards production and withholds payments if farmers do not comply 
with a set of environmental rules, while Pillar II promotes sustainable rural development. 
The latest CAP reform in 2013 introduced the greening of the direct payment systems under Pillar 
I. The “greening” refers to the introduction of three measures deemed beneficial for the environment and 
the climate with which farmers must comply in order to receive their full allocation of direct payments. The 
first measure is crop diversification and aims to tackle the issue of decreasing diversity in agricultural 
landscapes - in other words the presence of monocultures. The second measure is the maintenance of 
permanent grassland. Member States need to ensure that the ratio of permanent grassland area to total 
Utilized Agricultural Area does not fall by more than 5% compared to the reference level. Finally, the third 
measure ensures that famers dedicate 5% of arable land to Ecological Focus Areas (EFAs). EFAs cover a 
broad range of features from which set-aside land is a popular choice from Member States but also from 
farmers. 
The introduction of the greening measures poses new challenges for agricultural policy modellers. 
Measures are farm specific and are designed to change the land allocation at farm level. Consequently, any 
ex-ante assessment should be able to simulate farmers’ adoption of new crop, to correctly reproduce the 
substitution pattern, to correctly represent farmer heterogeneity and account for price uncertainty. Hence, 
the objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the impact assessment of the three greening measures. 
To reach this objectives and answer the abovementioned modelling challenges, we propose a non-
parametric model. Furthermore, we compare the effectiveness of two measures - the maintenance of 
permanent grassland and the requirement for EFAs – to two alternative policy instruments – a premium 
payment for permanent grassland and a Counter Cyclical Capacity Payment (CCCP) for set-aside land. 
To simulate the impact of the crop diversification measure, we develop a new modelling route based 
on mimicking behaviour. The crop diversification measure requires that modellers simulate the adoption of 
a new crop for a given farmer without having any cost information on the potential new crops for this given 
farmer. We develop a non-parametric mathematical programming model based on peer behaviour. In fact, 
to predict the reaction of a non-compliant farmer A to a newly imposed rule, we look at compliant farmer 
B and project the crop allocation of farmer B on farmer A. Here, we assume that farmer B is similar to 
farmer A and shares similar context, hence it is likely that farmer A come to the same conclusion than farmer 
B. To select farmer B, first we only look at compliant farmers. Then from this pool of farmers, we use four 
variables and choose the farmer that differs the least from farmer A according to the relative permanent 
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grassland area, the number of crops, the crops areas, and located as close as possible. Once farmer B is 
identified, we project his crop allocation onto the total arable area of farmer A in order to render him 
compliant with the crop diversification measure. We simulate the impact of this measure on Flemish 
farmers. This measure implicitly targets monoculture and it is indeed maize, the most dominant crop, which 
would see the largest reduction in area. In this sense, the mechanism is effective. However, the largest part 
of the ‘freed’ area was absorbed by other dominant crops, which reduces the overall crop diversification 
effect at landscape level. The measure has, in its present form, limited effect at landscape level. 
As agricultural policies continue to evolve and integrate environmental and climatic concerns, 
agricultural policy models tend to incorporate more components of environmental models where 
biophysical relationships might play a role between environmental and economic outcomes. Non-linear 
phenomena such as threshold effects are frequent in biological systems which may respond to an 
incremental change with a sudden regime shift. Therefore we test the validity of two models - a non-
parametric and a parametric model - in reproducing a data generating process where biophysical 
relationships hold. The parametric approach is a standard econometric model. The non-parametric 
approach is an inverse Data Envelopment model. In fact, the proposed non-parametric approach builds 
further on the premise of ‘mimicking’ behaviour, but assuming profit maximisation behaviour, and the 
possibility of multiple peers. Models are considered valid if we cannot distinguish output coming from the 
initial data generating process with the tested models. In general, the econometric model performs poorly 
as we have generated datasets of 1000 observations with different prices and free of any measurement or 
sampling bias. This amount of data is far beyond the real world policy simulation, where typically less than 
20 observations per farm are available and the amount of price variation is limited. On the contrary, one of 
the main strengths of the non-parametric model is the ability to obtain reliable results for a small sample. 
Nevertheless, our results show the importance of using panel data or robust grouping technics in order to 
maximise homogeneity in the sample.  
Based on our validation exercise, we further develop the non-parametric model to account for 
farmers heterogeneity and so aggregation bias. We propose a farm-type regional model using historical 
activity mixes that we extend using individual farm production frontier constraints defined by the historical 
activity mix for the observed farmers and their associated peers. Such an approach enables us to take full 
advantage of the information available and to model farmers’ adoption while ensuring consistency between 
farm level results and regional level results.  
First we simulate the opportunity costs at farm-type regional level for maintaining the ratio of 
permanent grassland at the 2009 level in France. The opportunity cost for the maintenance of permanent 
grassland varies greatly between farm types and regions, from 5.9€/ha for specialist cattle-rearing and 
fattening in Languedoc-Roussillon to 240€/ha for specialist horticulture in Basse-Normandie. In light of 
the partial recoupling of certain subsidy in the livestock sector under the Voluntary Coupled Support 
scheme, and in order to address farmer heterogeneity, we propose to study the option of a premium per 
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hectare for permanent grassland. Increasing the competitiveness of permanent grassland would ultimately 
lead to a decrease in forage costs and would support the livestock sector per se. Results show that a premium 
of 100€/ha for permanent grassland for all farmers in France would, as a minimum, maintain permanent 
grassland at the 2009 level. Furthermore, a premium per hectare would increase diversification in farm 
production by increasing cattle production for every farm type and so strengthen the link, at farm level, 
between crop and livestock production. Such a policy would match current budget expenditure and would 
represent 78% (720M€) of the Voluntary Coupled Support scheme. However, a differentiated premium for 
permanent grassland for different farm types and regions would divide the overall budget by ten from 
720M€ to 72M€. Hence, from a cost-benefit point of view, we can wondered, if the argument of insuring 
the same level playing among farmers, is still valid. 
Second we introduce the notion of a capacity payment and suggest considering set-aside land as a 
reserve agricultural capacity. The rationale underpinning reserve agricultural capacity is that in times of low 
commodity prices farmers will receive an incentive to withdraw land from production and vice-versa. In 
this configuration, set-aside land could play a role beyond the provision of environmental goods by 
mitigating farm income volatility. In order to account for price uncertainty, we assume that farmers decide 
upon their land use, know their selling prices and the amount of CCCP they will receive. However, the 
model does not draw a distinction between future prices and stock market prices. We therefore assume that 
when farmers determine their land allocation, they protect themselves and fix their selling prices using future 
markets or forward contracts. The results show that by pooling commodity price risk under one policy 
instrument and linking it to set-aside, we could achieve a higher level of set-aside at farm and regional level 
compared to the current requirement, while at the same time decreasing production in times of low 
commodity prices and reducing farm income volatility.  
The EU introduced the greening of the CAP to address climate change, but at the same time it has re-
introduced support coupled to production classified by the OECD as environmentally harmful. We argue 
that coupled support should be linked to the provision of environmental benefits. Coupled payments for 
permanent grassland will not only increase areas under permanent grassland but they would incentivize 
farmers to change their management practices and they would indirectly target farmers currently considered 
under the Voluntary Coupled Support scheme. Additionally, some policy instruments might exhibit synergy 
effects. A counter cyclical payment linked to more environmentally friendly practices would explicitly take 
into account the risk attitude of farmers, while the provision of environmental goods would be achieved at 
the lowest cost. Accounting for natural capital and formalising its link with the provision of environmental 
services is a challenging task. Agricultural land can be considered as a natural capital stock providing 
agricultural output and ecosystem services that are valued by people. Hence, the formalisation of such an 
approach by policy makers would help to design more transparent policy instruments, taking into account 
the existing trade-off or synergy between agricultural capacity, agricultural production and ecosystem 
services.
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Samenvatting 
Vandaag de dag houden regeringen over heel de wereld rekening met milieu in hun landbouwbeleid.  
Ze doen dit enerzijds door het financieel ondersteunen van milieuvriendelijke landbouwpraktijken en 
anderzijds door het sanctioneren van landbouwers die niet voldoen aan een set van milieuvoorwaarden. In 
de Europese Unie is deze dichotomie tussen ondersteunen en sanctioneren zichtbaar in de twee pijlers van 
het Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid (GLB). De eerste pijler richt zich op productie en weerhoudt 
inkomenssteun aan landbouwers als ze niet voldoen aan bepaalde milieuvoorwaarden, terwijl de tweede 
pijler duurzame plattelandsontwikkeling ondersteunt.  
Bij de laatste hervorming van het GLB in 2013 werd de vergroening van de rechtstreekse 
inkomenssteun onder de eerste pijler ingevoerd. De ‘vergroening’ verwijst naar de invoering van drie 
maatregelen die gunstig worden geacht voor het milieu en het klimaat. Landbouwers moeten aan deze 
maatregelen voldoen om recht te hebben op de volledige rechtstreekse inkomenssteun. De eerste maatregel, 
gewasdiversificatie, heeft als doel diversiteitsverlies in landbouwlandschappen een halt toe te roepen. Ze 
richt zich met andere woorden op het tegengaan van monoculturen. De tweede maatregel is het behoud van 
blijvend bestaand grasland. Lidstaten moeten er op toezien dat de verhouding van blijvend grasland op de 
totale oppervlakte cultuurgrond niet met meer dan 5% afneemt ten opzichte van het referentieniveau. Ten 
slotte eist de derde maatregel dat 5% van het bouwland van landbouwers als ecologisch aandachtsgebied 
(EAG) moet worden ingericht. Er bestaan verschillende mogelijkheden voor het inrichten van ecologisch 
aandachtsgebied, waarvan braakland de populairste keuze is.  
De invoering van de vergroeningsmaatregelingen brengt nieuwe uitdagingen met zich mee voor het 
modelleren van landbouwbeleid. De maatregelen zijn bedrijfsspecifiek en gericht op het veranderen van 
landgebruik op het niveau van individuele boerderijen. Als gevolg daarvan moet een ex-ante 
beleidsbeoordeling in staat zijn de keuze van een landbouwer voor nieuwe gewassen te simuleren, het 
substitutiepatroon correct reproduceren, de heterogeniteit in de landbouwerspopulatie weergeven en 
prijsonzekerheid in rekening brengen. Daarom is het doel van dit proefschrift om bij dragen aan de 
impactbeoordeling van de drie vergroeningsmaatregelen. Om dit doel te verwezenlijken en te beantwoorden 
aan de bovengenoemde uitdagingen kiezen we voor een niet-parametrisch model. Voorts vergelijken we de 
effectiviteit van twee maatregelen -  het behoud van bestaand grasland en de vereiste van ecologisch 
aandachtsgebied – met twee alternatieve beleidsinstrumenten: een premiumbetaling voor blijvend grasland 
en een contracyclische capaciteitsbetaling voor braakland.  
Om de impact van de gewasdiversificatiemaatregel te simuleren ontwikkelen we een nieuwe 
modelleerbenadering gebaseerd op kopieergedrag. De gewasdiversificatiemaatregel vereist dat 
modelleerders de keuze van een nieuw gewas voor een bepaalde landbouwer voorspellen, zonder te 
beschikken over informatie over de kost van potentiële nieuwe gewassen voor diezelfde landbouwer. We 
ontwikkelen een niet-parametrisch mathematisch programmeermodel gebaseerd op peer-gedrag. Om de 
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reactie van een landbouwer A, die niet aan de gewasdiversificatiemaatregel voldoet, op een nieuwe opgelegde 
beleidsmaatregel te voorspellen, kijken we naar het gedrag van een landbouwer B die wel aan de maatregel 
voldoet. Vervolgens projecteren we het teeltplan van landbouwer B op dat van landbouwer A. Hierbij 
veronderstellen we dat landbouwer B vergelijkbaar is met landbouwer A en in een gemeenschappelijke 
context handelt, waardoor het waarschijnlijk is dat landbouwer A tot dezelfde beslissing komt als 
landbouwer B. Om landbouwer B te selecteren starten we met landbouwers die aan de 
gewasdiversificatiemaatregel voldoen. Uit die groep selecteren we de landbouwer die op basis van vier 
variabelen het minst verschilt van landbouwer A: de relatieve oppervlakte blijvend grasland, het aantal 
gewassen, de oppervlakte toegekend aan deze gewassen en de locatie. Zodra landbouwer B wordt 
geïdentificeerd projecteren we zijn teeltplan op de totale oppervlakte bouwland van landbouwer A, zodanig 
dat deze ook voldoet aan de vereiste van gewasdiversificatie. We simuleren de impact van de 
gewasdiversificatiemaatregel op Vlaamse landbouwers. De maatregel heeft als doel monoculturen tegen te 
gaan. Het is inderdaad maïs, het dominante gewas in Vlaanderen, waarvoor we de grootste afname in 
oppervlakte waarnemen. In die optiek is de maatregel effectief. Het grootste deel van de vrijgekomen grond 
wordt echter ingenomen door andere dominante gewassen, wat er voor zorgt dat het effect van 
gewasdiversificatie op landschapsniveau wordt afgezwakt. De maatregel heeft, in zijn huidige vorm, een 
beperkt effect op landschapsniveau.  
Aangezien landbouwbeleid continu evolueert en meer en meer milieu- en klimaataspecten in 
rekening brengt, worden componenten van milieumodellen in landbouwbeleidsmodellen geïntegreerd, in 
het bijzonder als biofysische relaties een link vormen tussen ecologische en economische effecten. Niet-
lineaire fenomenen zoals drempeleffecten zijn veelvoorkomend in biologische systemen, waarbij een kleine 
verandering kan resulteren in een plotse regimeshift. Daarom testen we hoe goed twee modellen – een niet-
parameterisch en een parametrisch model – het data-genererend proces reproduceren wanneer er 
biofysische relaties in het spel zijn. De parametrische aanpak omvat een standaard econometrisch model. 
De niet-parametrische aanpak bestaat uit een invers Data Envelopment model. De voorgestelde niet-
parametrische aanpak bouwt voort op de aanname van ‘kopieergedrag’, maar veronderstelt aanvullend ook 
winst-maximaliserend gedrag en de mogelijkheid tot het hebben van meerdere peers. Modellen worden als 
geschikt beschouwd als we de output van het model niet kunnen onderscheiden van de output van het 
initieel data-generend proces. Het econometrisch model presteert slecht, hoewel we datasets gegeneerd 
hebben met 1000 observaties van verschillende prijzen, vrij van meetfouten en sampling bias. Deze 
hoeveelheid data gaat veel verder dan gebruikelijke beleidssimulaties, waarvoor er doorgaans minder dan 20 
observaties per bedrijf beschikbaar zijn, met beperkte prijsvariatie. Daar staat tegenover dat niet-
parametrische modellen als voordeel hebben dat je er zelfs met een kleine steekproef betrouwbare resultaten 
mee kan verkrijgen. Niettemin tonen onze resultaten aan dat het belangrijk is gebruik te maken van paneldata 
en robuuste clusteringtechnieken, om de homogeniteit van de steekproef te maximaliseren.  
Voortgaand op onze validatieoefening hebben we het niet-parametrisch model verder verfijnd, 
zodat het rekening houdt met de heterogeniteit in de landbouwerspopulatie en aggregation bias. We stellen 
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een bedrijfstype-specifiek regionaal model voor, gebruik makend van historische data over de 
activiteitenmix, die we aanvullen met individuele frontier beperkingen op de productie. Deze zijn gebaseerd 
op historische activiteitenmixen voor de geobserveerde landbouwers en hun geassocieerde peers. Deze 
aanpak laat toe om alle beschikbare informatie te benutten en om het aanpassingsgedrag van individuele 
boeren te modelleren, terwijl de consistentie tussen bedrijfsspecifieke en regionale resultaten wordt 
gevrijwaard.  
Eerst simuleren we, op bedrijfstype-specifiek regionaal niveau, de opportuniteitskosten voor het 
behoud van blijvend grasland op het niveau van 2009 in Frankrijk. Deze opportuniteitskosten variëren sterk 
afhankelijk van de regio en het bedrijfstype, gaande van 5.9 €/ha voor gespecialiseerde opfok- en 
afmestbedrijven van rundvee in Languedoc-Rousillon tot 240€/ha voor gespecialiseerde tuinbouw in Basse-
Normandie. Met het oogpunt op gedeeltelijke herkoppeling van subsidies in de veeteeltsector, deel 
uitmakend van het vrijwillige gekoppelde steunprogramma, en tegemoetkomend aan heterogeniteit in de 
landbouwerspopulatie, onderzoeken we de beleidsoptie van een premium per hectare blijvend grasland. Een 
verhoging van het concurrentievermogen van blijvend grasland zou uiteindelijk resulteren in een verlaging 
van voederkosten en een ondersteuning van de veeteeltsector op zich. De resultaten tonen aan dat een 
premium van 100€/ha voor blijvend grasland voor alle boeren in Frankrijk ervoor kan zorgen dat het 
blijvend grasland ten minste op het niveau van 2009 blijft. Bovendien zou een premium per hectare de 
diversificatie op bedrijfsniveau verhogen door de productie van vee te stimuleren voor elk bedrijfstype, 
waardoor de link tussen akkerbouw en veeteelt op het niveau van individuele bedrijven wordt versterkt. Een 
dergelijke beleid zou binnen de huidige budgettering passen en zou 78% (720M€) van het budget voor het 
vrijwillige gekoppelde steunprogramma vertegenwoordigen. Een gedifferentieerd premium voor blijvend 
grasland, afhankelijk van bedrijfstype en regio, zou het totale budget met een factor tien reduceren van 
720M€ tot 72M€. We kunnen ons dus, vanuit het perspectief van kosten en baten, afvragen of het argument 
van een ‘gelijk speelveld’ voor alle landbouwers wel opgaat.  
Vervolgens introduceren we het concept van een capaciteitsbetaling en stellen we voor dat 
braakland kan worden beschouwd als reserve landbouwcapaciteit. Het idee hierachter is dat landbouwers in 
tijden van lage verkoopprijzen een prikkel krijgen om grond uit productie te halen, en vice-versa in het geval 
van hoge verkoopprijzen. In die configuratie zou braakland niet alleen een rol spelen in de voorziening van 
milieugoederen, maar ook in het afvlakken van inkomensvolatiliteit. Om rekening te houden met 
prijsonzekerheid, gaan we ervan uit dat landbouwers kennis hebben van hun verkoopprijzen en de 
hoeveelheid capaciteitsbetaling die ze zullen ontvangen wanneer ze beslissen over hun landgebruik. Het 
model houdt echter geen rekening met het onderscheid tussen future prijzen en beursprijzen. Daarom 
nemen we aan dat landbouwers  zichzelf beschermen bij hun beslissing over landgebruik, door hun 
verkoopprijzen vast te pinnen doormiddel van future markten of termijncontracten. Onze resultaten tonen 
aan dat, door de prijsrisico’s te bundelen in één beleidsinstrument en deze te linken met braakland, we een 
grotere oppervlakte met braakland verkrijgen dan wat vereist is door het huidige beleid. Tegelijkertijd 
vermindert de productie in geval van lage verkoopprijzen, waardoor de inkomensvolatiliteit afneemt.  
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De EU voerde de vergroening van het GLB in om klimaatverandering aan te pakken, maar 
tegelijkertijd zorgde ze voor de herinvoering van steun gekoppeld aan productie, wat door de OESO als 
milieuonvriendelijk wordt beschouwd. We stellen dat gekoppelde steun gelinkt moet zijn met de 
verschaffing van milieugoederen. Gekoppelde steun voor blijvend grasland zou niet enkel de totale 
oppervlakte blijvend grasland verhogen, maar de landbouwers ook een prikkel geven om hun 
beheerspraktijken te veranderen. Daarnaast zou het een indirect effect hebben op landbouwers die 
momenteel onder het vrijwillige gekoppelde steunprogramma vallen. Bovendien vertonen bepaalde 
beleidsinstrumenten sterke synergie-effecten. Een contracyclische betaling gekoppeld aan milieuvriendelijke 
praktijken zou het gedrag van landbouwers ten aanzien van risico’s in rekening brengen, terwijl de 
voorziening van milieugoederen zou worden verkregen aan de laagste kost. Het in  rekening brengen van 
natuurlijk kapitaal en het formaliseren van de link met de voorziening van milieugoederen vormt een 
uitdaging. Landbouwgrond kan worden beschouwd als een voorraad natuurlijk kapitaal die 
landbouwproducten verschaft en ecosysteemdiensten verstrekt die door mensen worden gewaardeerd. De 
formalisering van een dergelijke aanpak door beleidsmakers kan ervoor zorgen dat er meer transparante 
beleidsinstrumenten worden ontwikkeld, rekening houdend met de bestaande trade-offs en synergiën tussen 
landbouwcapaciteit, landbouwproductie en ecosysteemdiensten. 
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